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AN INFERENCE ABOUT INTERFERENCE: A SURPRISING
APPLICATION OF EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO
INHIBIT ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS
DAVID A. KOPLOW*
Outer space presents an exceptionally challenging operational
environment. The exoatmospheric world is simultaneously: a)
tremendously important, with a growing population of satellites
now essential for performing or supporting the full array of civil
and military functions; b) inescapably hazardous, with spacecraft
vulnerable to both parlous natural phenomena and human-caused
disruptions; and c) politically resistant to additional regulation,
with spacefaring countries, notably including the United States,
reluctant to agree to meaningful new legal limitations.
This article examines the conjunction of these unique
circumstances, in the particular case of dangerous and
destabilizing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. It contends that
existing international law can be patched together in a surprising
way, to provide a modicum of unanticipated protection to
satellites, even in the absence of any new treaty. Little-noticed
shards of the existing arms control legal regime related to outer
space can be reconceptualized, rendering illegal many current and
future contemplated tests and operational uses of ASAT weapons,
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and thereby promoting international peace and security in a way
that has to date escaped international attention.
The article is organized as follows. Section 1 provides the key
background, concisely surveying the three critical characteristics of
the outer space ecosystem noted above. It briefly presents the
multifarious uses of satellites for peaceful and warlike purposes
and the likely growth of this reliance in the future; it highlights the
dangers that those spacecraft inevitably face, especially the
emerging crisis of human-created orbital debris; and it notes the
relative paucity of recent space law and the political stalemate
occluding the development of new norms.
Section 2 collects more detail regarding one particular type of
satellite: those that serve as critical components of the “national
technical means (NTM) of verification.” These include the
photoreconnaissance and other sensor and communications
satellites that enable a party to an arms control treaty to monitor
the activities of the other participants, ensuring mutual compliance
with the obligations. There are not many such NTM satellites, but
they are among the most important breed, for their unencumbered
operation is essential to promoting mutual confidence among
suspicious armed rivals.
Section 3 marshals the law regarding NTM, especially the
provisions, now common in arms control treaties, through which
parties pledge not to “interfere” with these crucial yet delicate
orbiters.
Many treaties—but by no means all—include
substantially similar passages, and more can be anticipated in the
future.
Section 4 focuses on ASATs, highlighting the modern and
emerging dangers inherent in the testing or use of these satellitehunting weapons. The threat is especially pronounced regarding
the types of ASATs that accomplish their functions via explosions
or high-speed collisions with their targets (in contrast to systems
relying upon “directed energy” mechanisms, such as lasers)
because these generate plumes of long-lasting, hazardous orbital
debris.
Section 5 presents the thesis: the argument that the NTMprotection provisions of arms control treaties already prohibit the
testing and use of destructive, debris-creating ASATs, because it is
foreseeable that the resulting cloud of space junk will, sooner or
later, impermissibly interfere with the operation of another state’s
NTM satellite, such as by colliding with it or causing it to
maneuver away from its preferred orbital parameters into a safer,
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but less useful, location. If sustained, this thesis would be
surprising, providing a heretofore-unnoticed legal constraint upon
ASATs, and perhaps helping to catalyze other, more
comprehensive efforts to rein in these devices and protect all
satellites, regardless of function or nationality.
Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding thoughts, including
the concession that a new treaty, or even a new non-legallybinding set of “rules of the road” for the safe and mutuallyrespectful conduct of activities in space, would be a much more
advantageous method for dealing comprehensively with the ASAT
problem. But if intractable political factors currently preclude
additional explicit measures of arms control in the space domain,
then this sort of incremental, unanticipated interpretation of
existing international legal rules can make a small, useful
contribution.
1.

BACKGROUND

Despite a persistent constellation of dangers, outer space has
assumed primary importance for the United States and much of
the rest of the world, as the preferred venue for a swelling host of
critical civil and military applications.
An early flurry of
innovative international lawmaking empowered and facilitated
those enterprises, but has regrettably given way to a more recent
legal hiatus, as elaborated below.
1.1. The Strong, Diverse, and Growing Exploitation of Outer Space
Almost 1100 operational satellites today perform or contribute
to the full array of essential services to governments, industry, and
consumers.1
Space assets have revolutionized modern

1 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. & U.S. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE,
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE STRATEGY: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY 1 (2011), available at
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/NationalSecurit
ySpaceStrategyUnclassifiedSummary_Jan2011.pdf; Ambassador Gregory L.
Schulte, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Space Policy, U.S. Dept. of Def.,
Presentation at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies: Protecting
Global Security in Space 1 (May 9, 2012), available at http://
photos.state.gov/libraries/singapore/231771/PDFs/Schulte_GlobalSecurityinSpa
ce.pdf; SPACE SECURITY INDEX 24, 31 (Cesar Jaramillo ed., 2013) [hereinafter Space
Security Index 2013], available at http://www.spacesecurity.org/SSI2013.pdf;
UNION
OF
CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS,
UCS
SATELLITE
DATABASE,
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons
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communications, weather forecasting, banking, and navigation;
advanced applications in mapping, earth resources monitoring,
and search-and-rescue functions have likewise become so
ubiquitous as to largely escape daily notice.2 The satellite-enabled
revolution in military affairs is no less striking: aircraft, ships, and
drones guided by Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites,
dispense their own GPS-reliant “smart bombs”; an insatiable
demand for additional bandwidth for satellite communications in
combat has forever altered command relationships; and the ability
to use space assets to reconnoiter over the horizon has transformed
battlefield operations.3

/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). See
Brian Weeden, The Numbers Game: What’s in Earth Orbit and How Do We Know?,
SPACE REV. (July 13, 2009), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1417/1?
iframe=true&width=95%&height=95% (reporting uncertainty about the precise
numbers of active and inactive artificial satellites in orbit).
2 Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 42–43; SPACE SECURITY INDEX 85,
89–99 (Cesar Jaramillo ed., 2012) [hereinafter Space Security Index 2012], available
at http://www.spacesecurity.org/SpaceSecurityReport2012.pdf. See EUR. SPACE
POLICY INST., REPORT 25, CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES FOR SATELLITE EARTH OBSERVATION
(Matxalen Sanchez Aranzamendi, Rainer Sandau & Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds., 2010);
Peter L. Hays, Space and the Military, in SPACE AND DEFENSE POLICY 150, 155–56
(Damon Coletta & Frances T. Pilch eds., 2009) (identifying space as an “economic
center of gravity” for the United States, subject to a “gold rush” of commercial
exploitation); FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 3, 411–14
(2009) (surveying use of space assets for multiple purposes, especially remote
sensing); NASA, OFF. OF THE CHIEF TECHNOLOGIST, SPINOFF 2012 (2012), available at
http://spinoff.nasa.gov/Spinoff2012/pdf/Spinoff2012.pdf (identifying forty-four
technologies that were developed for the U.S. space program that now have
terrestrial economic and commercial applications in robotics, biomedicine,
semiconductors, solar energy, and elsewhere); GPS Applications, GPS.GOV,
http://www.gps.gov/applications/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2013) (providing
“Official U.S. Government information about the Global Positioning System (GPS)
and related topics”). See generally EVIDENCE FROM EARTH OBSERVATION SATELLITES:
EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES (Ray Purdy & Denise Leung eds., 2013) (discussing
applications of satellite data in environmental monitoring and domestic and
international criminal prosecutions).
3 See CENAN AL-EKABI, EUR. SPACE POLICY INST., REPORT 42, SPACE POLICIES,
ISSUES
AND
TRENDS
IN
2011/2012,
63
(2012),
available
at
http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/studies/ESPI_Report_42.pdf
(highlighting the use of military and commercial space assets in the hunt for
Osama Bin Laden); TODD HARRISON, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & BUDGETARY
ASSESSMENTS, THE FUTURE OF MILSATCOM 3 (2013), available at
http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2013/07/the-future-of-milsatcom/
(“The U.S. military now relies on space-based systems for a number of core
enabling capabilities.”); Hays, supra note 2, at 159–72; Space Security Index 2013,
supra note 1, at 65–66; Space Security Index 2012, supra note 2, at 105–15; Peter L.
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The United States is the path-breaker on many of these space
applications. For example, the U.S. military outspends the rest of
the world combined on military space applications and commands
half the world’s dedicated military space assets.4 But other
countries have not ceded the “high ground” to the United States,
and they, too, appreciate the strategic and tactical advantages
satellites can offer.5 On the civilian side, the global commercial
Hays, Space and Sino-American Security Relations, in 2 SPACE AND DEFENSE 18, at 19,
28
(Winter
2009)
[hereinafter
Hays,
Sino-American],
available
at
http://www.usafa.edu/df/dfe/dfer/centers/ecsds/docs/Space_and_Defense_2
_3.pdf (observing that in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, less than eight percent
of the air-delivered ordnance used by U.S. forces was precision-guided (none
guided by GPS satellites), while in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, almost
seventy percent of U.S. air-delivered bombs were precision-guided, mostly by
GPS); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 499–532 (surveying the military use of
outer space); Petr Topychkanov, Features of the Outer Space Environment, in OUTER
SPACE: WEAPONS, DIPLOMACY, AND SECURITY 3, 10–13 (Alexei Arbatov & Vladimir
Dvorkin eds., 2010) (providing Russian perspective on outer space as a sphere of
military operations).
4 AL-EKABI, supra note 3, at 16, 60 (estimating the U.S. military space budget
as constituting between seventy-five percent and ninety-five percent of the
world’s total); Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 67–70; Space Security
Index 2012, supra note 2, at 20, 105–06; Paul Meyer, Failure to Launch? Why the EU’s
Proposed International Code of Conduct for Outer Space is Running Low on Diplomatic
Fuel, OPENCANADA.ORG (Feb. 28, 2013), http://opencanada.org/features/thethink-tank/essays/failure-to-launch/ (chart listing number of military satellites
by country); Debra Werner, US Military Space Spending Set at $8 Billion for 2014,
SPACE.COM (Apr. 17, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.space.com/20702-united-statesmilitary-space-budget-2014.html (outlining key aspects of the U.S. Defense
Department’s budget plan request for 2014).
5 Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 67, 71–72 (Russia), 72–73 (China),
73 (India), 68, 73–75 (other countries); Space Security Index 2012, supra note 2, at
115–118 (Russia), 118–120 (China), 120–21 (India), 122–25 (other countries); ALEKABI, supra note 3, at 63–69 (describing military space programs of several
countries; Russia, in particular, operates sixty to seventy military satellites and
plans to launch 100 additional satellites in the next decade); Hays, Sino-American,
supra note 3, at 29–30 (describing China’s increasing use of military satellites);
HARRISON, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that during the Cold War, space was a
sanctuary for the U.S. military, but conditions have changed since then); U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2013 65 (2013), available
at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf
(describing
China’s increasing use of space-based imaging systems); Barry D. Watts, Ctr. for
Strategic & Budgetary Assessments, Testimony Presented Before the U.S.-China
Econ. & Sec. Rev. Comm’n: The Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space
Programs 4 (2011), available at http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2011/
05/the-implications-of-chinas-military-and-civil-space-programs/ (presenting a
view of the vital role that information will play in future high-tech wars, and
stating that China “has no choice but to invest in the capability to get information
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space industry has largely rebounded from the economic
downturn and today posts annual revenues estimated as exceeding
$200 billion.6 Increasingly, the traditional dividing lines between
public and private, or between military and civilian, satellites have
become obscured, as governments rely more heavily upon the
private sector for routine needs or to supply a sudden surge
capacity.7 The United States, for example, has decreed an official
for its forces from space”); Jos Heyman, Briefing: MilComSats of the USSR/Russia,
MILSAT MAG., Mar. 2009, at 36, available at http://www.milsatmagazine.com/cgibin/display_article.cgi?number=1643982016 (describing Russia’s extensive use of
satellites for military communications); Japan Plans Satellites to Monitor Foreign
Ships in Territorial Waters, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 8, 2013, 3:34 AM),
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1277340/japan-launch-satellitesmonitor-oceans (noting Japanese plan to launch nine military satellites in the next
five years); Spacecraft, GUNTER’S SPACE PAGE, http://space.skyrocket.de/
directories/sat.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2013) (listing earth observation and
military satellites operated by many countries). See also Donna Miles, Am. Forces
Press Serv., Stratcom Strives to Build Coalitions for Space Operations, U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF. (May 14, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?
ID=120029 (stating that the U.S. military hopes to forge an international coalition
that shares assets and capabilities in space, comparable to the tight international
military-to-military cooperation that exists in other sectors).
6 AL-EKABI, supra note 3, at 15 (estimating global space revenue in 2011 at
$216.99 billion, reflecting substantial growth over prior years); NANCY GALLAGHER
& JOHN D. STEINBRUNER, AM. ACAD. OF ARTS & SCI., RECONSIDERING THE RULES FOR
SPACE SECURITY 16–18 (2008), available at http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/
files/spacesecuritymonograph.pdf (noting that commercial activities and
spending in space have displaced government activities and spending as the
predominant forces shaping space security); Space Security Index 2013, supra note
1, at 15, 54–63; SATELLITE INDUS. ASS’N, STATE OF THE SATELLITE INDUSTRY REPORT 6
(2012), available at http://www.sia.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Final2012-State-of-Satellite-Industry-Report.pdf (reporting growth in satellite revenue
and overall space industry revenue).
7 COMMERCIAL SATELLITE IMAGERY AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: A VIEW
FROM ABOVE passim (James F. Keeley & Rob Huebert eds., 2004); EVIDENCE FROM
EARTH OBSERVATION SATELLITES, supra note 2, at xxx (“Commercialization and
privatization of remote sensing activities started quite early.”); Raymond Jeanloz,
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and U.S. Security, in REYKJAVIK REVISITED:
STEPS TOWARD A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 369, 384 (George P. Shultz,
Steven P. Andreasen, Sidney D. Drell & James E. Goodby eds., 2008) (noting that
non-governmental organizations complement governments’ efforts to monitor
compliance with arms control treaties, independently focusing additional
observation assets on sensitive targets); MICHAEL KREPON & CHRISTOPHER CLARY,
HENRY L. STIMSON CTR., SPACE ASSURANCE OR SPACE DOMINANCE? THE CASE
AGAINST WEAPONIZING SPACE 16 (2003) (noting that during Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, forty-five percent of U.S. military communications
flowed through commercial satellites, whereas by the time of the Kosovo
campaign, that rate was up to eighty percent); Frank Pabian, Commercial Satellite
Imagery: Another Tool in the Nonproliferation Verification and Monitoring Toolkit, in
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policy of employing private sector satellite services for
governmental purposes—including military and intelligence
operations—as fully as possible.8
Moreover, the exploitation of outer space by an expanding
array of countries and private sector companies is likely to
continue to grow. The rate of launching new spacecraft was higher
NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, SECURITY, AND NONPROLIFERATION: ACHIEVING SECURITY
WITH TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY 221 (James E. Doyle ed., 2008); Space Security Index
2013, supra note 1, at 61–66; U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, THE ROLE OF
NORMS OF BEHAVIOUR IN AFRICAN OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 3 (2013) [hereinafter
AFRICAN OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES], available at http://unidir.org/files/
publications/pdfs/the-role-of-norms-of-behaviour-in-african-outer-spaceactivities-en-418.pdf (citing examples of South African satellites used for both
civilian and security purposes); P.J. Blount, Targeting in Outer Space: Legal Aspects
of Operational Military Actions in Space, HARVARD NAT’L SEC. J., Nov. 25, 2012, at 1,
9–15, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Targeting-in-OuterSpace-Blount-Final.pdf (describing military, civilian, commercial and other types
of satellites); Roger G. Harrison, Collins G. Shackelford & Deron R. Jackson, Space
Deterrence: The Delicate Balance of Risk, 3 SPACE & DEF., no. 1, Summer 2009, at 1, 22
n.35, available at http://www.usafa.edu/df/dfe/dfer/centers/ecsds/docs/Space
_and_Defense_3_1.pdf (quoting Air Force leader saying “[t]he health and safety of
some civilian satellites may become just as important to the outcome of an armed
conflict as those of dedicated military satellites”).
8 Fact Sheet from the White House on the U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing
Policy 2 (Apr. 25, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/
documents/ostp/press_release_files/fact_sheet_commercial_remote_sensing_pol
icy_april_25_2003.pdf (directing federal agencies to “[r]ely to the maximum
practical extent on U.S. commercial remote sensing space capabilities for filling
imagery and geospatial needs for military, intelligence, foreign policy, homeland
security, and civil users”); U.S. Dep’t of Def., Directive 3100.10, Space Policy 4
(Oct. 18, 2012) [hereinafter DoD Directive 3100.10] (“[P]roven commercial systems
and technologies will be used to the maximum practical extent.”); Space Security
Index 2012, supra note 2, at 100–02 (reporting that the U.S. government partners
with the private sector in remote sensing); id. at 100, 122 (noting that other
countries also use privately owned satellites to perform military functions or
purchase data and services from private space companies); Press Release, Off. of
the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, DNI Blair Announces Plan for the Next Generation
of Electro-optical Satellites (Apr. 7, 2009), available at http://www.
gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB404/docs/27.pdf (stating that the
Department of Defense and Intelligence Community will increase their use of
satellite imagery available through U.S. commercial providers); Sandra I. Erwin,
Satellite Shortages May Choke Off Military Drone Expansion, NAT’L DEF. MAG., Apr.
2013,
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2013/April/Pages/
SatelliteShortagesMayChokeOffMilitaryDroneExpansion.aspx
(forecasting
increased collaboration between public and private satellite systems to support
military’s increasing demand for bandwidth); William L. Shelton, Military Space–
At a Strategic Crossroad, MILSAT MAG., Oct. 2013, at 66, available at
http://www.milsatmagazine.com/story.php?number=228336512 (detailing how
the U.S. Air Force stresses the value of commercially-hosted satellite payloads).
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in 2011 than at any point in the prior decade, totaling 80 launches,
and placing 126 satellites into orbit.9 New countries and new
companies have continued to enter the market—Estonia recently
became the forty-first country to command its own satellite10—and
polyglot consortia of public and private operators from multiple
states have proliferated. For example, the U.S. military recently
leased satellite services from erstwhile rival China. This one-year
$10.7 million deal for a Chinese Apstar-7 satellite will provide
essential communications services for American troops in Africa,
where Chinese telecommunications coverage is expansive.11 Novel
applications of simple, low-cost, miniaturized “nanosatellites” are
the latest fad in space, as diverse schemes for accelerating
exploitation of the regime continue to proliferate.12
9 Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 120–23 (listing spacecraft
launched in 2012); Space Security Index 2012, supra note 2, at 11, 31. But see
Satellite Statistics: Launches, JONATHAN’S SPACE REPORT, http://www.
planet4589.org/space/log/stats1.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) (noting that the
annual rate of satellite launches was much higher during the Cold War era than
today).
10 AFRICAN OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES, supra note 7, at 1 (“Space-based services,
once the privilege of a select few states, have reached users of every level of
economic and social development, including in the Asia-Pacific region, Latin
America, and particularly Africa.”); Ajey Lele, Outer Space Comes Closer to a
Regime, INST. FOR DEF. STUDIES & ANALYSES (May 20, 2013),
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Outerspacecomesclosertoaregime_alele_200
513. See also Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 44–46, 53 (discussing the
plethora of nations beginning or expanding existing outer space presence); Donna
Miles, Am. Forces Press Serv., Stratcom Shares Space Data to Promote Safety,
Transparency, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119775 (“Sixty nations are now considered ‘spacefaring,’ with others anxious to join them . . . .”).
11 Tony Capaccio, Pentagon Continues Use of China Satellite in New Lease,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 15, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-1
5/pentagon-continues-use-of-china-satellite-in-new-lease.html; Noah Shachtman,
Pentagon Paying China–Yes, China–to Carry Data, WIRED.COM (Apr. 29, 2013),
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/04/china-pentagon-satellite/.
12 Werner Balogh, The Role of Binding and Non-Binding Norms in the
Implementation of Small Satellite Programmes, in SOFT LAW IN OUTER SPACE: THE
FUNCTION OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 325-42 (Irmgard
Marboe ed., 2012); Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 44-46; U.S. AIR FORCE
SPACE COMMAND, RESILIENCY AND DISAGGREGATED SPACE ARCHITECTURES: WHITE
PAPER (2013), available at http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/
AFD-130821-034.pdf; David Axe, After $200 Million, Darpa Gives Up on FormationFlying Satellites, WIRED.COM (May 17, 2013), http://www.wired.com/
dangerroom/2013/05/formation-flying-satellites; Anita Bernie, Small Satellites: InOrbit Operational Solutions Are at Hand, MILSAT MAG., Jan. 2013, at 20, available at
http://www.milsatmagazine.com/cgi-bin/display_article.cgi?number=1517707
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With this increased usefulness of outer space has arisen an
inescapable vulnerability. As the world appreciates and exploits
the benefits of satellite operations, growing accustomed to the
reliable delivery of essential services, it is inevitable that countries
have become reliant upon those satellites and have forgotten or
discarded some of the alternative routines. Some crucial terrestrial
assets, for both civilian and military application, may be falling
into desuetude, and serious, prolonged interruption of satellite
services could now have grave consequences.13 Pursuit of ASAT

651; David Samuels, The Watchers, WIRED.COM (June 19, 2013), http://www.
wired.com/wiredscience/2013/06/ startup-skybox; Noah Shachtman, With New
Mini-Satellites, Special Ops Takes Its Manhunt Into Space, WIRED.COM (May 21, 2013)
http://www.wired.com/ dangerroom/2013/05/special-ops-mini-sats-manhunts;
Andrea Shalal-Esa, U.S. Air Force Eyes Mixed Approach for Next Weather Satellite,
REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2013, 2:21 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/
us-airforce-satellites-idUSBRE938 0XD20130409 (explaining that the next
generation of U.S. Air Force weather satellites will include smaller, less expensive
craft); Shelton, supra note 8 (discussing the U.S. Air Force pursuit of
“disaggregation,” favoring multiple small, simple, inexpensive satellites); Theresa
Hitchens, Saving Space: Threat Proliferation and Mitigation 7 (Int’l Comm’n on
Nuclear Non-proliferation & Disarmament, Research Paper, 2009) [hereinafter
Hitchens, Saving Space], available at http://icnnd.org/Documents/Hitchens
_Saving_Space.pdf, (“400 micro-sats have been orbited over the last 20 years.”);
News Release, NASA, NASA Successfully Launches Three Smartphone Satellites
(Apr. 22, 2013), available at http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2013/apr/
HQ_13-107_Phonesat.html.
13 Space Security Index 2012, supra note 2, at 106 (“[T]he United States is the
nation most dependent on its space systems.”); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION TO ASSESS UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE MANAGEMENT
AND ORGANIZATION 9 (2001) [hereinafter Rumsfeld Commission], available at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/space20010111.html (expressing concern about
growing U.S. dependence on space, and the vulnerabilities it creates); Jesse
Oppenheim, Danger at 700,000 Feet: Why the United States Needs to Develop a Kinetic
Anti-Satellite Missile Technology Test-Ban Treaty, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 761, 789-90
(2013) (identifying the extreme reliance upon satellites as the U.S. military’s
“Achilles heel”); Tom Wilson, Threats to United States Space Capabilities, FED’N OF
AM. SCIENTISTS, Jan. 2001, at 1, 2, 9, available at http://www.fas.org/spp/
eprint/article05.html (“[T]he United States’ increasing economic and military
dependence on space creates a vulnerability that is an attractive target for our
foreign adversaries.”); US Army Seeks New Technology to Replace GPS, PHYS.ORG
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://phys.org/news/2013-04-army-technology-gps.html
(explaining that U.S. reliance upon Global Positioning Satellites has become a
vulnerability).
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capabilities, as elaborated infra, is therefore neither surprising nor
recent.14
1.2. The Permanent and Growing Hazards to Space Operations
The milieu in which this growing assembly of satellites
operates is far from benign and stable. As the U.S. Department of
Defense describes it, space is “increasingly congested, competitive
and contested.”15 While the growing population of satellites
continuously jockeys for position, both natural and human-caused
risks persist.
Inescapable natural phenomena, ranging from solar flares to
radiation belts to meteoroids, make the remote vacuum a most
unforgiving and costly habitation.16 Anthropogenic problems
include competition for the best satellite “parking places”—outer
space is a big place, but not all locations within it are equally
valuable, and the first to occupy a particular orbit may pre-empt,
14 See infra section 4; Shelton, supra note 8 (noting the U.S. Air Force Space
Command leader’s warning that U.S. reliance upon satellites carries great
advantages, but also vulnerabilities).
15 NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 1 (emphasis removed);
William J. Lynn, III, Deputy Sec’y of Def., Remarks on Space Policy at U.S.
Strategic Command Space Symposium (Nov. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1515; Schulte, supra
note 1, at 1-2. See also Rep. of the Grp. of Governmental Experts on Transparency
and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, at 9, U.N. Doc.
A/68/189 (July 29, 2013) [hereinafter Group of Governmental Experts], available at
http://www.unidir.org/files/medias/pdfs/final-report-29-july-2013-eng-0512.pdf (documenting UN expert group adopting the concept that space is
“congested, contested, and competitive”); JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE, HEAVENLY
AMBITIONS: AMERICA’S QUEST TO DOMINATE SPACE (2009) [hereinafter JOHNSONFREESE, HEAVENLY AMBITIONS] (discussing origins of the current U.S. approach to
space security).
16 DAVID WRIGHT, LAURA GREGO & LISBETH GRONLUND, THE PHYSICS OF SPACE
SECURITY: A REFERENCE MANUAL 37-40 (2005) [hereinafter WRIGHT, GREGO &
GRONLUND] (discussing effects of radiation, atmosphere, and gravity on satellites);
Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 33-37 (discussing threat of collisions
with “Near Earth Objects,” including asteroids and comets); James Marson &
Gautam Naik, Falling Meteor Explodes Over Russia, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2013, 6:37
PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873241623045783051635745
97722.html (describing two dangerous and prominent near-simultaneous space
events: a meteorite falling into Siberia, causing significant damage, and a larger
asteroid passing close enough to earth to be inside the orbit of many satellites);
Brad Plumer, When Space Weather Attacks!, WASH. POST (July 13, 2013), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/13/whenspace-weather-attacks.
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or be jostled by, late arrivals.17 Electronic communications to and
from satellites similarly rely upon a relatively narrow selection of
optimal frequency bands, and the demand for those
communications links exceeds the supply.18
Satellites are
inherently vulnerable; efforts to improve resiliency, by physically
or technically hardening them against the various hazards, are
expensive and can have only limited effect.19
Among the worst, and most rapidly growing, perils for space
operations is the specter of space debris—the leftover “junk” from
earlier launches, including expended rocket bodies, dysfunctional
satellites, castoff parts, bolts that are used to hold and release a
satellite from its launching rocket, discarded hardware, lost
equipment, and human garbage.20 Satellite breakups—explosions
17 Space Security Index 2012, supra note 2, at 27-28, 39 (noting international
friction over the limited availability of the optimal orbital slots); Phillip J. Baines,
The Security Dimensions of Space Traffic Management, in UNITED NATIONS INST. FOR
DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE: 50 YEARS OF SPACE
TECHNOLOGY, 40 YEARS OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY: CONFERENCE REPORT 189 (2007)
[hereinafter CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE]; Petr Lála, Study on Space Traffic
Management by the International Academy of Astronautics, in CELEBRATING THE SPACE
AGE, supra; Peter Hulsroj, Three Sources—No River: A Hard Look at the Sources of
Public International Law with Particular Emphasis on Custom and “General Principles of
Law,” 54 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 219 (1999); Miles, supra note 5
(quoting a U.S. military official discussing geosynchronous orbit: “Those specific
spots and those orbits are increasingly scarce, increasingly expensive and
increasingly sought after”).
18 Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 31-33; Space Security Index 2012,
supra note 2, at 27-28, 38-39 (noting that competition over radiofrequency is
currently not epidemic, but is a growing concern). See also id. at 63-64 (describing
alleged incidents of deliberate radiofrequency interference). See also NATIONAL
SECURITY SPACE STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 2 (noting “increasing congestion in the
radiofrequency spectrum”); Amaani Lyle, Official Addresses Diminishing
Government Frequency Spectrum, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. (May 15, 2013),
http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=120052
(reporting
reduced frequency bandwidth available to U.S. military users).
19 Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 78-82; Space Security Index 2012,
supra note 2, at 129-36; GALLAGHER & STEINBRUNER, supra note 6, at 3-4; U.S.
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS,
COUNTERMEASURES, AND ARMS CONTROL 75-86 (1985) [hereinafter OTA] (discussing
possible responses to an ASAT threat); Harrison, Shackelford & Jackson, supra
note 7, at 12; Yousaf Butt, Can Space Weapons Protect U.S. Satellites?, BULL. OF THE
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (July 22, 2008, 9:07 AM), http://thebulletin.org/can-spaceweapons-protect-us-satellites.
20 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Scientific & Technical
Subcomm., Technical Report on Space Debris, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/720 (1999)
[hereinafter Technical Report]; HEINER KLINKRAD, SPACE DEBRIS: MODELS AND RISK
ANALYSIS 5-58 (2006); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 304, nn. 125-27 (discussing
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caused by unexpended fuel in abandoned booster rockets or
chemical reactions in batteries—are a major, erratic, and
unpredictable contributor to the problem.21 Every space launch
and other activity produces some quantity of this litter, but careless
operations or unforeseen accidents can contribute excessively to
the miasma.22
a glove, a camera, a tool bag, a golf ball, garbage, and urine lost in space at
various times); ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAM OFF., NASA, HISTORY OF ON-ORBIT
SATELLITE FRAGMENTATIONS (14th ed., 2008), available at http://orbitaldebris
.jsc.nasa.gov/library/SatelliteFragHistory/TM-2008-214779.pdf;
Steven
A.
Mirmina, Reducing the Proliferation of Orbital Debris: Alternatives to a Legally Binding
Instrument, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 649 (2005) [hereinafter Mirmina, Alternatives]; Peter
B. de Selding, Debris-Control Report Card Cites Improvement by Geo Sat Owners,
SPACE NEWS (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.spacenews.com/article/satellitetelecom/37861debris-control-report-card-cites-improvement-by-geo-sat-owners
(observing that debris, including defunct satellites, is becoming an increasing
problem even at high altitude orbits); Orbital Debris: Frequently Asked Questions,
NASA ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAM OFF., http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html
(last updated Mar. 2012); Peter Vorsmann, Space Debris, TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT
BRAUNSCHWIG (Dec. 18, 2010), https://www.tu-braunschweig.de/ilr/forschung
/raumfahrttechnik/spacedebris.
21 ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAM OFF., NASA, HISTORY OF ON-ORBIT SATELLITE
FRAGMENTATIONS (14th ed. 2008), available at http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.
gov/library/SatelliteFragHistory/TM-2008-214779.pdf; NASA, Four Satellite
Breakups in February Add to Debris Population, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, Apr. 2007,
at 1, 3, available at http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv
11i2.pdf; Orbital Debris: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 20. See generally
Steven A. Hildreth and Allison Arnold, Threats to U.S. National Security Interests in
Space: Orbital Debris Mitigation and Removal, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43353 (2014),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43353.pdf.
22 Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 23-30; Space Security Index 2012,
supra note 2, at 32-33, 36-37 (noting increased awareness about space debris, and
the development and implementation of additional efforts to mitigate the
problem); Technical Report, supra note 20, at 31 (reporting that in 1999,
approximately twelve percent of the catalogued space debris consisted of objects
discarded during normal satellite operations); GALLAGHER & STEINBRUNER, supra
note 6, at 21 (noting frustrated expectations that outer space might be regulated as
a “global commons” to reduce incidence of unregulated pollution); NASA,
HANDBOOK FOR LIMITING ORBITAL DEBRIS, 8719.14, (2008) [hereinafter NASA
HANDBOOK], available at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/doctree/
NHBK871914.pdf; Jessica West, Next Generation Space Security Challenges, in U.N.
INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, SEC. IN SPACE: THE NEXT GENERATION,
CONFERENCE REPORT 35, 38-39, (noting the space situational awareness capabilities
of several countries); David Wright, Space Debris, PHYSICS TODAY, Oct. 2007, at 35
available at http://scitation.aip.org/content/aip/magazine/physicstoday/article
/60/10/10.1063/1.2800252; Paul B. Larsen, Outer Space Traffic Safety Standards
(paper presented at McGill University May 2013) (forthcoming, on file with
author). Some of what is now considered harmful debris was originally sent into
space with benign motivations. For example, in Project West Ford, 1961-63, the
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The distinctive feature of this orbital debris is its persistence.
Debris deposited at relatively low altitudes will sooner or later
degrade and fall back to earth, but junk that initiates at altitudes
above about 600 kilometers can remain aloft for years, decades, or
even centuries.23
It is impossible to know precisely how much space debris is
now whizzing around in orbit.
The U.S. military’s Space
Surveillance Network, comprising some two dozen radars and
telescopes, is generally able to monitor objects that are roughly ten
centimeters in diameter or larger; it tracks some 22,000 such items.
There are an estimated 500,000 objects of orbital debris larger than
one centimeter, and perhaps 100 million that are smaller.24
U.S. military placed into orbit 480 million magnetized two-centimeter copper
needles, intending to facilitate global radio communications. Clumps of these
dipoles have remained in space, posing a hazard. LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at
297; DELBERT R. TERRILL JR., THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL
OUTER SPACE LAW 63-68 (2009); Oppenheim, supra note 13, at 769; West Ford
Needles: Where Are They Now, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, Oct. 2013, at 3, 4, available at
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv17i4.pdf.
23 Space Security Index 2012, supra note 2, at 28, 32.
24 Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 23-26; Space Security Index 2012,
supra note 2, at 11, 29, 31, 45-47 (noting that the system is able to track 22,000
objects in space, and to catalog (i.e., to identify and attribute to a particular
launching state) 17,000 of those); TIFFANY CHOW, SECURE WORLD FOUND., SPACE
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS SHARING PROGRAM: AN SWF ISSUE BRIEF (2011), available at
swfound.org/media/3584/ssa_sharing_program_issue_brief_nov2011.pdf;
KLINKRAD, supra note 20, at 27-47 (describing other systems for tracking space
objects); NASA HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 42-61 (describing capabilities and
operations of Space Surveillance Network); JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (6th ed. 2012) at 270-91; MICHAEL T. VALLEY, SEAN P.
KEARNEY & MARK ACKERMANN, SANDIA NAT’L LABORATORIES, SMALL SPACE OBJECT
IMAGING: LDRD FINAL REPORT (2009), available at http://prod.sandia.gov/techlib/
access-control.cgi/2009/090692.pdf; BRIAN WEEDEN, SECURE WORLD FOUND.,
GOING BLIND: WHY AMERICA IS ON THE VERGE OF LOSING ITS SITUATIONAL
AWARENESS IN SPACE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2012) [hereinafter
WEEDEN, BLIND], available at http://swfound.org/media/90775/going_blind_
final.pdf; Bryan Bender, Raytheon Is in the Hunt for a $3B Space Project, BOSTON
GLOBE (May 21, 2013), available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/
nation/2013/05/20/defense-dollars-dwindle-fight-for-space-shield-contractrages/FOwIc4FEVzcsfXzTWCA4HN/story.html (describing efforts to develop
the improved Space Fence); Debris Detection Devs.—The Space Fence, MILSAT MAG.,
Feb. 2013, at 42, available at http://www.milsatmagazine.com/cgibin/display_article.cgi?number=1554778712 (describing development of the next
generation of radar, denominated as a replacement “Space Fence,” for improved
tracking of space objects); Miles, supra note 10; Brian Weeden, Gambling with a
Space Fence: An Analysis of the Decision to Shut Down the Air Force Space Surveillance
Fence, SPACE REVIEW (Aug. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Weeden, Gambling], available at
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The inventory of space debris continues to increase inexorably;
the catalogued population grew by 7.8% from 2010 to 2011, despite
a period of good luck in avoiding any new major fragmentation
events.25
The reason why space experts are sounding such shrill alarms
over space debris is the clear, present, and growing danger of
damaging and even disastrous collisions. The indiscriminate
detritus travels through space at speeds up to 7.8 kilometers per
second in low orbit, so any wayward piece that strikes a satellite
can inflict calamitous harm.26 The European Space Agency has
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2357/1; Orbital Debris: Frequently Asked
Questions, supra note 20. See generally, EUR. SPACE AGENCY, 6TH EUROPEAN
CONFERENCE ON SPACE DEBRIS (2013), available at http://www.slideshare.net/
esaops/6th-european-conference-on-space-debris; Space Security Index 2013,
supra note 1, at 39; Space Security Index 2012, supra note 2, at 47-49 (discussing
space observational capabilities of other countries); Don’t Touch Their Junk: USAF’s
SSA Tracking Space Debris, DEF. INDUS. DAILY (July 23, 2013), available at http://
www.defenseindustrydaily.com/air-force-awards-first-phase-of-next-generationspace-fence-05511; Space Debris, EUR. SPACE AGENCY, available at
http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_ Debris (last visited Mar.
31, 2014). But see Mike Gruss, Space Fence Shutdown Expected to Weaken Orbit
Surveillance Network, SPACE NEWS (Aug. 9, 2013), available at http://www.
spacenews.com/article/military-space/36720space-fence-shutdown-expected-toweaken-orbit-surveillance-network (noting that Air Force funding shortfalls are
leading to the termination of a key component in the existing space surveillance
system).
25 Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 24 (noting a decrease, for the
first time in recent years, of 7.6% in the population of cataloged orbital debris in
2012); Space Security Index 2012, supra note 2, at 11, 29-31. See also Joseph S.
Imburgia, Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A Proposal for a Binding
International Agreement to Clean Up the Junk, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589, 599
(2011) (discussing the ever-increasing amount of space junk and its concomitant
dangers); Nicholas L. Johnson, Orbital Debris: The Growing Threat to Space
Operations, AM. ASTRONOMIAL SOC., 2010, at 1, available at http://www.ntrs.nasa.
gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100004498_2010003521.pdf (discussing
the unprecedented rate of increase of space debris and the increased need for
“collision avoidance maneuvers” in space). In 2012, the total inventory of tracked
orbital debris declined slightly because the quantity that de-orbited slightly
exceeded the amount of new debris created. Satellite Statistics: Space Debris
Population,
JONATHAN’S
SPACE
REPORT,
http://www.planet4589.org/
space/log/stats1.html.
26 Space Security Index 2012, supra note 2, at 27; MISSILE DEF. AGENCY, U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF., BALLISTIC MISSILE DEF. SYS. (BMDS), 1 PROGRAMMATIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 4-116, 4-132 (2007) (reporting that a space
impact with a fragment of debris ten centimeters long would be comparable to
twenty-five sticks of dynamite, and an one centimeter fragment collides with a
force comparable to a 400 pound weight traveling sixty miles per hour. Even a
speck of debris only 0.1 millimeter in size could penetrate an astronaut’s
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concluded that any impact in space with an object as large as ten
centimeters (roughly the size of a softball) “will most likely entail a
catastrophic disintegration of the target.”27 Even a relatively small
pellet, if it happened to strike a satellite at a vulnerable spot, could
prove fatal.28
One evocative illustration:
segments of the
windshield of the U.S. Space Shuttle, designed and built to
withstand the enormous stresses of re-entry into the earth’s
atmosphere, had to be repeatedly replaced because they were
irretrievably scratched by collisions with minute flecks of dried
paint space debris.29
Much more massive and consequential space crashes have
occurred, too. In July 1996, a small French military reconnaissance
satellite, Cerise, collided with debris from an Ariane rocket stage.

protective suit on a space walk); Technical Report, supra note 20, at 35; Kathy
Jones, Krista Fuentes & David Wright, A Minefield in Earth Orbit: How Space Debris
Is Spinning Out of Control [Interactive], SCI. AM. (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.
scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-space-debris-spinning-out-of-control
(noting that Russia, the United States, and China together account for ninety
percent of space debris); Steven A. Mirmina, The Ballistic Missile Defense System and
Its Effects on the Outer Space Environment, 31 J. SPACE L. 287, 301-02 (2005); Joel R.
Primack, Debris and Future Space Activities, in FUTURE SEC. IN SPACE: COMMERCIAL,
MILITARY, AND ARMS CONTROL TRADE-OFFS 18 (James Clay Moltz ed., Monterey
Inst., Ctr. for Nonproliferation Studies, Occasional Paper No. 10, July 2002).
27 Space Debris, EUR. SPACE AGENCY, http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/
Operations/Space_Debris/Hypervelocity_impacts_and_protecting_spacecraft
(last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
28 Space Security Index 2012, supra note 2, at 27 (assessing that a high-speed
impact in space with a ten centimeter piece of debris would carry the same kinetic
energy as a 35,000 kilogram truck traveling at 190 kilometers per hour); id at 28
(concluding that it is impractical to shield satellites against impacts with space
debris).
29 COMM. FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NASA’S ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAMS, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, LIMITING FUTURE COLLISION RISK TO SPACECRAFT: AN
ASSESSMENT OF NASA’S METEOROID AND ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAMS 50-51 (2011)
[hereinafter NATIONAL ACADEMY], available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php
?record_id=13244; MISSILE DEF. AGENCY, supra note 26, at 4-132; Orbital Debris
Success Story – A Decade in the Making, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, Apr. 2010, at 1,
available at http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv14i2.pdf
(noting that a collision with 0.2mm paint chip required Space Shuttle window to
be replaced); Primack, supra note 26 (quoting astronaut Sally Ride regarding paint
debris gouging space shuttle window on her first flight into space); Space Debris
and Human Spacecraft, NASA (Sept. 27, 2013) http://www.nasa.gov/mission
_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html.
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The impact severed a critical stabilizing boom and knocked Cerise
off course.30
Even more spectacularly, in February 2009, an operational U.S.
Iridium 33 satellite was blind-sided at 800 kilometers altitude by a
defunct Russian Cosmos 2251 satellite, fracturing both orbiters into
immense clouds of debris.31 No one is immune from this danger:
in May 2013, Pegasus (or Pegaso), a miniature Ecuadorian
satellite—the country’s first space effort—was operational for only
one week before it was bashed by debris fragments from a longdefunct Soviet rocket at 650 kilometers altitude, spinning it off
kilter and rendering it non-functional.32 In fact, the specter of a
30 Space Security Index 2012, supra note 2, at 30; KLINKRAD, supra note 20, at
233-34; Timothy P. Payne, First “Confirmed” Natural Collision Between Two Cataloged
Satellites,
393
EUR.
SPACE
AGENCY
597
(1997),
available
at
http://articles.adsabs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/nph-iarticle_query?1997ESASP.393..
597P&defaultprint=YES&filetype=.pdf; F. Alby, E. Lansard & T. Michal, Collision
of Cerise with Space Debris, Proceedings of the Second European Conference on Space
Debris, 393 EUR. SPACE AGENCY 587 (1997), available at http://adsabs.
harvard.edu/full/1997ESASP.393..589A (confirming the collision and noting that
Cerise continued to function even without its boom). See also NATIONAL
ACADEMY, supra note 29, at 13 (discussing four space collisions); Accidental
Collisions of Catalogued Satellites Identified, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, Apr. 2005, at 1,
available at http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=16201 (identifying
earlier instances of destructive collisions between catalogued items of space
debris).
31 NATIONAL ACADEMY, supra note 29, at 66–67; M. Matney, Small Debris
Observations from the Iridium 33/Cosmos 2251 Collision, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS,
Apr. 2010, at 6, available at http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/
pdfs/ODQNv14i2.pdf (reporting 1600 debris objects from that collision are being
catalogued and more than 2000 are being actively tracked). See also Tariq Malik,
Space Junk Forces ISS Astronauts to Take Shelter in ‘Lifeboat’ Capsules, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 24, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/24/space-junkiss-astronauts_n_1376963.html (noting that three years after the collision with the
Iridium satellite, debris from Cosmos 2251 flew so close to the International Space
Station that six astronauts aboard it entered escape pods).
32 Ecuador Pegasus Satellite Fears over Space Debris Crash, BBC NEWS (May 23,
2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22635671; EXA Space
Agency’s First Satellite Is Silent after Cube Is Hit + Run, SATNEWS.COM (Sept. 9, 2013),
http://www.satnews.com/story.php?number=2071574060; High-Speed Particle
Impacts Suspected in Two Spacecraft Anomalies, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, July 2013,
at 1, 2, available at http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/
ODQNv17i3.pdf (noting that investigation continues into the cause of Pegasus’s
disruption); Ian Steadman, Ecuador’s First Satellite Collides with Soviet Rocket Debris,
Possibly Survives, WIRED UK (May 24, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/
archive/2013-05/24/ecuador-satellite-crash; Ian Steadman, Ecuador Launches its
First Satellite, Has Webcam, Will Search for Asteroids, WIRED UK (Apr. 26, 2013),
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-04/26/first-ecuador-satellite.
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“chain reaction” collision—in which one impact generates a spray
of wreckage that cascades into other satellites or fragments, in turn
spinning additional percussions—is now all too likely.33
The ability to anticipate and dodge these hypervelocity
collisions is still under-developed, and shielding can be effective
against only the smallest particles.34
The U.S. monitoring
capability represents the global state of the art in space “situational
awareness,” and the United States has begun a practice of
providing “conjunction warnings” to some domestic and foreign
satellite operators whose assets are projected to come dangerously
close to known objects. It now sends these alerts twenty to thirty
times per day.35 But this remains a very inexact science: ninety33 See Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 23–24 (listing major
collisions between space objects); Space Security Index 2012, supra note 2, at 34–36
(warning that the prevalence of space debris may already approach a “tipping
point” known as the Kessler Syndrome, in which cascading collisions become
inevitable and irreversible); Technical Report, supra note 21, at 26; NATIONAL
ACADEMY, supra note 29, at 10–13; Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination
Comm., Stability of the Future LEO Environment 2, 17, Working Group 2, Action
Item
27.1,
IADC-12-08,
Rev.
1
(Jan.
2013),
http://www.iadconline.org/Documents/IADC-2012-08,%20Rev%201,%20Stability%20of%20
Future%20LEO%20Environment.pdf (stating that the debris population in low
earth orbit is already unstable, and will continue to grow despite remediation
efforts; catastrophic collisions are likely every five to nine years); J.-C. Liou, An
Update on LEO Environmental Remediation with Active Debris Removal, ORBITAL
DEBRIS Q. NEWS, Apr. 2011, at 4, 5, available at http://orbitaldebris.
jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv15i2.pdf
(estimating
numbers
of
“catastrophic collisions” in low earth orbit in coming years, under various
assumptions about the prevalence of debris); Brian Weeden, Overview of the Legal
and Policy Challenges of Orbital Debris Removal, 27 SPACE POLICY 38 (2011); Darren
McKnight & Donald Kessler, We’ve Already Passed the Tipping Point for Orbital
Debris, IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 26, 2012), http://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/
satellites/weve-already-passed-the-tipping-point-for-orbital-debris (arguing that
the “chain reaction” phenomenon has already started); Mike Wall, Destroyed
Russian Satellite Highlights Space Junk Threat, NBC NEWS (March 11, 2013),
http://science.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/11/17269924-destroyed-russiansatellite-highlights-space-junk-threat?lite (quoting estimates that the danger of a
collision in space has roughly doubled since 2007).
34 Technical Report, supra note 20, at 34 (concluding that protection against
debris particles smaller than 1 centimeter can be achieved, but larger objects
cannot be dealt with successfully); NASA HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 151–52;
Johnson, supra note 25, at 6.
35 DoD Directive 3100.10, supra note 8, at sec. 4.j(1) (determining that the
Department of Defense will provide ample warning and timely attribution of
hostile and natural events in space); Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 26,
37–40; Space Security Index 2012, supra note 2, at 52–53; CHOW, supra note 24, at 6;
WEEDEN, BLIND, supra note 24, at 6 (stating that the U.S. military plans to spend $4
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nine percent of the danger comes from particles too small to track;
sometimes the warnings do not come early enough to enable
evasive maneuvers; and no one can confidently specify exactly
how close the two space objects will come, or even which direction
or how far the risk-averse satellite should be moved.36 Moreover,
not all satellites have great maneuver capability; in any event,
significant course adjustments consume scarce fuel and require the
satellite to depart from its preferred trajectory, to adopt a less-thanoptimal position for some period of time.37
Collision-avoiding displacements have become more common,
as the population of space debris mushrooms and as awareness of
the threat grows; seventy-five such maneuvers were conducted in
2012.38 In March 2011, for example, the International Space Station
billion to improve space situational awareness); Miles, supra note 10 (detailing that
Stratcom has issued more than 10,000 warnings of potential collisions and
supported seventy-five “avoidance maneuvers”); Schulte, supra note 1, at 2
(reporting 1300 warnings issued in the past year).
36 CHOW, supra note 24, at 8 (noting that the information supplied by the SSA
sharing program “can be untimely and inaccurate,” and that U.S. legislation
shields the program from legal liability associated with defects or delays in the
information it provides); WEEDEN, BLIND, supra note 24, at 9 (noting a fifty percent
error rate in conjunction warnings); Johnson, supra note 25, at 6, 7 (noting that
“predicting the collision of two satellites remains a probabilistic endeavor” and
ninety percent of the risk comes from untrackable fragments); Malik, supra note 31
(noting that when debris from Cosmos 2251 flew dangerously close to the
International Space Station, the surveillance system did not provide sufficient
advance warning to enable the space station to undertake evasive maneuvers);
Brian Weeden, Dancing in the Dark: The Orbital Rendezvous of SJ-12 and SJ-06F,
SPACE REVIEW (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1689/1
(describing large error margins in calculating the exact location of space objects;
just before the 2009 Iridium-Cosmos collision, the best calculations had estimated
that the two spacecraft would miss each other by 600 meters).
37 See GALLAGHER & STEINBRUNER, supra note 6, at 3; JOHNSON-FREESE,
HEAVENLY AMBITIONS, supra note 15, at 70–71 (discussing the cost and difficulty of
changing a satellite’s orbit; a satellite carries only a fixed amount of fuel, giving it
only a limited capacity for maneuvering); NATIONAL ACADEMY, supra note 29, at 92
(“Shielding, debris avoidance maneuvers, and other efforts to avoid debris impact
increase the cost of spacecraft design and operation.” Some estimate these
expenditures as adding zero to ten percent to the mission cost); Orbital Debris:
Collision Avoidance: Conjunction Analysis, NASA, orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/
protect/collision_avoidance.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2013) (“Typically, satellites
cannot afford to maneuver unnecessarily . . . .”). But see Johnson, supra note 25, at
7 (stating that, in most cases, collision avoidance maneuvers “can be conducted in
a manner which does not waste propellant resources”).
38 Weeden, Gambling, supra note 24. See also Space Security Index 2013, supra
note 1, at 26–27, 40; CHOW, supra note 24, at 6 (reporting 126 evasive maneuvers in
2010).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/3

03_KOPLOW (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

AN INFERENCE ABOUT INTERFERENCE

6/30/2014 2:24 PM

755

(ISS) was alerted to the near approach of debris from the 2009
Iridium-Cosmos collision, and forced to initiate evasive
maneuvers.39 This was the fifth time in thirty months that the ISS
had been required to undertake avoidance operations,40 and the
frequency of those demands increased in the following year, with
four more required “dodge-ball” operations, and two additional
instances in which maneuvers would have been initiated, if the
conjunction warning had been more timely.41 When the alert
comes too late, the protocol calls for the ISS astronauts to board
escape modules, for a hasty undocking and return to earth, if the
debris fatally impairs the space station’s life support operations.42
Beyond ISS experiences, two Canadian radar satellites
experienced a combined total of twenty-eight close approach alerts
in 2011 and were forced to maneuver out of harm’s way five
times,43 France reported thirteen evasive maneuvers for satellites
under its control in 2010,44 and the European Space Agency
recorded nine further comparable incidents.45

39 International Space Station Again Dodges Debris, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS,
July 2011, at 1, available at http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/
ODQNv15i3.pdf; Malik, supra note 31.
40 International Space Station Again Dodges Debris, supra note 39. See also Space
Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 25–27; Space Security Index 2012, supra note 2,
at 34; KLINKRAD, supra note 20, at 234 (detailing that on six occasions between June
1999 and May 2002 the International Space Station initiated maneuvers to evade
dangers of collision with space debris).
41 See Increase in ISS Debris Avoidance Maneuvers, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS,,
Apr. 2011, at 1, available at http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/
ODQNv16i2.pdf. See also International Space Station Maneuvers Twice to Avoid
Tracked Debris, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, Apr. 2014, at 1, available
at http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv18i2.pdf (reporting
that the International Space Station was required to alter its trajectory twice in
early 2014 to avoid debris; this bring to eighteen the total number of such
maneuvers since 1999).
42 International Space Station Again Dodges Debris, supra note 39; Malik, supra
note 31 (noting another near miss between debris from Cosmos 2251 and the
International Space Station); Traci Watson, Station Crew Has Close Call with Space
Junk, ABC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=
7069746&page=1; Space Debris and Human Spacecraft, supra note 29 (describing
procedures for maneuvering the International Space Station to avoid debris, and
for moving the astronauts into the escape module as a precaution against
oncoming debris).
43 Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 34.
44 United Nations Discusses Space Debris and Long-Term Sustainability of
Activities in Outer Space, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, Apr. 2011, at 1, available at
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Aggravating the problem is the predictable fact that space
debris is most plentiful—and the jeopardy for safe space
operations is therefore greatest—in the most useful orbits. Those
are the altitudes, orbital inclinations, and positions that satellite
operators most prefer to occupy, in order to optimally perform
their various missions, so that is where the most flotsam is found.
Collisions in those regions, accordingly, have the greatest
propensity to spawn additional jeopardy.46
The international space community has been seized with the
issue of debris, and NASA and the relevant United Nations office
have promulgated voluntary guidelines, now widely accepted, on
“best practices” for minimizing (but not eliminating) the creation
of additional space junk in normal operations.47 On the other
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv15i2.pdf (addressing
numerous countries’ reports on space debris and related issues).
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., Bhupendra Jasani, Satellite Capabilities and Orbits, in INTERNATIONAL
SAFEGUARDS AND SATELLITE IMAGERY: KEY FEATURES OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
AND COMPUTER-BASED ANALYSIS 19 (Bhupendra Jasani, Irmgard Niemeyer, Sven
Nussbaum, Bernd Richter & Gotthard Stein eds., 2009) (noting that the mission of
a satellite determines the orbit at which it is placed; civil remote sensing satellites,
for example, are operated at altitudes between 400 kilometers and 700 kilometers);
Weeden, supra note 33, at 38 (reporting that space debris “is concentrated in the
regions of Earth orbit that are most heavily utilized”). Sometimes, it is difficult to
determine whether a particular satellite failure has been caused by a collision with
a piece of human-created space debris, a collision with a small fragment of natural
space material, or an internal malfunction. Attempts to improve “space
situational awareness” can ameliorate this problem, but not quickly or
completely. See, e.g., High-Speed Particle Impacts Suspected in Two Spacecraft
Anomalies, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, July 2013, at 1, 2, available at
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv17i3.pdf
(noting
ongoing uncertainty about the cause of recent satellite disruptions); Amy Butler,
Pentagon: No Evidence Chinese Debris Damaged Russian Satellite, AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECH. (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?
id=/article-xml/AW_03_25_2013_p31-561065.xml
(reporting
that
“debate
continues about what caused the breakup of a Russian satellite in orbit”); Weeden,
Gambling, supra note 24.
47 UN Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Comm., IADC Space Debris
Mitigation Guidelines, IADC Action Item No. 22.4 (2007), available at http://iadconline.org/index.cgi?item=docs_pub
(promulgating
non-binding
recommendations, approved by U.N. General Assembly, to reduce the creation of
additional space debris); Tom Graham & Darren Huskisson, Cooperation in Space:
International Institutions, in SPACE AND DEFENSE POLICY , supra note 2, at 104, 120-21;
LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 301-11; Irmgard Marboe, The Importance of
Guidelines and Codes of Conduct for Liability of States and Private Actors, in SOFT LAW
IN OUTER SPACE, supra note 12, at 139-43; NATIONAL ACADEMY, supra note 29, at 5759; NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 7 (2010), available at
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hand, efforts at—or even concepts for—removal of persistent
abandoned material that already pollutes the space environment
are barely at the conceptual stage.48
1.3. The rise and pause of outer space law

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-2810.pdf (stating Obama Administration U.S. policy for minimizing debris and
preserving the space environment); U.S. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY (2006), available at
http://www.nss.org/resources/library/spacepolicy/2006NationalSpacePolicy.ht
m (stating Bush Administration U.S. government policy to minimize the creation
of orbital debris, “in order to preserve the space environment for future
generations”); Carsten Wiedemann, Space Debris Mitigation, in SOFT LAW IN OUTER
SPACE, supra note 12, at 315-24; United Nations Adopts Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, Apr. 2011, at 1, available at
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv15i2.pdf;
Space
Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 27-30 (“As in previous years, compliance with
international orbital debris mitigation guidelines was mixed in 2012.”); Space
Security Index 2012, supra note 2, at 32-33, 36-37 (noting the development and
implementation of additional efforts to mitigate the generation of debris);
Mirmina, Alternatives, supra note 20 (calling for strengthened guidelines to
restrict space debris). See also NAT’L SCIENCE & TECH. COUNCIL, WHITE HOUSE,
FACT SHEET: NATIONAL SPACE POLICY 14, PDD/NSC 49 (PDD/NSTC 8) (Sept. 19,
1996) [hereinafter 1996 National Space Policy] (emphasizing that official U.S. policy
is to minimize the creation of space debris and to ensure that other nations do
likewise); Maureen Williams, Safeguarding Outer Space: On the Road to Debris
Mitigation, in UN INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, SECURITY IN SPACE: THE NEXT
GENERATION, CONFERENCE REPORT 81, 89-98 (2008) (presenting draft of Buenos
Aires International Instrument on the Protection of the Environment from
Damage Caused by Space Debris).
48 DAVE BAIOCCHI & WILLIAM WELSER IV, RAND NAT’L DEF. RES. INST.
CONFRONTING SPACE DEBRIS: STRATEGIES AND WARNINGS FROM COMPARABLE
EXAMPLES INCLUDING DEEPWATER HORIZON (2010), available at http://www.rand.
org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1042.pdf; VALLEY,
KEARNEY & ACKERMANN, supra note 24 (noting difficulty in imaging small objects
in space, a precondition for removing them); Weeden, supra note 33; Imburgia,
supra note 25; Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 29-30; Space Security
Index 2012, supra note 2, at 32-33, 36-37 (noting that there is currently no practical
capability for collecting debris and removing it from space); Sarah Cruddas, ESA
Plans to Clear Up Space Junk, SEN (Oct. 3, 2012), http:// www.sen.com/news/esaplans-to-clear-up-space-junk.html; Jason Palmer, Space Junk Could Be Tackled by
Housekeeping Spacecraft,
BBC NEWS (Aug. 11, 2011,
8:43 PM),
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-14405118 (reporting a proposal
that could, at most, remove five to ten large space objects per year); Claude
Phipps, Clearing Space Debris with Lasers, SPIE (Jan. 20, 2012),
http://spie.org/x84761.xml; Lionel Pousaz, The Time Has Come to Destroy Debris;
The Clean Space One Mission, SAT MAG., Oct. 2013, at 30, available at
http://www.satmagazine.com/story.php?number=140549881.
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Outer space evoked an impressive outpouring of legal
institutions, norms, and treaties in the early years, as space
exploration and use were just beginning,49 but the global legislative
process has stultified in recent decades.
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST)50 is the foundational
document, joined by virtually all space-faring states.51
It
establishes certain critical legal concepts, including: that the
exploration and use of outer space “shall be carried out for the
benefit and in the interests of all countries”;52 that outer space and
celestial bodies shall not be “subject to national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty” or by any other means;53 that international
law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies in outer
space;54 and that specified weapons-related activities are banned.55
These contributions are vital and virtually universally accepted,
but in reality, they do not much inhibit practical satellite weapons
programs or constrain various countries’ military aspirations in
space.

49 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 4-9 (discussing early antecedents of space
law); Jonty Kasku-Jackson & Elizabeth Waldrop, Understanding Space Law: Legal
Framework for Space, in SPACE AND DEFENSE POLICY, supra note 2, at 64; TERRILL,
supra note 22; Steven Weber & Sidney Drell, Attempts to Regulate Military Activities
in Space, in U.S.-SOVIET SECURITY COOPERATION: ACHIEVEMENTS, FAILURES, LESSONS
373-431 (Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley & Alexander Dallin eds., 1988);
Michael C. Mineiro, The United States and the Legality of Outer Space Weaponization:
A Proposal for Greater Transparency and a Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 33 ANNALS
OF AIR & SPACE L. 441 (2008).
50 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter OST].
51 OST Signatory List,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (last updated Oct. 8, 2013),
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm#signatory (listing 102 parties to the OST).
See Raymond L. Garthoff, The Outer Space Treaty: 1967 to the Present, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 877 (Richard Dean Burns ed.,
1993); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 53-57 (noting that the OST is frequently
referred to as “the Magna Carta of Space”).
52 OST, supra note 50, at art. I, ¶ 1.
53 Id. at art. II.
54 Id. at art. III.
55 Id. at art. IV (prohibiting, inter alia, the placement of nuclear weapons or
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, the establishment of
military bases on the moon, and the testing of weapons on the moon). See
generally Michel Bourbonniere & Ricky J. Lee, Legality of the Deployment of
Conventional Weapons in Earth Orbit: Balancing Space Law and the Law of Armed
Conflict, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 873 (2008).
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Subsequent to the OST, states promptly crafted three additional
widely-accepted agreements elaborating the legal regime for space:
the 1968 Rescue and Return Agreement (safeguarding astronauts
and space vehicles);56 the 1972 Liability Convention (establishing
absolute tort liability for damage caused on earth by a space object,
and liability for fault caused by a space object upon another space
object);57 and the 1975 Registration Convention (requiring a
launching state to publish basic information about its space
objects).58
In addition, norms of customary international law,59 reflected
in canonical resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly,60

56 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570,
T.I.A.S. No. 6559, 672 U.N.T.S. 119; Status of International Agreements Relating to
Activities in Outer Space, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFF., http://www.oosa.
unvienna.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treatystatus/index.html (last visited Oct. 8,
2013). See generally LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 96–102, 134–41.
57 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. 187; Status of
International Agreements, supra note 56. See generally LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2,
at 103–16.
58 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Nov. 12,
1974, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15; Status of International
Agreements, supra note 56. See generally LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 84–96.
59 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2), § 102 cmt. b
(1986) (defining customary international law as a leading source of international
law); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 70–80 (arguing that “elements of the OST
have passed into customary international law,” as evidenced by various
resolutions by the U.N.’s General Assembly and the space treaties adopted after
the OST); Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant”
International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 23 (1965) (examining the legal
status and impact of U.N. resolutions on space law).
60 See Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular
Account the Needs of Developing Countries, G.A. Res. 51/122, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/51/122 (Dec. 13, 1996) (“International cooperation in the exploration and
use of outer space for peaceful purposes . . . shall be conducted in accordance with
the provisions of international law . . .”); Declaration of Legal Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, G.A.
Res. 1962 (XVIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1962(XVIII) (Dec. 13, 1963) (“Outer space and
celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States on a basis of equality
and in accordance with international law.”); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 43–
50, 56–57 (discussing the impact of the 1963 Outer Space Resolution as
crystallizing customary international law and leading to the OST); Space Security
Index 2013, supra note 1, at 96 (citing six key U.N. resolutions); Karin Traunmüller,
The ‘Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
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also pursued similar principles, and an international institutional
infrastructure arose to entrench the peaceful, shared, and mutually
advantageous exploitation of space.61 Particularly noteworthy in
this regard was the 1986 U.N. General Assembly resolution on
“Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer
Space.”62 Although this resolution was directed at the use of
satellites for earth resources management and protection, rather
than at national security issues,63 it called for remote sensing to “be
carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,”64
and for the resulting data to be made available to the sensed

and Use of Outer Space’: The Starting Point for the United Nations’ Law of Outer Space,
in SOFT LAW IN OUTER SPACE, supra note 12, at 145 (enumerating the events and
discussions that ultimately led to the passage of the 1963 Outer Space Resolution);
see also Paul B. Larsen, Application of the Precautionary Principle to the Moon, 71 J. AIR
L. & COM. 295 (2006) (calling for the broad application of the precautionary
principle from environmental law).
61 Particularly noteworthy elements of this international diplomatic and legal
infrastructure are the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) and its Legal Subcommittee, and the U.N. Office for Outer Space
Affairs, which serves as its secretariat. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 17–22
(introducing the functions and structures of the United Nations Office for Outer
Space Affairs (UN OOSA) and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS)); Graham & Huskisson, supra note 47, at 106–08 (discussing
international organization with respect to space cooperation); Munish Sharma,
Space Treaty Mechanisms, in DECODING THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 53–61 (Ajey Lele ed., 2012) (discussing legal mechanisms
that have been developed to govern space security); Theresa Hitchens,
Transparency and Confidence Building in Outer Space: Inching Toward Action, ISN
(May 9,
2013),
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/SpecialFeature/Detail/?id=163379&contextid774=163379&contextid775=163367&tabid=1
454268614 (discussing COPUOS’s actions to improve safety and security in outer
space).
62 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, G.A.
Res. 41/65, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/65 (Dec. 3, 1986) [hereinafter U.N. Remote
Sensing Principles]. See generally Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, The UN Principles
Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space and Soft Law, in SOFT LAW IN
OUTER SPACE, supra note 12, at 183 (analyzing the travaux préparatoires of the U.N.
Remote Sensing Principles as part of a broader discussion of its place in soft law);
LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 420–29 (noting that the Principles are not
regarded as constituting customary international law, but may have been
influential in shaping state behavior).
63 U.N. Remote Sensing Principles, supra note 62, at Annex, Principle I (a).
64 Id. at Annex, Principle IV.
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state65—but did not incorporate a regime requiring the consent of
the sensed state.66
However, the episodic efforts to promote additional
agreements to restrain the development, testing, and use of ASATs
and other space weapons were always stillborn. During the Jimmy
Carter Administration, for example, the United States and the
Soviet Union undertook three fitful rounds of bilateral negotiations
on a proposed ASAT treaty during 1978 and 1979, but never came
close to an agreement.67 Likewise, during the Ronald Reagan
Administration, bilateral negotiations on space weaponry were
initiated in 1985, but were characterized by neither vigor nor
success.68
Multilateral efforts in pursuit of new measures of space arms
control have also been thoroughly frustrated. The Conference on
Disarmament (CD) (a sixty-five-member UN affiliate, responsible
for negotiating numerous successful international accords on
Id. at Annex, Principle XII.
Ray Harris, Science, Policy and Evidence in EO, in EVIDENCE FROM EARTH
OBSERVATION SATELLITES, supra note 2, at 43, 44.
67 See ROGER G. HARRISON, EISENHOWER CTR. FOR SPACE & DEF. STUDIES, 1 SPACE
AND
VERIFICATION:
POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
6-7
(2011),
available
at
http://swfound.org/media/37101/Space%20and%20Verification%20Vol%201%2
0-%20Policy%20Implications.pdf; Hays, Sino-American, supra note 3, at 24–25;
MILTON LEITENBERG, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF SWEDEN, STUDIES OF MILITARY
R&D AND WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT: CASE STUDY 1 – THE HISTORY OF US ANTISATELLITE WEAPONS (1984), available at http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/
leitenberg/asat.pdf (describing the failed 1977-79 U.S.-U.S.S.R. ASAT treaty
negotiations); Viktor Mizin, Non-Weaponization of Outer Space: Lessons from
Negotiations, in OUTER SPACE: WEAPONS, DIPLOMACY, AND SECURITY, supra note 3, at
48, 52–53 (providing the Russian perspective on the negotiations); NAT’L ACAD. OF
SCI., COMM. ON INT’L SEC. & ARMS CONTROL, NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL:
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 161–63 (1985); OTA, supra note 19, at 96; John Pike & Eric
Stambler, Anti-Satellite Weapons and Arms Control, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 991, 995 (Richard Dean Burns ed., 1993); PAUL B.
STARES, THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE: U.S. POLICY, 1945-1985 180–200 (1985); John
Wertheimer, The Antisatellite Negotiations, in SUPERPOWER ARMS CONTROL: SETTING
THE RECORD STRAIGHT 139, 139–63 (Albert Carnesale & Richard N. Haass eds.,
1987); Ambassador Donald A. Mahley, Acting Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Threat
Reduction, Export Controls, & the State of Space Sec., Remarks at the Space Policy
Institute at George Washington University: The State of Space Security (Jan. 24,
2008), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rm/2008/99746.htm.
68 Hays, Sino-American, supra note 3, at 27 (observing that the space talks were
“the only category of superpower arms control negotiations started in the 1980s
that did not produce a treaty”); Mizin, supra note 67, at 56-63 (noting the Russian
perspective on the negotiations); NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 67, at 164-86; Pike
& Stambler, supra note 67, at 995; Mahley, supra note 67.
65
66
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nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons)69 has carried on its
proposed agenda the task of articulating a new agreement on
“Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” (PAROS).
Incredibly, however, the lack of a consensus among its members
has rendered the CD utterly unable—since 1996—even to initiate
meaningful talks on the topic.70 The United Nations General
Assembly, for its part, annually adopts a PAROS resolution, but
conspicuously lacks the authority to compel states to undertake
negotiations or to alter their behaviors in space.71 The General
Assembly and the Secretary General have also twice sponsored a
“Group of Governmental Experts” on outer space transparency
and confidence-building measures, to pursue the possible
elaboration of elusive agreed principles.72

69 See
An Introduction to the Conference, UN OFF. AT GENEVA,
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/BF18ABFEFE5D344
DC1256F3100311CE9?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 30, 2014) (describing the
nature of the CD).
70 Graham & Huskisson, supra note 47, at 108–10; Kasku-Jackson & Waldrop,
supra note 49, at 89–90; Laura Grego, A History of Anti-Satellite Programs, UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, Jan. 2012, at 1, 13, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/
assets/documents/nwgs/a-history-of-ASAT-programs_lo-res.pdf.
71 Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, G.A. Res. 67/30, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/67/30 (Dec. 3, 2012); Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, G.A.
Res. 66/27, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/27 (Dec. 2, 2011); Prevention of an Arms Race in
Outer Space, G.A. Res. 65/44, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/44 (Dec. 8, 2010). Notably,
the United States has routinely voted against or abstained on the annual U.N.G.A.
PAROS resolution. Grego, supra note 70, at 13.
72 Group of Governmental Experts, supra note 15; Transparency and
Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, G.A. Res. 65/68, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/65/68 (Dec. 8, 2010); Hitchens, supra note 61, at 2–3; Frank A. Rose,
Addressing the Challenges of Space Security, SPACE NEWS (Apr. 8, 2013),
http://www.spacenews.com/article/opinion/34757addressing-the-challengesof-space-security; Frank A. Rose, A Golden Opportunity on a Golden Anniversary,
SPACE NEWS (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.spacenews.com/article/opinion
/36946a-golden-opportunity-on-a-golden-anniversary; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of State, Statement on Consensus Achieved by the UN Group of Governmental
Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures for Outer Space
Activities (July 18, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2013/07/212095.htm (stating that the United States welcomes the consensus on
international cooperation and coordination in voluntary non-legally-binding
measures). See also U.N. Secretary General, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space: Study on the Application of Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space, U.N.
Doc. A/48/305 (Oct. 15, 1993), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_
doc.asp?symbol=A/48/305 (detailing a previous United Nations study of similar
dangers and possibilities).
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Some states have tentatively stepped into this void, attempting
to spur the development of new international law regulating the
weaponization of space. Russia and China have promulgated
successive iterations of a draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Placement of Weapons in Space,73 but well-placed opposition from
the United States and others has kept it on the international back
burner.74 The European Union has likewise sponsored a draft nonlegally-binding “Code of Conduct” for safe and mutuallyaccommodating space operations75—a modest, but still
disproportionately controversial advancement.76
73 Conference on Disarmament, Letter Dated 12 February 2008 from the
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation and the Permanent Representative of
China Addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference Transmitting the Russian
and Chinese Texts of the Draft “Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in
Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT),”
CD/1839 (Feb. 29, 2008), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/
doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/604/02/PDF/G0860402.pdf?OpenElement;
http://
www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2008/
documents/Draft%20PPWT.pdf. This draft treaty would establish limitations on
the use, but not on the development or deployment, of space weapons, and does
not include provisions for verification or enforcement of compliance. See Alexei
Arbatov, Preventing an Arms Race in Space, in OUTER SPACE: WEAPONS, DIPLOMACY,
AND SECURITY, supra note 3, at 78, 82–86; Mizin, supra note 67, at 54–55; Gunjan
Singh, PPWT: An Overview, in DECODING THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT,
supra note 61, at 47, 47–49; Victor Vasiliev, The Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space
Objects, in SECURITY IN SPACE, supra note 47, at 145, 145–51 (2008); Grego, supra note
70, at 13. See also OTA, supra note 19, at 96–99, 145–46 (discussing previous draft
space weaponization treaties proposed by U.S.S.R. in 1981 and 1983); PAUL B.
STARES, SPACE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 148–50 (1987) (describing U.S. rejection of
early Soviet proposals for arms control in space).
74 For the official 2008 U.S. comments on the draft Russia-Chinese treaty, see
Conference on Disarmament, Letter Dated 19 August 2008 from the Permanent
Representative of the United States of America Addressed to the Secretary-General of the
Conference Transmitting Comments on the Draft “Treaty on Prevention of the Placement
of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects
(PPWT),” CD/1847 (Aug. 26, 2008), available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.
org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2008/documents/1847.pdf
(critiquing provisions regarding the scope of the proposed treaty, lack of
verification provisions, amendment process, and other matters). See Grego, supra
note 70, at 14 (noting that the Russia-China “proposal was not well received by
the United States, which offered a critique but no counter-proposal”).
75 Council Decision 2012/281/CFSP, In the Framework of the European
Security Strategy in Support of the Union Proposal for an International Code of
Conduct on Outer-Space Activities, 2012 O.J. (L140/68), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:140:0068:0073:EN:PDF;
International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (Revised Draft), EUROPEAN
UNION (Working Document, Sept. 16, 2013), available at http://eeas.europa.eu/
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non-proliferation-and-disarmament/pdf/space_code_conduct_draft_vers_16_
sept_2013_en.pdf; DECODING THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 61;
STIMSON CTR., A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR RESPONSIBLE SPACE-FARING NATIONS
(Michael Krepon ed., 2010) (discussing a proposed code of conduct that preceded
the EU draft); Jean-Francois Mayence, The European Union’s Initiative for a Code of
Conduct on Space Activities: A Model of Soft Law for Outer Space?, in SOFT LAW IN
OUTER SPACE, supra note 12, at 343–60; Awaiting Launch: Perspectives on the Draft
ICOC for Outer Space Activities (Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Daniel A. Porras
eds., 2014), OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, available at http://orfonline.
org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/report/attachments/AwaitingLaunch_1397
728623369.pdf; Sergey Oznobishchev, Codes of Conduct for Outer Space, in OUTER
SPACE: WEAPONS, DIPLOMACY, AND SECURITY, supra note 3, at 68, 71–76 (providing a
Russian perspective on the EU Code); Gregory L. Schulte & Audrey M. Schaffer,
Enhancing Security by Promoting Responsible Behavior in Space, 6 STRATEGIC STUD. Q.,
Sping 2012, at 9, 9–17 (describing several approaches, including the EU Code, for
developing non-legally-binding norms for space); Grego, supra note 70, at 14
(describing proposed EU Code as “a good starting point” and “a modest step
forward”); Hitchens, supra note 61, at 5–6; Meyer, supra note 4; Dylan Rebstock, A
Revised and Stronger International Code of Conduct for Space, STIMSON CTR. (Nov. 5,
2013), http://www.stimson.org/summaries/a-revised-and-stronger-international
-code-of-conduct-for-space/ (comparing the September 16, 2013 draft of the code
to the June 5, 2012 version); Jana Robinson, Advancing an International Space Code of
Conduct, E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (July 13, 2012), http://www.eir.info/2012/07/13/transparency-and-confidence-building-measures-as-practicaltools-for-advancing-an-international-space-code-of-conduct/.
76 Letter from Senators to Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State (Feb. 2, 2011) (on
file with author) (expressing deep concern about the EU Code of Conduct);
John R. Bolton & John C. Yoo, Hands Off the Heavens, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/opinion/hands-off-the-heavens.html?
_r=0; Omri Ceren, Obama’s New Anti-Satellite Weapons Push to Cede Space to the
Chinese?, COMMENTARY (Jan. 28, 2011, 4:12 PM), http://www.commentary
magazine.com/2011/01/28/obamas-new-anti-satellite-weapons-push-to-cedespace-to-the-chinese; Peter B. de Selding, Europe Changes Tactics in Push for Space
Code of Conduct, SPACE NEWS (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.spacenews.com/
article/military-space/35033europe-changes-tactics-in-push-for-space-code-ofconduct; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Safe Passage: Why the Pentagon Wants an
International “Code of Conduct” for Space, BREAKINGDEFENSE.COM (Mar. 22, 2012),
http://breakingdefense.com/2012/
03/22/safe-passage-why-the-pentagonwants-an-international-code-of-c; Michael Krepon, Weak Arguments Against a Space
Code of Conduct, STIMSON CTR. (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.stimson.org/
spotlight/space-code-of-conduct-advances/ (rebutting the opposition to a space
code); John R. Jeff Kueter & John B. Sheldon, An Investment Strategy for National
Security Space, HERITAGE FOUND., Feb. 20, 2013, at 10, available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/an-investment-strategyfor-national-security-space (arguing that the EU Code of Conduct “is not in the
interests of the United States and can leave U.S. national security space
capabilities needlessly vulnerable”); Eli Lake, U.S., EU Eye Anti-Satellite Weapons
Pact, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2011/jan/27/us-eu-eye-anti-satellite-weapons-pact /?page=all;
Michael J.
Listner, Geopolitical Challenges to Implementing the Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities,
E-INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
(June
26,
2012),
www.e-
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A new multilateral treaty on ASATs and other military activity
related to space would certainly be difficult to negotiate, even
under the best of circumstances. Complex issues regarding the
specific definition of the to-be-prohibited objects and activities,77
the mechanisms for verification of compliance with the new
obligations,78 the overlap between ASAT and missile defense
programs,79 and the relationships with states that do not join the
treaty80 could all be show-stoppers.
Even more importantly, leading space actors have been
ambivalent about the desirability of limiting ASATs—or, at least, a
blocking minority clings to the view that the weaponization of
outer space is inevitable (because all other domains have seen
human conflict, and space may be especially prized by various

ir.info/2012/06/26/geopolitical-challenges-to-implementing-the-code-ofconduct-for-outer-space-activities; Rose, Addressing the Challenges, supra note 72.
77 The definition of an “ASAT” or a “space weapon” for purposes of a treaty
would be complex, because any system (including even the Space Shuttle) that is
capable of closely approaching and docking with another space object would
simultaneously be capable of attacking it. Differentiating between benign and
hostile actions – especially to regulate the testing of those capabilities – would
therefore be difficult. Arbatov, supra note 73, at 86-93; HARRISON, supra note 67, at
6; Ross Liemer & Christopher F. Chyba, A Verifiable Limited Test Ban for Antisatellite Weapons, 33 WASH. Q., no. 3, July 2010, at 149, 153-54; Weeden, supra note
33, at 42; Richard L. Garwin, Taming Antisatellite and Space Weapons, BULL. OF THE
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (May 29, 2007), http://thebulletin.org/taming-antisatelliteand-space-weapons; Joan Johnson-Freese, China’s Anti-Satellite Program: They’re
Learning, CHINA FOCUS (July 12, 2013) [hereinafter Johnson-Freese, Learning],
http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/chinas-anti-satellite-programtheyre-learning (highlighting the difficulty in defining what constitutes an ASAT
weapon); Krepon, supra note 76; Mahley, supra note 67, at 7.
78 Richard A. Bruneau & Scott G. Lofquist-Morgan, Verification Models for
Space Weapons Treaties: A Flexible, Layered Approach as a Negotiating Tool, in U.N.
INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, BUILDING THE ARCHITECTURE FOR SUSTAINABLE
SPACE SECURITY: CONFERENCE REPORT 73 (2006); William J. Durch, Verification of
Limitations on Antisatellite Weapons, in VERIFICATION AND ARMS CONTROL 81-106
(William C. Potter ed., 1985); DAVID FINKLEMAN, EISENHOWER CTR. FOR SPACE &
DEF. STUDIES, 2 SPACE AND VERIFICATION: TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT (2011);
GALLAGHER & STEINBRUNER, supra note 6, at 79; Richard L. Garwin, ASAT Treaty
Verification, in ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION: THE TECHNOLOGIES THAT MAKE IT
POSSIBLE 208 (Kosta Tsipis, David W. Hafemeister & Penny Janeway eds., 1986);
HARRISON, supra note 67; Liemer & Chyba, supra note 77, at 153-54.
79 See infra text accompanying note 182.
80 To be effective in securing outer space, a treaty would require the
participation of all the major spacefaring states, but in current political
circumstances, several of them may be unwilling to participate.
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militaries as the ultimate “high ground”)81 and perhaps even
desirable (because a high-tech arms race in space is a winnable
contest).82 In the United States, for example, there is considerable
sympathy for the view that we should develop and deploy a range
of ASAT capabilities, in order to deter other countries from
threatening or attacking our satellites, and to defeat an enemy’s
potential exploitation of its space assets in a war against us.83 Some
of this hawkish ambition was associated with the George W. Bush
Administration,84 but the predecessor Bill Clinton Administration
81 GALLAGHER & STEINBRUNER, supra note 6, at 24-25 (quoting U.S. military
officials who assert that war in space is inevitable and that a competitive “gold
rush” is already under way in space); Hays, supra note 2, at 177 (referring to
“inevitable weaponizers”); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 499; Rumsfeld
Commission, supra note 13, at 10.
82 GALLAGHER & STEINBRUNER, supra note 6, at 25 (pointing out how U.S.
military publications assert that the United States could maintain “full spectrum
dominance” in space); Hays, supra note 2, at 176-77 (referring to “space hawks”).
See HARRISON, supra note 67, at 12, n.19 (describing the internal divisions of the
U.S. government on space weaponization by citing the comments of the
negotiator for a previous arms control treaty who commented: “It was, and
remains, difficult to find common ground between those who believe that, in
general, the national security of the United States would be strengthened if no
limits were placed on the weapons it could have, even if that would mean that
there would be no limits on the same type of Soviet (or some other adversaries)
weapons, and those who believe that the national security of the United States
would be strengthened if limits were placed on the Soviet (or some other
adversaries) weapon systems, even if that would mean limits on the same type of
U.S. system”); Paul Oh, Assessing Chinese Intentions for the Military Use of the Space
Domain, 64 JOINT FORCE Q., no. 1, 2012, at 91 (suggesting that the government of
China may similarly be divided concerning militarization of space).
83 See Everett C. Dolman & Henry F. Cooper, Jr., Increasing the Military Uses of
Space, in TOWARD A THEORY OF SPACEPOWER: SELECTED ESSAYS 97 (Charles D. Lutes
& Peter L. Hays eds., 2011); GALLAGHER & STEINBRUNER, supra note 6 (presenting
and critiquing perspectives on militarization of space); Elizabeth S. Waldrop,
Weaponization of Outer Space: US National Policy, 29 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 329,
331-36 (2004) (explaining the “weaponization” of space); Butt, supra note 19
(explaining the need for improved space security); Kueter & Sheldon, supra note
76 (discussing potential investments in national space security); Baker Spring,
Slipping the Surly Bonds of the Real World: The Unworkable Effort to Prevent the
Weaponization of Space, Heritage Foundation Lectures No. 877 (Apr. 14, 2005),
available at http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/slipping-the-surly-bondsof-the-real-world-the-unworkable-effort-to-prevent-the-weaponization-of-space
(lecturing on “weaponization of space”).
84 Christine Rocca, U.S. Permanent Rep. to the CD, Statement to the
Conference on Disarmament, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (Feb. 13,
2007) (presenting the Bush Administration perspective that there is no need for
additional measures of arms control in outer space because there is currently no
arms race under way there); Jeremy Singer & Colin Clark, China’s Anti-Satellite
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and successor Barack Obama Administration were little more
sympathetic to (or little more vigorous in pursuit of) the concept of
arms control in space.85
An important modern feature of the international dialog about
space weapons policy is the expanding cast of relevant players. As
more countries have joined the roster of participants, the task of
securing consensus about ASAT restrictions only becomes more
complex. The United States, Russia, China, France, the European
Union, Japan, Israel, and India remain the predominant space
actors, but several other states are increasingly engaged, too. As

Test Widely Criticized, U.S. Says No New Treaties Needed, SPACE.COM (Jan. 19, 2007),
http://www.space.com/3370-chinas-anti-satellite-test-widely-criticized-treatiesneeded.html (quoting Bush Administration official saying “[a]rms control is not a
viable solution for space”); U.S. National Space Policy, NAT’L SPACE SOC’Y (Aug. 31,
2006),
www.nss.org/resources/library/spacepolicy/2006NationalSpacePolicy.
htm (stating that “The United States will oppose the development of new legal
regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of
space.”). See also GALLAGHER & STEINBRUNER, supra note 6, at 24-26 (summarizing
U.S. military publications favoring U.S. control of space); Carl Kaysen & Paul K.
MacDonald, Foreword, in GALLAGHER & STEINBRUNER, supra note 6, at v
(commenting that “a policy of national military space domination prevails within
the U.S. government at the moment [2008]”); Grego, supra note 70, at 8, 13.
85 DoD Directive 3100.10, supra note 8, at § 4j(5) (stating that U.S. space
control plans and activities will maintain capability to deter and, if necessary,
defeat efforts to interfere with U.S. space capabilities); Todd Barnet, United States
National Space Policy, 2006 & 2010, 23 FLA. J. INT’L L. 277 (2011) (comparing Bush
and Obama Administrations space policies); NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE STRATEGY,
supra note 1, at 5 (stating that the United States “will consider proposals and
concepts for arms control measures,” but not suggesting that the Obama
Administration will exercise leadership in initiating efforts in this area); NATIONAL
SPACE POLICY, supra note 47, at 7 (stating Obama Administration U.S. policy to
pursue transparency and confidence-building measures for space and to consider
proposals and concepts for arms control, but also to maintain the capabilities to
execute “space control, and force application missions”); Grego, supra note 70, at
14 (characterizing the Obama space policy as indicating “greater openness” to
diplomatic initiatives in space, but not as suggesting that the United States will
exercise “an active leadership role in drafting and submitting proposals”). See also
NATIONAL SPACE POLICY, supra note 47, at 13-14 (describing the Clinton
Administration policy that the United States will consider and formulate policy
positions on arms control in space and will conclude agreements if they are
equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance U.S. security); Andrea Shalal-Esa,
Pentagon Cites New Drive to Develop Anti-Satellite Weapons, REUTERS (May 7, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/07/us-pentagon-satellites-idUSBRE
94614E20130507 (quoting Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter saying that
the U.S. military has launched a “’long overdue’ effort” to counter the space
capabilities of rival states and to deny them the use of space assets against U.S.
forces in combat).
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many as sixty states now have a presence in space, promoting their
interests in ways that further disrupt the prospects for easy new
space arms control agreements.86
Overall, the point is that military activities in space remain
largely unregulated. The world beyond air is not a world beyond
law, but to a distressing extent, countries have legally obligated
themselves only to refrain from the particular weapons behaviors
that they did not want to—or did not have the capacity to—
undertake anyway. Space is certainly not as “weaponized” as the
land, sea or air domains, but the shared commitment to reserve
space for “peaceful purposes” is fragile,87 and the legal safeguards
against regrettable movement in the opposite direction are still
sparse and underdeveloped.
2.

NTM SATELLITES

It is difficult to be very precise and detailed about National
Technical Means of verification; this is a topic traditionally
shrouded in intense secrecy. Indeed, although the United States
had launched its first military observation satellites in 1959, as part
of the famous Corona program,88 (as soon as the relevant
86 Miles, supra note 10 (reporting that sixty states are now considered “spacefaring”); News Briefing with Dep. Sec’y of Defense William Lynn & Dep.
Assistant Sec’y of Defense Gregory Schulte (Feb. 4, 2011), available at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4765 (noting
that eleven countries can launch objects into space, and “space is no longer sort of
the preserve of the U.S. and the Soviet Union at the time from which we can
operate with impunity.”).
87 OST, supra note 50, at art. IV (limiting certain military uses of space). The
United States has traditionally defined “peaceful” as meaning “non-aggressive” in
character; several other states have asserted that “peaceful” carries a stronger
meaning, closer to “non-military,” and would restrict more defense-related
activities in space. Kasku-Jackson & Waldrop, supra note 49, at 66-67; LYALL &
LARSEN, supra note 2, at 510-25; Andrew T. Park, Incremental Steps for Achieving
Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for
Space, 28 HOUS. J INT’L L. 871, 883-84 (2006) (noting the ambiguity that has led to
military use being considered “peaceful” in most circumstances); Waldrop, supra
note 83, at 338-39 (discussing the differing definitions of “peaceful” in regards to
the limits on space use).
88 David Christopher Arnold, Space and Intelligence, in SPACE AND DEFENSE
POLICY, supra note 2, at 202, 216 (tracking the milestones of the “CORONA
program”); WILLIAM E. BURROWS, DEEP BLACK: SPACE ESPIONAGE AND NATIONAL
SECURITY 132-42, 151-52 (1986) (analyzing the history of space reconnaissance);
John Lewis Gaddis, The Evolution of a Reconnaissance Satellite Regime, in U.S.-SOVIET
SECURITY COOPERATION: ACHIEVEMENTS, FAILURES, LESSONS 353, 353-73 (Alexander
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technology became available), it was only in 1979 that the United
States finally (and despite considerable controversy) declassified
the sheer fact that arms control treaty verification relied in part
upon satellite photoreconnaissance.89
L. George, Philip J. Farley, & Alexander Dallin eds., 1988) (analyzing the change in
the U.S.-Soviet acceptance of reconnaissance); Hays, Space and Sino-American,
supra note 3, at 19; Jasani, supra note 46, at 29; GERALD M. STEINBERG, SATELLITE
RECONNAISSANCE: THE ROLE OF INFORMAL BARGAINING 23-26, 39-48 (1983)
(describing the history of reconnaissance and the acceptance thereof). See also
INGARD CLAUSEN & EDWARD A. MILLER, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF NAT’L
RECONNAISSANCE, INTELLIGENCE REVOLUTION 1960: RETRIEVING THE CORONA
IMAGERY THAT HELPED WIN THE COLD WAR (2012), available at http://
www.nro.gov/history/csnr/corona/Intel_Revolution_Web.pdf; GALLAGHER &
STEINBRUNER, supra note 6, at 7 (citing a 1950 RAND study of the concept of
reconnaissance from space, long before the advent of the first satellites);
STEINBERG, supra, at 26-29, 51-56 (discussing early Soviet responses); Jos Heyman,
Intel: Early U.S. Recon Satellites, MILSAT MAG., Oct. 2011, at 32, available at
http://www.milsatmagazine.com/cgi-bin/display_article.cgi?number=1728840
346; Grego, supra note 70, at 2, n.2 (noting failed 1962 diplomatic efforts by the
Soviet Union to oppose satellite reconnaissance). The program of satellite overflight complemented the prior programs using aircraft (such as the famous U-2) to
conduct reconnaissance. Satellites were less vulnerable to interception from
ground defenses, more politically acceptable to the U.S.S.R., and more consistent
with international law. BRUCE BERKOWITZ, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF NAT’L
RECONNAISSANCE, THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AT 50 YEARS: A BRIEF
HISTORY 16 (2011), available at http://www.nro.gov/history/csnr/programs
/NRO_Brief_History.pdf (recounting the history and purpose of the National
Reconnaissance Office); THOMAS GRAHAM JR., DISARMAMENT SKETCHES: THREE
DECADES OF ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 37, 58-59 (2002) (describing
reliance upon satellite photoreconnaissance in early SALT negotiations, even
though the fact of their use was classified); Robert A. McDonald & Patrick
Widlake, Looking Closer and Looking Broader: Gambit and Hexagon – The Peak of Film
Return Space Reconnaissance After Corona, NAT’L RECONNAISSANCE J. OF THE
DISCIPLINE
&
PRAC.,
Spring
2012,
at
39,
39-40,
available
at
http://www.nro.gov/history/csnr/articles/docs/gh%20journal_web.pdf (noting
the brief timeline leading up to the initiation of the space programs). At the same
time, the U.S.S.R. undertook a comparable development program for its own
series of increasingly sophisticated photoreconnaissance satellites.
Valery
Babintsev, The Peaceful and Military Development of Space: A Historical Perspective, in
OUTER SPACE: WEAPONS, DIPLOMACY, AND SECURITY, supra note 3, at 16, 22-23;
BURROWS, supra, at 252-72; Asa Bates, Jr., National Technical Means of Verification,
123 ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INST. J., No. 2, June 1978, at 64 (describing early Soviet
NTM satellites); Jos Heyman, The Photo Reconnaissance Satellites of the USSR/Russia,
MILSAT MAG., Oct. 2012, at 48, available at http://www.milsatmagazine.com/cgibin/display_article.cgi?number=30747315&method=print
(documenting
the
Soviet Union’s satellites).
89 BERKOWITZ, supra note 88, at 16 (observing that changes in arms control led
to changed opinions about reconnaissance); Stuart A. Cohen, The Evolution of
Soviet Views on SALT Verification: Implications for the Future, in VERIFICATION AND
SALT: THE CHALLENGE OF STRATEGIC DECEPTION 49, 54-56 (William C. Potter ed.,
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Broadly, the term “NTM” is understood to refer to a wide array
of mechanical apparatus (in contrast to “human sources,” such as
diplomats and spies90) that are under the sole control of a single
country91 and that do not depend (very much) upon the sufferance
or cooperation of the monitored country (in contrast to on-site
inspection, where the host state must provide considerable
toleration and support92). NTM constitute the “crown jewels” of
arms control treaty verification—uniquely powerful, reliable, and
independent.93 Verification, in turn, is widely regarded as critical
1980) (discussing the acknowledgment of satellite programs); GRAHAM, supra note
88, at 82-83 (recounting anecdote from SALT II negotiations, revealing that neither
United States nor Soviet Union wanted to define or even to discuss NTM); How
Satellites May Help to Sell SALT, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 21, 1979, at 25
(revealing satellite reconnaissance programs as the Senate evaluated the SALT II
Treaty); Memorandum for Mr. John P. Snow, Comments on Draft Report of 156
Committee (Nov. 5, 1971), available at http://www.nro.gov/foia/declass/
NROStaffRecords/692.PDF (detailing selected functions of the National
Reconnaissance Office); Memorandum from Robert A. Rosenberg to Zbigniew
Brzezinski on “Guidance on Public Queries Related to Declassification of the “Fact
of” Photoreconnaissance Satellites” (Sept. 18, 1978), available at http://www.gwu.
edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB231/doc29.pdf (discussing the advisability of
declassifying satellite operations). See also 1996 National Space Policy, supra note 47,
at 7 (listing specific facts about U.S. satellite photoreconnaissance and related
activities that are unclassified).
90 Alan S. Krass, Arms Control Treaty Verification, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 297, 305-06 (Richard Dean Burns ed., 1993)
(discussing different tools and techniques for treaty verification); RICHELSON, supra
note 24, at 292-320 (explaining that Human Intelligence includes information
derived from spies, diplomats, defectors, travelers, and others).
91 See infra text accompanying notes 112–113 concerning intelligencecollection assets that are jointly operated by multiple countries – multilateral
technical means (MTM).
92 Several arms control treaties supplement the activities of NTM by
including carefully-negotiated provisions pursuant to which inspectors from
another state or from an international organization are empowered to conduct onsite inspections, to resolve ambiguities and assess a party’s compliance with the
treaty. See, e.g., Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, art. IV, Protocol Part II,
Sept. 24, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-28 (1997) 35 I.L.M. 1439 [hereinafter CTBT];
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, art. IX, Verification Annex,
IV(A).D, Jan. 13, 1993 [hereinafter CWC], available at http://www.opcw.org/
chemical-weapons-convention. See generally Krass, supra note 90, at 306-09 (noting
the increase in cooperative verification); James A. Schear, Cooperative Measures of
Verification: How Necessary? How Effective? in VERIFICATION AND ARMS CONTROL 735 (William C. Potter ed., 1985).
93 Amy F. Woolf, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41201, MONITORING AND
VERIFICATION IN ARMS CONTROL 4, 10, 13 (2011) (describing the diversity of NTM
programs, identifying NTM as providing the “bulk of the information” necessary
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for effective and politically sustainable arms control—so NTM
have become indispensable tools of the trade.94
The appropriate types of NTM vary considerably from treaty to
treaty, depending upon what objects and activities are regulated or
banned by the agreement and are therefore subject to close
monitoring by the parties. The 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT),95 for example, intends to prohibit nuclear weapon
tests; to verify compliance with it, parties rely upon a vast array of
321 terrestrial seismometers, hydroacoustic sensors, infrasound
detectors, and radionuclide samplers, as well as satellite-borne
monitoring and communications capabilities.96 The 2010 New
to monitor arms control treaties, and stating that both the United States and the
Soviet Union/Russia “rely on NTM as the foundation of their verification
regimes”); Krass, supra note 90, at 301-05 (describing the U.S. NTM); Christopher
E. Paine, Thomas B. Cochran & Robert S. Norris, Techniques and Procedures for
Verifying Nuclear Weapons Elimination, in CANBERRA COMMISSION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BACKGROUND PAPERS 167, 168-69 (1996) (on file
with author) (identifying a variety of satellite-based and other NTM platforms);
Thomas Graham, International Law and the Military Uses of Space, DISARMAMENT
DIPLOMACY, no. 63, Mar.-Apr. 2002, available at http://www.acronym.
org.uk/dd/dd63/63op1.htm (noting that without space-based NTM, effective
verification of arms control treaties would be virtually impossible).
94 Woolf, supra note 93; Arms Control Verification, DEF. THREAT REDUCTION
AGENCY, http://www.dtra.mil/missions/ArmsControlVerification/ArmsControl
VerificationHome.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) (describing the role of
verification in arms control); Verification of Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament
Treaties,
NUCLEAR
FILES.ORG,
http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/keyissues/nuclear-weapons/issues/arms-control-disarmament/verification/index.
htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) (analyzing verification and its importance).
95 CTBT, supra note 92.
96 Regarding the four designated CTBT verification technologies, see
Verification Regime, PREPARATORY COMM’N FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST
BAN TREATY ORG., http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/ (last visited Oct.
31, 2013) [hereinafter CBTO Verification Regime]; regarding the satellite
communications mechanisms—operating through a network of six satellites in
geosynchronous orbits and three alternative satellites to serve particularly remote
locations—designed to feed data from the worldwide detection stations to the
International Data Center in Vienna, and from there to each of the treaty parties,
see Verification Regime, GLOBAL COMM. INFRASTRUCTURE, http://www.ctbto.org/
verification-regime/the-global-communications-infrastructure/ (last visited Oct.
31, 2013). See generally COMM. ON REVIEWING & UPDATING TECHNICAL ISSUES
RELATED TO THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY, NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY – TECHNICAL ISSUES FOR
THE UNITED STATES (2012) [hereinafter NRC, CTBT TECHNICAL ISSUES]; OLA
DAHLMAN, JENIFER MACKBY, SVEIN MYKKELTVEIT & HEIN HAAK, DETECT AND DETER:
CAN COUNTRIES VERIFY THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN (2011); Bhupendra Jasani,
Verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty from Space: A Preliminary Study (U.N.
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START Treaty,97 in partial contrast, imposes limits on U.S. and
Russian long-range nuclear weapons; photoreconnaissance
satellites are a primary means for identifying and counting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), nuclear submarines and
other accountable objects.98
Satellites form a critical component of NTM, performing two
primary kinds of functions: monitoring and communications.
Monitoring includes diverse operations such as imagery
observation of the visual spectrum, the infrared, and other
frequencies;99 “signals intelligence” (SIGINT), which entails
interception of electronic communications and other emanations;100
Inst. for Disarmament Research, Research Paper No. 32, 1994). See also Jihye Park
et. al., Ionospheric Detection of the 25 May 2009 North Korean Underground Nuclear
Test, 38 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, L22802, 2011, at 1 (describing how sensors on
satellites detect evidence of previously clandestine nuclear explosion).
97 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation
on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, Apr. 8, 2010 [hereinafter New START Treaty]; Les Aspin, The Verification of
the SALT II Agreement, 240 SCI. AM. 38 (1979) (describing the verification methods
of the SALT II Treaty).
98 See New START Treaty, supra note 97, at art. II (establishing numerical
limits on each party’s deployed and non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy
bombers, and associated warheads); Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, &
Compliance, New START Treaty: Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification,
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Dec. 22, 2012), http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/153910.htm
(referring to condition 2, which requires annual presidential certification that U.S.
NTM and other verification mechanisms “are sufficient to ensure effective
monitoring of Russian compliance” with the treaty); Bureau of Verification,
Compliance, & Implemention, Fact Sheet: Verification, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE (April 8,
2010), http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/139906.htm (noting measures of
verification); The Value of New START Verification, 1 ARMS CONTROL ASSOC., no. 9,
July 21, 2010, http://www.armscontrol.org/issuebriefs/STARTVerification
(discussing the verification provisions of the New START Treaty).
99 DAHLMAN ET. AL., supra note 96, at 75-77 (providing information on
satellite-based monitoritng); Harris, supra note 66, at 48-57; Shaida Johnston,
Technical Introduction to Satellite EO, in EVIDENCE FROM EARTH OBSERVATION
SATELLITES, supra note 2, at 17-36; Krass, supra note 90, at 304-05 (explaining
infrared monitoring devices); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 411-14; David
Hafemeister, Science and Society Test IX: Technical Means of Verification, 54 Am. J.
Physicis 693 (1986), available at http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=phy_fac (detailing different methods and
means of monitoring).
100 RICHELSON, supra note 24, at 203-39 (stating that SIGINT includes
interception of communications and detection of electronic emanations from
foreign military equipment; sequential generations of satellites – operating in low
earth orbits, geosynchronous orbits, and highly elliptical orbits – are critical
components for collecting this data).
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and the use of other types of sensors such as advanced synthetic
aperture radars and “bhangmeters” that collect the electromagnetic
radiation released by an atmospheric or outer space nuclear
weapon detonation.101 Satellite NTM communications operations
include the swift, reliable conveyance of reams of authenticated
data.
For example, under the CTBT, disparate technical
information streams from the treaty’s worldwide array of sensors
are reported in near real time to a centralized data analysis
headquarters in Vienna, Austria. The organization then conveys
that data, again via satellites, to interested parties.102
The United States is by far the global leader in NTM satellites
of heterogeneous sorts, having deployed increasingly sophisticated
generations of orbiting platforms,103 but other countries now also
engage in an increasing array of space-enabled data collection and
dissemination operations.
Some states are understandably reluctant to rely upon an
exclusively made-in-America treaty verification capability, and
have accordingly invested in independent sources of compliance
data.104
101 DAHLMAN ET. AL., supra note 96, at 108-10 (detailing the development and
improvement of nuclear explosions monitoring equipment over time); RICHELSON,
supra note 24, at 241-47; William C. Priedhorsky, Eyes in Space: Sensors for Treaty
Verification and Basic Research, 28 LOS ALAMOS SCI. 152, 153 (2003) (describing U.S.
space-based systems for detecting nuclear detonations); Jasani, supra note 96, at 6
(suggesting that Russia may have deployed similar sensors on its satellites).
102 CBTO Verification Regime, supra note 96.
103 Jasani, supra note 46, at 21, 29-31; Krass, supra note 90, at 305 (discussing
how numerous countries have or are developing satellite imaging capability).
104 GALLAGHER & STEINBRUNER, supra note 6, at 23, n.59 (reporting that France
and Israel recently deployed independent reconnaissance satellites “in large part
because they could not count on receiving imagery from the United States and felt
that access to information had been used to manipulate their security policies.”);
Jasani, supra note 46, at 21, 24; W.E. STONEY, ASPRS GUIDE TO LAND I MAGING
SATELLITES (2008), available at http://www.asprs.org/a/news/satellites/ASPRS_
DATABASE_021208.pdf (providing a roster of optical and radar satellites, by
country, swath, and best resolution); Jana Honkova, The Russian Federation’s
Approach to Military Space and Its Military Space Capabilities, GEORGE C. MARSHALL
INST. POL’Y OUTLOOK, Nov. 2013, at 1, available at http://marshall.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/11/Russian-Space-Nov-13.pdf; George Jahn, UN Nuke
Agency’s Iran Probe Driven by US-Led Intel, WORLD POST, May 24, 2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/24/un-nuke-agency-iran_n_3331090
.html (reporting resistance from many countries to the International Atomic
Energy Agency’s heavy reliance upon U.S. intelligence, noting that “[m]uch of the
world looks at U.S. intelligence on weapons development with a suspicious eye”);
Russia to Launch New Spy Satellite in June, SPACE WAR, June 4, 2013,
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Promoting this dissemination of reconnaissance assets is the
fact that for some purposes, even less than state-of-the-art
capabilities may be useful. That is, even relatively inexact images
or imprecise data can contribute to treaty monitoring, by providing
a state a basis for challenging or complementing another treaty
party’s claims or intelligence assessments, and perhaps triggering
additional verification functions.105
Moreover, the technology in this area both advances and
spreads rapidly. By one count, in 2008, there were thirty-five
separate commercial imaging satellite systems in orbit from
seventeen countries, and many more were anticipated.106 Another
tally recorded 130 earth observation satellites operated by thirtythree countries in 2009.107 The level of ground resolution capability
attained by satellite photoreconnaissance (a measure of how small
an object on the surface of the earth can be discerned from space)
has dramatically improved.108 Details that could have been
detected only by top-secret U.S. government assets only a few
years ago are now accessible to satellites from many more

http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Russia_to_Launch_New_Spy_Satellite_in_J
une_999.html (reporting that Russia operates a network of 60-70 military
reconnaissance satellites, using updated imaging technology and electro-optical
systems). See also Kueter & Sheldon, supra note 76, at 16 (noting how national
security space systems are used for earth imaging or communications by several
countries, and how other countries are likely to pursue similar programs); Cerise
(Satellite), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cerise_(satellite) (last
updated Jan. 15, 2014) (listing reconnaissance satellites of nine countries).
105 For example, under the CTBT, supra note 92, evidence from NTM may be
used to support a request for on-site inspection and to assist in assessing a party’s
compliance. CTBT, supra note 92, at art. IV.D.37. See also Mort Canty et al., Treaty
Monitoring, in REMOTE SENSING FROM SPACE: SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY 167, 185 (Bhupendra Jasani, Martino Pesaresi, Stefan Schneiderbauer &
Gunter Zeug eds., 2009).
106 Pabian, supra note 7, at 226. See also STONEY, supra note 104 (listing optical
and radar satellites and their best resolutions); Space Security Index 2012, supra
note 2, at 122-25 (surveying remote sensing capabilities of several countries).
107 Hitchens, Saving Space, supra note 12, at 6.
108 CANTY ET AL., supra note 105, at 167-88; DAHLMAN ET AL., supra note 96, at
196-97; EUR. SPACE POLICY INST., supra note 2, at 6 (charting “the state of the art in
earth observation”); Hays, supra note 2, at 180-84; Jasani, supra note 46, at 21, 31;
LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 413-14; Irmgard Niemeyer, Perspectives of Satellite
Imagery Analysis for Verifying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in INTERNATIONAL
SAFEGUARDS AND SATELLITE IMAGERY, supra note 46, at 35, 36-39; Pabian, supra note
7, at 225-26; RICHELSON, supra note 24, at 169-87; WRIGHT, GREGO & GRONLUND,
supra note 16, at 169-71.
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countries, and to commercial operators, as well.109 According to
published reports, early images from the U.S. Landsat system
could discern objects only at the level of thirty to seventy-nine
meters; today, the GeoEye sensor can collect data as small as 0.41
meters.110 Chinese satellites, too, may soon be capable of sub-meter
ground resolution capabilities.111
It is therefore easy to predict that reliance upon multiple NTM
satellite platforms will increase in the future—more countries will
orbit more satellites to perform more verification functions
pursuant to more arms control and national security treaties. In
addition, at least as a cost-sharing measure, multinational consortia
are likely to grow, empowering additional joint participation.112
109 CANTY ET AL., supra note 105, at 167-88; EVIDENCE FROM EARTH
OBSERVATION SATELLITES, supra note 2, at xxx (observing that “commercialization
and privatization extended to the entire remote sensing operation, from building
and launching satellites to marketing and selling the data”); Jasani, supra note 46,
at 21, 31; BHUPENDRA JASANI, INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE MONITORING AGENCY – HAS
THE
TIME COME FOR ITS ESTABLISHMENT? 4-5 (2003), available at
http://esarda2.jrc.it/db_proceeding/mfile/P_2003_Como_2-10-jasani-040130.pdf
(listing resolution capabilities of optical satellites from several countries, some of
which are commercially available); Niemeyer, supra note 108, at 36-39; Pabian,
supra note 7, at 227; JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, COMMERCIAL SATELLITE IMAGERY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY (2012), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB404/; STONEY, supra note 104; WRIGHT, GREGO & GRONLUND,
supra note 16, at 169-71; U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
INTELLIGENCE NOTE, HIGH-RESOLUTION IMAGERY AND OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL (1996), available at http://www.gwu.edu/
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB404/docs/13.pdf (anticipating the advent of
widely-available high-resolution satellite imagery, which might affect verification
of arms control agreements); David Samuels, The Watchers, WIRED (June 19, 2013),
http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2013/06/startup-skybox.
110 Harris, supra note 66, at 50; Pabian, supra note 7, at 225-26 (listing high
resolution commercial satellites from several countries); Satellite Tasking, DIGITAL
GLOBE,
http://www.digitalglobe.com/products/data/select-tasking#featuresbenefits (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). See also Peter B. de Selding, Satellite Imagery
Firms in U.S. and Europe Pushing for Permission to Sell Sharper Imagery, SPACE NEWS
(Sept.
16,
2013),
http://www.spacenews.com/article/military-space/
37204satellite-imagery-firms-in-us-and-europe-pushing-for-permission-to-sell
(noting that private geospatial imagery providers are seeking authorization to
offer products revealing even better ground resolution).
111 Peter B. de Selding, China’s Satellite Imagery Capabilities Coming into Sharper
Focus, SPACE NEWS (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.spacenews.com/article/civilspace/37220china%E2%80%99s-satellite-imagery-capabilities-coming-intosharper-focus.
112 Eur. Comm’n, Towards a More Competitive and Efficient Defence and Security
Sector: A New Deal for European Defence, § 6.3, COM (2013) 542 final (July 24, 2013),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/files/
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The concept of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency113
—a hardy perennial in the disarmament literature—may be
revived, offering the potential for further collaboration in space
verification operations, via MTM (multilateral technical means), as
well as individual states’ NTM.
An important associated recent development has been an
increased reliance upon multi-function and privately-owned
satellites for monitoring purposes, expanding the concept of NTM
satellites in two ways. First, many defense-related satellites
perform multiple types of operations simultaneously.
GPS

communication_defence_en.pdf (calling for new forms of collaboration among
Member States to build an EU satellite high resolution capability); DoD Directive
3100.10, supra note 8, § 4f (stating that U.S. Department of Defense “will seek to
expand space-related cooperation with international partners”); AL-EKABI, supra
note 3, at 61 (noting collaboration between five European countries on commercial
satellite services to support European Defense Agency); RICHELSON, supra note 24,
at 347-72 (describing U.S. intelligence cooperation with foreign services, including
use of space assets); Media Note, U.S.-Japan, Joint Statement from the First
Meeting of the Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space (Mar. 11, 2013),
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/205939.htm?keepThis
=true&TB_iframe=true&height=600&width=960&caption=U.S.+Department+of+
State+-+Highlights (noting cooperation in space situational awareness and in
transparency and confidence-building measures between United States and
Japan); Media Note, U.S.-India, U.S.-India Joint Fact Sheet: Cooperation in Space
(June 24, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/
06/211029.htm (noting cooperation in earth observation and other fields); SPACE
SECURITY INDEX 69-71 (2011) [hereinafter Space Security Index 2011], available at
http://www.spacesecurity.org/space.security.2011.revised.pdf (noting increasing
formalized cooperation in space among African states); Dean Cheng, China’s
Military Role in Space, STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Spring 2012, at 55, 63 (noting
cooperation between China and Brazil in satellite imaging system); Peter B. de
Selding, Chinese, French Space Agencies Talk Collaboration, SPACE NEWS (July 19,
2013),
http://www.spacenews.com/article/civil-space/36363chinese-frenchspace-agencies-talk-collaboration; French Seek Lock on Persian Gulf Satellite Deals,
UPI (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry
/2013/10/14/French-seek-lock-on-Persian-Gulf-satellite-deals/UPI-88361381767
739/ (detailing the cooperation between France and Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates, and others); Tom Kington, Italy to Market Satellite Data to Other Countries,
DEF. NEWS (Oct. 19, 2013), http://www.defensenews.com/article/201310
19/DEFREG/310190004/Italy-Market-Satellite-Data-Other-Countries (reporting
that Italy purchased a reconnaissance satellite from Israel and will sell imagery on
the open market); Miles, supra note 5; Shelton, supra note 8 (reporting that U.S. Air
Force Space Command leader warns that U.S. reliance upon satellites carries great
advantages, but also vulnerabilities).
113 Dep’t for Disarmament Affairs, The Implications of Establishing an
International Satellite Monitoring Agency: Report of the Secretary-General,
A/AC.206/14 (1983); CANTY ET AL., supra note 105, at 168; Jasani, supra note 46.
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satellites, for example, not only provide reliable, precise location
information to the plethora of military and civilian receivers, they
also contribute to arms control verification by hosting sensors that
measure the visible light, radio waves, x-rays and radiation
emitted from a nuclear explosion.114
Likewise, other earth
monitoring orbiters can simultaneously or episodically contribute
data that are relevant both to the detection, identification, and
enumeration of other states’ military resources (fulfilling an NTM
function) and to the civilian tasks of forecasting weather,
facilitating commercial communications, assessing crop yields,
mapping highways, and responding to natural disasters.115
Second, commercially-owned and -operated satellites can be
hired or commandeered for security purposes, including as NTM,
as the occasion demands.116 For example, early in the fighting of
the Afghanistan war in 2001, the U.S. military entered the
international commercial marketplace to purchase all the available
satellite imagery of the theater of battle from all public sources—

114 AARON J. BELL, AIR FORCE INST. OF TECH., ANALYSIS OF GPS SATELLITE
ALLOCATION FOR THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR DETONATION DETECTION SYSTEM 9-14
(2002); DAHLMAN ET AL., supra note 96, at 108-09; Jasani, supra note 96, at 7; Shaida
Johnston, Technical Introduction to Satellite EO, in EVIDENCE FROM EARTH
OBSERVATION SATELLITES, supra note 2, at 11-13 (noting that “Many satellite
systems have multiple sensors on the same satellite platform” and citing the
example of the French SPOT system); RICHELSON, supra note 24, at 245; Paul R.
Higbie & Norman K. Blocker, The Nuclear Detonation Detection System on the GPS
Satellites, LOS ALAMOS NAT’L LAB. (Sept. 7, 1993), http://www.osti.gov/
bridge/servlets/purl/10185731-Uwbga3/10185731.pdf.
115 AFRICAN OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES, supra note 7, at 3 (discussing dual-use
satellites for Africa); DAHLMAN ET AL., supra note 96, at 108-10; Jasani, supra note
96, at 7; Cheng, supra note 112, at 64 (describing Chinese satellites used for both
civilian and military purposes); India to Tap Satellites as Missile Sensors, GLOBAL
SEC. NEWSWIRE (May 21, 2013) (stating that India will use geosynchronous
satellites both to monitor other countries’ missile developments, and to assist with
meteorology and communications).
116 DEFENSE GROUP INC., INDEPENDENT STUDY OF THE ROLES OF COMMERCIAL
REMOTE SENSING IN THE FUTURE NATIONAL SYSTEM FOR GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE
(NSG): FINAL REPORT (2007) [hereinafter INDEPENDENT STUDY], available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB404/docs/22.pdf;
U.S.
Army, Concept Capability Plan: Space Operations 2015-2024, TRADOC Pamphlet
525-7-4, 54 (Nov. 15, 2006) (listing several commercial communications satellites
as “enablers” of Army combat operations); Watts, supra note 5, at 5-6 (noting that
during the heaviest fighting in Iraq in 2003, eighty-four percent of U.S. military
communications were conveyed by commercial satellites); Hitchens, Saving Space,
supra note 12, at 7 (noting that several states are building dual-use satellites to
perform both civil and military functions).
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partially to obtain products that would supplement the output of
the U.S. government’s own satellites, and partly to deny access to
the enemy.117 As noted above, the emphatic policy of the U.S.
government is to increase its exploitation of private satellites for
the full array of public functions including security operations.118
Other states are also likely to realize the economic efficiency of
turning to the private sector for the performance of intermittent or
regular public missions—what some call “the Poor Man’s NTM.”119
This trend is evidenced by the fact that satellite remote sensing has
grown to a $1 billion per year business.120
Therefore, there can be no definitive roster listing all NTM
satellites; there is no requirement or state practice of officially
designating a particular orbiter as performing a national security
monitoring function.121 Many platforms, launched by a wide array
117 Hays, supra note 2, at 167, 183-84 (describing the practice of “checkbook
shutter control”); Niemeyer, supra note 108, at 39-40; Duncan Campbell, US Buys
Up All Satellite War Images, GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2001) http://www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2001/oct/17/physicalsciences.afghanistan.
118 Supra text accompanying note 8 (reporting the official policy of the U.S.
government to rely as much as possible upon private providers of satellite
functions).
119 Eur. Comm’n, supra note 112, at 19 (identifying commercial satellites as
the “most affordable and flexible solution” for the growing need for military
satellite communications); INDEPENDENT STUDY, supra note 116, at 54-55 (listing
several countries where governmental and commercial sponsors collaborate in
development of reconnaissance satellites); Pabian, supra note 7, at 221, 233-35
(recounting use of commercial satellite imagery in the detection of a covert
nuclear facility in Algeria, and other instances of application of private satellites
for security and arms control purposes); Kueter & Sheldon, supra note 76, at 15-16
(describing use of public-private satellite partnerships in other countries to save
costs and serve multiple functions); Sandra I. Erwin, Satellite Shortages May Choke
Off Military Drone Expansion, NAT’L DEF. MAG., Apr. 2013, http://www.
nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2013/April/Pages/SatelliteShortagesMay
ChokeOffMilitaryDroneExpansion.aspx (illustrating how Australia has achieved
significant savings by pursuing commercial-military cooperation in space).
120 SATELLITE INDUSTRY ASSOC., STATE OF THE SATELLITE INDUSTRY REPORT 12
(2012), available at http://www.sia.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Final2012-State-of-Satellite-Industry-Report.pdf (reporting ten percent growth in
satellite remote sensing imagery revenues to $1.1 billion in 2011).
121 See HARRISON, supra note 67, at 9 (explaining that during the cold war era,
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wanted to specify which satellites
were engaged in verifying compliance with arms control treaties and “both
extended the general ban on non-interference to the entire national security space
constellation of the other”); Harrison, Shackelford & Jackson, supra note 7, at 19
(“Both the Russians and the United States have extended the ‘non-interference’
ban to the entire military space constellation of the other.”).
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of actors ostensibly to fulfill a variety of purposes, can be adapted
to support arms control treaty monitoring as the occasion
demands. Google Earth122 and other types of widely distributed
satellite-based systems may in the future represent the face of
NTM almost as much as highly classified government-owned
orbiters now do.
Before moving on, it is instructive to note that NTM and other
satellites can transit a variety of orbital paths through space.123
Regarding altitude, three rough zones have been differentiated:
Low earth orbit (LEO) (closer to earth than about 1000-2000
kilometers) is the favored posture for high-resolution
photoreconnaissance satellites such as the now obsolete U.S.
Keyhole system.124 Medium earth orbit (MEO) (out to about 30,000
kilometers) is the environment for GPS satellites (and the
corresponding navigation constellations created by other
countries125) and the NTM sensors they host.126 Geosynchronous
earth orbit (GEO) (at 35,800 kilometers altitude, where the speed of
the satellite precisely matches the speed of the earth’s rotation so
the satellite appears to “hover” over a particular location on the
equator) offers special advantages for communications and
broadcasting satellites and for NTM satellites, such as elements of
the U.S. Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), which monitor

122 Pabian, supra note 7, at 238-44 (presenting a case study of using Google
Earth and commercial satellite imagery to observe a challenged clandestine
nuclear facility in Iran); GOOGLE EARTH, http://www.google.com/
earth/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2014) (offering “hundreds of maps covering
all corners of the globe, from historical imagery to the latest high-resolution
underwater terrain”).
123 See generally Jasani, supra note 46, at 20–29; Johnston, supra note 114, at 13–
16; WRIGHT, GREGO & GRONLUND, supra note 16, at 29–46.
124 WRIGHT, GREGO & GRONLUND, supra note 16, at 40–42.
125 Other space actors have developed their own versions of the U.S. GPS
system to provide independent location and timing information, such as Russia’s
GLONASS system, the European Galileo constellation, and China’s Beidou. See
LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 394–99; Honkova, supra note 104, at 19–25;
Pakistan Adopts Chinese Rival GPS Satellite System, PHYS.ORG (May 18, 2013),
http://phys.org/news/2013-05-pakistan-chinese-rival-gps-satellite.html (stating
that Pakistan is set to adopt China’s GPS satellite system); Russia Launches Latest
Satellite in Its Global Positioning System, GPS DAILY (Apr. 26, 2013),
http://www.gpsdaily.com/reports/Russia_launches_latest_satellite_in_its_globa
l_positioning_system_999.html (describing the satellite launch); Space Security
Index 2013, supra note 1, at 41–42.
126 WRIGHT, GREGO & GRONLUND, supra note 16, at 42.
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foreign missile launches and support U.S. missile defense
programs.127
These orbits may be structured as roughly circular, somewhat
elliptical, or highly elliptical, each of which confers particular
operational advantages.128 In addition to its orbital altitude, a
satellite is characterized by the degree to which its path overflies
the equator, overflies the poles, or is inclined at some selected
angle between those extremes.129 Due to a variety of anomalies
(e.g., magnetic fields, the effects of which are not evenly
distributed), not all regions of space, and not all orbital pathways,
are equally valuable. Instead, satellites tend to cluster into the
most advantageous operating sub-environments for the optimal
performance of their specified monitoring, communications and
other functions.
Finally, it is important to stress how the NTM functions
demand rigorous precision and reliability in the satellite
operations. For example, the characteristic dual-peak flash of light
from an atmospheric nuclear explosion, necessary to confidently
detect it and identify its location and nature, lasts barely one
second.130 If the appropriate NTM satellite is not on station
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, it may simply miss
this telltale signature of an important treaty violation. Likewise,
when a satellite is programed to overfly a particular site of interest
on earth at the same time each day, if that service is disrupted—as
when the satellite is not in the optimal position to perform its
assigned tasks—valuable comparative intelligence data may be
irretrievably lost.131 Often, the characterization of an event (such as
a nuclear explosion) requires the concerted efforts of multiple
satellites (such as calculating the location, time, and size of a
detonation, based upon the varying length of time required for the
127 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 248–50; RICHELSON, supra note 24, at 245;
WRIGHT, GREGO & GRONLUND, supra note 16, at 43; Cheryl Pellerin, Am. Forces
Press Service, Despite Smaller Budget, Air Force Seeks to Protect Satellites, DEP’T OF
DEF. (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119075
(noting that the SBIRS system employs satellites that are in geosynchronous orbits
as well as those in highly elliptical orbits).
128 WRIGHT, GREG & GRONLUND, supra note 16, at 24–25, 42–43; Space Security
Index 2013, supra note 1, at 31–32, 113.
129 WRIGHT, GREGO & GRONLUND, supra note 16, at 23–24.
130 See DAHLMAN ET AL., supra note 96, at 108–09.
131 Jasani, supra note 46, at 22–23.
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impulses to reach four or more satellites); if one element of the
necessary constellation is disrupted, the entire system may falter.132
NTM satellites, like all others, have only a limited capacity for
conducting maneuvers in outer space. All long-lived satellites
must have some ability to make adjustments (called “stationkeeping”) in order to maintain the desired orbital parameters in
the face of episodic disruptions from solar winds, interaction with
the upper atmosphere, irregularities in gravitational fields, etc.,
and they are equipped with small thrusters for this purpose.133 But
the fuel available to undertake these corrections is limited, and the
weight and volume of the propellant must compete with other
items necessary for performance of the satellite’s primary mission.
Large, repeated maneuvers are therefore expensive and shorten a
satellite’s useful lifetime.134
3.

THE LAW OF INTERFERENCE

The international law prohibiting interference with NTM is
longstanding and fundamental to the practice of arms control
treaty verification, but is still markedly incomplete. The concept—
or at least the vocabulary—of NTM, and the creation of an
obligation to refrain from interference,135 originated in the SALT I
132 See Higbie & Blocker, supra note 114 (describing the need for “four or
more satellites” to record the arrival time of x-rays from a nuclear detonation, in
order to determine its location); Pellerin, supra note 127 (quoting Gen. William L.
Shelton, the leader of the U.S. Air Force’s Space Command, stressing the
importance of a complete space program, saying “You can’t say, ‘Well, I’ll just
have one less GPS satellite or one less advanced [extremely high frequency]
satellite or one less [space-based radar] satellite’. . .You can’t create holes in the
constellation and still have global capability.”).
133 See WRIGHT, GREGO & GRONLUND, supra note 16, at 50 tbl. 6.1, 60–61;
Station-Keeping, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCI., http://www.daviddarling.info/
encyclopedia/S/station-keeping.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
134 WRIGHT, GREGO & GRONLUND, supra note 16, at 14, 49–61, 69–74. See also
GALLAGHER & STEINBRUNER, supra note 6, at 3; JOHNSON-FREESE, HEAVENLY
AMBITIONS, supra note 15, at 70–71; NATIONAL ACADEMY, supra note 29, at 92; Space
Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 79, 142 (reporting that the extra fuel required
for evasive maneuvers to avoid an ASAT interceptor “might represent more than
10–20 percent of the satellite cost”).
135 Article IX of the OST, supra note 50, which predates SALT I, creates a more
general obligation to engage in consultations prior to undertaking a space activity
that “would cause potentially harmful interference with the activities of other
States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.” Id. This aspect
of Art. IX has never been implemented. Michael C. Mineiro, FY-1C and USA-193
ASAT Intercepts: An Assessment of Legal Obligations Under Article IX of the Outer
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negotiations, 1969-1972.136 Those talks produced two agreements:
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty137 and the Interim
Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement),138
which inaugurated the stream of bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear
arms limitations. Neither of those two path-breaking accords
contained extensive provisions for “cooperative” verification of
compliance; each party relied instead upon its own unilateral
monitoring capabilities—notably, but not explicitly identified as,
satellites.139
Space Treaty, 34 J. SPACE L. 321, 344–45, 349 (2008). See also HARRISON, supra note
67, at 6 (reporting that the OST did not contain any explicit provisions on
verification because the United States was confident its NTM could adequately
verify compliance and it did not want to draw additional attention to those
capabilities; in fact, the United States preferred to rely upon its unilateral assets
instead of creating any cooperative international regime). Likewise, the 1963
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, which contains no express terms regarding verification, is tacitly
verified by the parties’ satellite NTM. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313,
480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter LTBT]. See Higbie & Blocker, supra note 114 (“[O]ne
of the conditions [underlying the LTBT] was that each party to the treaty could
monitor the ban on testing in the atmosphere or in space using its own technical
means”).
136 NOTBURGA K. CALVO-GOLLER & MICHEL A. CALVO, THE SALT AGREEMENTS:
CONTENT, APPLICATION, VERIFICATION 261–95 (1987); GRAHAM, supra note 88, at 37,
58–59; Krass, supra note 90, at 300; John B. Rhinelander, The SALT I Agreements, in
SALT: THE MOSCOW AGREEMENTS AND BEYOND 139–40 (Mason Willrich & John B.
Rhinelander eds., 1974); GERARD SMITH, DOUBLE TALK: THE STORY OF SALT I (1985);
STROBE TALBOTT, ENDGAME: THE INSIDE STORY OF SALT II (1979). See generally
VERIFICATION OF CURRENT DISARMAMENT AND ARMS LIMITATIONS AGREEMENTS:
WAYS, MEANS AND PRACTICES (Serge Sur ed., 1991).
137 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435 (no longer in force) [hereinafter ABM
Treaty]. The ABM Treaty significantly limited the two parties’ missile defense
systems. In particular, it confined them to two sites each (later reduced to one site
each) and restricted the numbers and types of interceptor missiles and supporting
radar installations.
138 Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3462 (no longer
in force) [hereinafter Interim Agreement]. The Interim Agreement was a five-year
“freeze” on the number of launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles and
submarine launched ballistic missiles. It was intended as a temporary holding
action, pending the negotiation of a more ambitious accord to reduce the numbers
of strategic weapons.
139 At the time of the SALT I negotiations, political conditions did not permit
intrusive onsite inspection of the territory of the United States or the U.S.S.R. The
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Regarding verification, Article XII of the ABM Treaty provides:
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance
with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use
national technical means of verification at its disposal in a
manner consistent with generally recognized principles of
international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national
technical means of verification of the other Party operating
in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment
measures which impede verification by national technical
means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.
This obligation shall not require changes in current
construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.140
Article V of the companion Interim Agreement on Strategic
Offensive Arms is substantively identical.141
These accords and their associated “agreed statements,”
“common understandings,” and “unilateral statements” provided
no definition of NTM or the other novel associated vocabulary.142
Similarly, the U.S. Department of State’s official “article by article

agreements were structured to regulate or ban only items that were sufficiently
large, fixed, and conspicuous (such as ICBM launchers and ABM radars), making
remote monitoring via NTM sufficient. Subsequent nuclear arms control treaties
between the United States and Russia, such as the START I and New START
Treaties, discussed infra, text accompanying notes 155–156, did incorporate
vigorous onsite inspection routines, but also retained the provisions for the use
and protection of NTM. GRAHAM, supra note 88, at 58–59, 131–33; Krass, supra
note 90, at 300, 306. See also STEINBERG, supra note 88, at 66 (reporting a famous
comment from President Lyndon Johnson, at the time of the early SALT
negotiations, that U.S. NTM satellites were worth ten times the money the nation
had spent in space, because “I know how many missiles the enemy has”).
140 ABM Treaty, supra note 137, at art. XII.
141 Interim Agreement, supra note 138, at art. V. The Interim Agreement
deviates from the ABM Treaty text only by substituting “Interim Agreement” for
“Treaty.”
142 ABM
Treaty, supra note 137, at Agreed Statements, Common
Understandings, & Unilateral Statements Regarding the Treaty between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles; Interim Agreement, supra note 138, at Agreed
Statements, Common Understandings, & Unilateral Statements.
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analysis” of the agreements143 and the U.S. Senate’s legislative
record144 were bereft of any expansive clarification of the intended
meaning of these points. Other items on the contemporaneous
public record, including the otherwise illuminating memoirs of the
chief U.S. negotiator,145 supplied no meaningful elaboration.
A general understanding emerged that “interference” (covered
by paragraph 2 of the ABM Treaty text) referred to actions that
might be undertaken against the NTM vehicle (e.g., attacking a
photoreconnaissance satellite), while “concealment” (regulated by
paragraph 3) related to actions that might be conducted on the
ground, to obscure the subject of the sensing (e.g., erecting covers
to hide the weapons being remotely observed).146 But little reliable
official clarification emerged.

143 See Treaty Compliance: ABM Treaty, Article by Article Review, U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF.: ACQWEB, http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/abm/abm_art.htm (last
visited Nov. 5, 2013) (the official Department of State explanation of the ABM
Treaty notes that Article XII.2 “would, for example, prohibit interference with a
satellite in orbit used for verification of the Treaty”).
144 See, e.g., Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements: Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 92d Congress, 2d Session 6, 340–41 (1972)
(containing only a brief discussion of NTM and satellites, which are mentioned
only in the testimony of Secretary of State Rogers and in colloquy between Phyllis
Schlafly, National Association of Pro America, and Senator John Sparkman).
145 See SMITH, supra note 136, at 30–31, 99–100, 534 (noting that satellite
photoreconnaissance is a critical form of NTM); GRAHAM, supra note 88, at 82–83
(recounting that in SALT II negotiations neither the United States nor the Soviet
Union wanted to define NTM).
146 See CALVO-GOLLER & CALVO, supra note 136, at 263–68 (discussing
concealment articles in the treaty); Stuart A. Cohen, The Evolution of Soviet Views
on SALT Verification: Implications for the Future, in VERIFICATION AND SALT: THE
CHALLENGE OF STRATEGIC DECEPTION 49, 60–65 (William C. Potter ed., 1980)
(differentiating between “active interference” and “passive interference,” the
latter of which is “concealment”). See also Cohen, supra, at 56–60 (discussing
evolving Soviet views of the legality of overhead reconnaissance under
international law, as reflected in paragraph 1 of the ABM Treaty provisions on
NTM); GUIDO DEN DEKKER, THE LAW OF ARMS CONTROL: INTERNATIONAL
SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT 118 (2001) (considering what limitations might be
suggested by the treaty commitment to operate NTM “in a manner consistent
with generally recognized principles of international law”); GRAHAM, supra note
88, at 59 (stating that the concept of “concealment” also applied to the encryption
of signals sent from a test missile back to its ground controllers, a practice that
interfered with the other side’s assessment of the missile’s compliance with arms
control treaties); TALBOTT, supra note 136, at 196–97 (describing SALT II
negotiations’ treatment of telemetry encryption as deliberate concealment);
WOOLF, supra note 93, at 11–15 (discussing importance of missile telemetry for
arms control treaty verification).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/3

03_KOPLOW (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

AN INFERENCE ABOUT INTERFERENCE

6/30/2014 2:24 PM

785

Nonetheless, the reliance upon NTM—and usually the rote
incorporation of virtually identical language—became standard
“boilerplate” practice in subsequent arms control treaties, as the
participants recognized that detente could not proceed in the
absence of reliable protection for these vital verification assets. The
1979 SALT II Treaty,147 for example, copied exactly the same text,148
supplementing it with a series of annotations defining in some
detail what “deliberate concealment” could mean in the context of
missile testing, but not otherwise elaborating the meaning of NTM
or of interference.149
The 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty150 specified
the NTM obligations in slightly different wording:

147 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R.,
June 18, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1138 [hereinafter SALT II]. SALT II would have replaced
the Interim Agreement with a comprehensive, long-term accord that provided
numerical limits on various categories and sub-categories of strategic nuclear
weapons; it never entered into force.
148 Id. at art. XV.
149 Id. at addenda to Article XV, First Agreed Statement (“Deliberate
concealment measures, as referred to in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty,
are measures carried out deliberately to hinder or deliberately to impede
verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the
Treaty.”); id. at Second Agreed Statement (“The obligation not to use deliberate
concealment measures, provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty,
does not preclude the testing of anti-missile defense penetration aids.”); id. at First
Common Understanding (“The provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the
Treaty and the First Agreed Statement thereto apply to all provisions of the
Treaty, including provisions associated with testing. In this connection, the
obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures associated with testing,
including those measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBMs and
launchers during testing.”); id. at Second Common Understanding (“Each Party is
free to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing,
including its encryption, except that, in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, neither Party shall engage in deliberate
denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption,
whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of
the Treaty.”); id. at Third Common Understanding (“In addition to the obligations
provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, no shelters which impede
verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the
Treaty shall be used over ICBM silo launchers.”)
150 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and ShorterRange Missiles, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Dec. 8, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-11 [hereinafter
INF Treaty]. The INF Treaty supplemented the SALT process by addressing
nuclear weapons of shorter ranges; it required the destruction of ground-launched
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1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance
with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use
national technical means of verification at its disposal in a
manner consistent with generally recognized principles of
international law.
2. Neither Party shall:
(a) interfere with national technical means of
verification of the other Party operating in accordance
with
paragraph
1
of
this
Article;
or
(b) use concealment measures which impede
verification of compliance with the provisions of this
Treaty by national technical means of verification
carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this
Article. This obligation does not apply to cover or
concealment practices, within a deployment area,
associated with normal training, maintenance and
operations, including the use of environmental shelters
to protect missiles and launchers.151
For purposes of this analysis, the substantive content of the INF
Treaty provision on NTM is identical to that of the ABM Treaty
and its progeny, with one conspicuous exception, discussed further
infra:152 the INF Treaty omits the word “deliberate” from the
restriction upon the use of “concealment” measures.
A host of other bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreements regarding
nuclear weapons mimicked these NTM provisions, not always
with cookie-cutter exactitude, but without any explanation of any
possible nuances of intended differences in the meanings of the
slightly varying formulations. The relevant provisions from the
1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty,153 the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear

ballistic and cruise missiles capable of ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers.
Id.
151 Id. at art. XII.
152 See infra text accompanying notes 223-225.
153 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., July 3, 1974, 1714 U.N.T.S. 123, 218 [hereinafter TTBT]. The TTBT
limited the size of nuclear weapons test explosions to 150 kilotons yield; it
constitutes a partial step toward the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Id. Article
II of the TTBT provides:
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Explosions Treaty,154 the 1991 START 1 Treaty,155 and the 2010 New
START Treaty156 are set out in the margin, with notations about the
minimal wording differences.

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of
verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with the generally
recognized principles of international law. 2. Each Party undertakes not
to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other
Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. To
promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this
Treaty the Parties shall, as necessary, consult with each other, make
inquiries and furnish information in response to such inquiries.
Id at 218. This article is substantively identical with the corresponding language
in the ABM Treaty except that the TTBT eliminates the ABM Treaty’s third
paragraph, which prohibits “deliberate concealment measures.” ABM Treaty,
supra note 137, at 3444.
154 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 28, 1976, 1714 U.N.T.S. 387, 435 [hereinafter PNET]. The PNET
regulates nuclear explosions conducted for “peaceful purposes” (e.g., for civil
engineering, such as to deepen a river channel or to create an underground
storage chamber, rather than for weapons development); it complements the
TTBT because there is no essential or externally observable difference between the
technologies of a “peaceful” and a “weapon” explosion, so similar limitations
should apply to both. TTBT, supra note 153. Article IV of the PNET provides:
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall: (a) use national technical
means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with
generally recognized principles of international law; and (b) provide to
the other Party information and access to sites of explosions and furnish
assistance in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Protocol to
this Treaty.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical
means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with
paragraph 1(a) of this article, or with the implementation of the
provisions of paragraph 1(b) of this article.
Id at 435. The PNET paragraph regarding interference with NTM is substantially
identical to the corresponding provisions of the ABM Treaty; the PNET (like the
TTBT) does not contain the ABM Treaty’s passage regarding “deliberate
concealment measures.” ABM Treaty, supra note 137, at 3444.
155 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
U.S.-U.S.S.R. July 31, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-20 [hereinafter START I].
START I continued the SALT process, but provided for actual reductions, rather
than merely ceilings, on the parties’ holdings of nuclear weapons, and established
legally binding cuts in several categories of arms. Id. Article IX of START I
provides:
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In addition, a number of multilateral treaties have noteworthy
provisions regarding NTM. For example, Article XV of the 1990
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty),157 provides:

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of
verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally
recognized principles of international law. 2. Each Party undertakes not
to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other
Party operating in accordance with paragraph l of this Article. 3. Each
Party undertakes not to use concealment measures that impede
verification, by national technical means of verification, of compliance
with the provisions of this Treaty. In this connection, the obligation not
to use concealment measures includes the obligation not to use them at
test ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs,
SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, or the association between ICBMs or
SLBMs and their launchers during testing. The obligation not to use
concealment measures shall not apply to cover or concealment practices
at ICBM bases and deployment areas, or to the use of environmental
shelters for strategic offensive arms.
Id at 33. START I is essentially identical with the ABM Treaty model, supra note
137, at 3444, regarding non-interference with NTM; like the INF Treaty, supra note
150, START I omits the word “deliberate” from the restriction on “concealment
measures.”
156 Article X of New START Treaty, supra note 97, provides:
For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes:
1. (a) to use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a
manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international
law; (b) not to interfere with the national technical means of verification
of the other Party operating in accordance with this Article; and (c) not to
use concealment measures that impede verification, by national technical
means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.
2. The obligation not to use concealment measures includes the
obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that result
in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, or the association
between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing. The
obligation not to use concealment measures shall not apply to cover or
concealment practices at ICBM bases or to the use of environmental
shelters for strategic offensive arms.
New START Treaty, supra note 97, at 13. The New START Treaty NTM provisions
are somewhat streamlined compared to the ABM Treaty model, supra note 137,
but substantively identical.
157 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe art. XV, Nov. 19, 1990, S.
Treaty No. 102-8 (1991), 2441 U.N.T.S 285, 309 [hereinafter CFE Treaty]. The CFE
Treaty limits five major categories of conventional military equipment in the
region between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains, and creates various
subzone limits. Id.
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1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance
with the provisions of this Treaty, a State Party shall have
the right to use, in addition to the procedures referred to in
Article XIV, national or multinational technical means of
verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with
generally recognized principles of international law.
2. A State Party shall not interfere with national or
multinational technical means of verification of another
State Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of
this Article.
3. A State Party shall not use concealment measures that
impede verification of compliance with the provisions of
this Treaty by national or multinational technical means of
verification of another State Party operating in accordance
with paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does not
apply to cover or concealment practices associated with
normal personnel training, maintenance or operations
involving conventional armaments and equipment limited
by the Treaty.158
The CFE text is not word-for-word identical to the ABM Treaty
model, but it is substantively the same, with the notable addition of
explicit recognition of “multinational” as well as “national”
technical means of verification.
The 1996 CTBT,159 in contrast, uses a different formulation of
the NTM obligations (without discussing whether any variation in
the meaning is intended). In Article IV., Section A, the CTBT
provides:
5. For the purposes of this Treaty, no State Party shall be
precluded from using information obtained by national
technical means of verification in a manner consistent with
generally recognized principles of international law,
including that of respect for the sovereignty of States.
6. Without prejudice to the right of States Parties to protect
sensitive installations, activities or locations not related to
this Treaty, States Parties shall not interfere with elements
158
159

Id. at art. XV.
CTBT, supra note 92.
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of the verification regime of this Treaty or with national
technical means of verification operating in accordance
with paragraph 5.160
In Article IV., Section D, there is an additional specification:
37. The on-site inspection request shall be based on
information collected by the International Monitoring
System, on any relevant technical information obtained by
national technical means of verification in a manner
consistent with generally recognized principles of
international law, or on a combination thereof. The request
shall contain information pursuant to Part II, paragraph 41
of the Protocol.161
The CTBT text is thus a departure from the traditional NTM
formula originally expressed in the ABM Treaty, but for purposes
of this analysis, the language accomplishes the same two

Id., at art. IV, sec. A.
Id. Note that the CTBT’s multilateral International Monitoring System
incorporates four collectively operated technologies relying upon ground- and
sea-based sensors; in addition, each party may employ its own NTM, which will
(at least in the case of the United States) depend heavily upon satellite monitoring.
See generally NRC, CTBT TECHNICAL ISSUES, supra note 96 (providing findings from
the committee on reviewing and updating technical issues related to the
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty). See DAHLMAN ET AL., supra note 96, at 10710, 126-27 (“In addition to using generally available data outside the
[International Monitoring System], a state may use different national assets as part
of its NTMs. This might include normal intelligence tools such as information
from human sources and from monitoring communications of different kinds.”);
See also Conference on Disarmament, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a
Nuclear Test Ban to the Conference on Disarmament 22, CD/1425 (Aug. 16, 1996),
available
at
http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G96/636
/15/pdf/G9663615.pdf?OpenElement (statement of China, objecting to the idea
of treating NTM and the international monitoring system “as equals”); id. at 25
(providing the statement of Cuba); id. at 28 (providing the statement of Iran); id. at
32 (providing the statement of Pakistan); DEN DEKKER, supra note 146, at 317-18
(reporting that during CTBT negotiations, Russia strongly supported including
language endorsing use of NTM, as a cost-efficient mechanism for verification;
China, Pakistan and others opposed such a provision, on the basis that NTM were
more available to the wealthy countries); Hays, Sino-American, supra note 3, at 20
(discussing Chinese resistance to allowing NTM to be used as a basis for CTBT
verification operations); Rebecca Johnson, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Now or
Never, ACRONYM Rep. No. 8, in A REPORT OF THE 1995 CONFERENCE ON
DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS (1995), available at http://www.acronym.org.uk
/acrorep/a08comp.htm.
160
161
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objectives: (1) an authorization to use NTM and; (2) a prohibition
against interference with it.
Surprisingly, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention,162
whose fulsome provisions on verification represent the “state of
the art” in arms control data reporting and inspection, does not
include any explicit reference to NTM. The provisions of the 1971
Seabed Arms Control Treaty,163 the 1986 Stockholm Document on
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in
Europe,164 and the partially applicable language of the OST165 are
CWC, supra note 92.
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the
Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337. This treaty
establishes the ocean floor as a zone free of nuclear weapons. Article III of this
treaty provides:
162
163

5. Verification pursuant to this article may be undertaken by any State
Party using its own means, or with the full or partial assistance of any
other State Party, or through appropriate international procedures
within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its
Charter.
6. Verification activities pursuant to this Treaty shall not interfere with
activities of other States Parties and shall be conducted with due regard
for rights recognized under international law, including the freedoms of
the high seas and the rights of coastal States with respect to the
exploration and exploitation of their continental shelves.
Id. at art. III. This treaty pre-dated the ABM Treaty, and therefore it does not fully
adopt the same vocabulary or structure. For instance, it does not use the term
“NTM,” and it specifies that verification activities shall not interfere with the
activities of the parties, rather than vice-versa. Id.
164 Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and SecurityBuilding Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with
the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSBMs), Sept. 19, 1986,
available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4725.htm. This document is a nonlegally-binding agreement regarding enhanced security arrangements in Europe.
With regards to compliance and verification, the agreement declares: “The
participating States recognize that national technical means can play a role in
monitoring compliance with agreed confidence- and security-building measures.”
Id. ¶ 64.
165 OST, supra note 50. Article IX provides:
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the
principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all
their activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial
bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States
Parties to the Treaty. States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of
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set out in the margin. In addition, there are several other arms
control regimes for which the parties do, as a practical matter, rely
upon NTM for the performance of treaty verification functions,
although the relevant treaty does not specify that procedure and
does not provide any explicit protection to NTM assets.166
Note that some of the above-cited instruments—most
importantly, the ABM Treaty, the SALT I Interim Agreement, and

outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct
exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also
adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the
introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt
appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has
reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its
nationals in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies,
would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other
States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake
appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such
activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to
believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause
potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful
exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or
experiment.
Id. The OST, which pre-dated the ABM Treaty, does not employ the term “NTM”
and does not directly prohibit “interference,” as the ABM Treaty model does.
Instead, the OST requires consultation prior to undertaking potentially interfering
activities. Id.
166 See generally INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND SATELLITE IMAGERY, supra
note 46 (describing states’ extensive reliance upon satellites to monitor compliance
with the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—which does not mention NTM—
and associated additional protocols, which are agreements that enhance the ability
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify compliance with
nuclear non-proliferation obligations); Pabian, supra note 7 (analyzing how
commercial satellites have played a role in non-proliferation verification); REMOTE
SENSING FROM SPACE, supra note 105, at 169; Priedhorsky, supra note 101, at 152
(stating that the LTBT, which contains no express terms regarding verification, is
tacitly verified by parties’ satellite NTM); Higbie & Blocker, supra note 114 (“[O]ne
of the conditions [underlying the 1963 treaty] was that each party to the treaty
could monitor the ban on testing in the atmosphere or in space using its own
technical means.”); George Jahn, Associated Press, UN Nuke Agency’s Iran Probe
Driven by US-Led Intel, HUFFINGTON POST (May 24, 2013, 8:27 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/24/un-nuke-agency-iran_n_333109
0.html (discussing IAEA’s use of intelligence information, including that derived
from satellite monitoring, provided by the United States).
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START I—are no longer in force (and SALT II was never legally
operative), and the CTBT has not yet entered into force.167
Finally, just as these treaties deliberately fail to provide any
definition of “national technical means,” they are likewise bereft of
any specification regarding the meaning of “interference.”
Nowhere in the texts of the instruments or in the public records
supporting their ratification and entry into force did the treaty
makers spell out the content of the concept of prohibited
interference in any meaningful detail.168 Nor has there been any
overt “case law” to flesh out the meaning of the key terms since no
party has ever publicly claimed that its NTM satellites have been
subject to actionable interference.
Surely, the notion of interference under these treaties would
have to embrace actions that would destroy, significantly damage,
or capture another state’s monitoring or communications
satellite.169 It should be equally obvious that less catastrophic

167 The implications of the lapse of these treaties are addressed further, infra,
section 5.2.
168 See SAMUEL BLACK, HENRY L. STIMSON CTR., NO HARMFUL INTERFERENCE
WITH SPACE OBJECTS: THE KEY TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING 5-8 (2008), available at http:
//www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/NHI_Final.pdf (discussing
“Methods of Interference”); Mineiro, supra note 135, at 337 (defining three types of
harmful interference in space: observational interference, radio frequency
interference, and physical interference).
169 See AM. ENTER. INST., SALT HAND BOOK: KEY DOCUMENTS AND ISSUES 19721979 45 (Roger P. Labrie ed., 1979) (quoting Henry Kissinger explaining that SALT
I does not prohibit the testing of an anti-satellite weapon, but would prohibit
using an ASAT to interfere with NTM); id. at 513 (quoting Paul Warnke as saying
that use of an ASAT would be both “interference” with NTM and “concealment”).
A standard dictionary definition of “interference” is an act of “hindering,
obstructing, or impeding” or a “hindrance or obstruction that prevents a natural
or desired outcome.”
Interference, THE FREE DICTIONARY http://www.
thefreedictionary.com/interference (last visited Nov. 5, 2013); Definition of
Interference, BING DICTIONARY, http://www.bing.com/ (search “definition of
interference”). Black’s Law Dictionary defines interference as “the wrongful act of
a person in preventing or disturbing the activities of another,” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910), available at http://thelawdictionary.org/
letter/i/page/54/ (scroll down page to find “interference” definition). For
comparison, the definition of “harmful interference” under the 1992 Convention
of the International Telecommunication Union is: “Interference which endangers
the functioning of a radionavigation service or of other safety services or seriously
degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication service operating
in accordance with the Radio Regulations.” Convention of the International
Telecommunication Union, Annex 2, December 22, 1992, 1825 U.N.T.S. § 1003
(emphasis added).
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actions, such as inflicting only temporary or limited disruptions
upon a satellite’s function—including dazzling or partially
blinding its sensors or fiddling with its internal circuitry to disable
it or divert it from its intended tasks—would also be prohibited.
Jamming the communications to and from a satellite (the uplinks
and downlinks) would also count as interference.
The argument here is that compelling a satellite to maneuver
away from its intended orbital pathway can also amount to
prohibited interference.
Such unplanned deviations are
impermissively disruptive for two reasons. First, they can cause a
satellite to be “off station”—in the sense of being absent from its
preferred, programmed location—at least to some degree, for some
period of time. The displacement may be small and temporary, or
it may be more significant and sustained. Second, obliging the
satellite to fire its thrusters in order to alter its orbit—and later to
do so a second time, to return to its wonted pathway—requires an
unbudgeted expenditure of fuel, often the most scarce element
limiting a satellite’s useful lifetime and its ability to sustain its
service to its owner.
4.

ASATS

The specter of anti-satellite weapons has been around almost as
long as satellites themselves—indeed, the first U.S. exploration of
ASAT concepts was drawn up within weeks of the U.S.S.R.’s first
orbit of Sputnik in 1957.170 In subsequent years, the United States,
Russia, and now China have pursued and experimented in space
with diverse ASAT systems; multiple other states also now have
significant capacities for and rising interests in similar
technologies.171
170 STARES, supra note 67, at 49 (reporting that first U.S. Army study of the
feasibility of satellite interceptors was commissioned in June 1957 (shortly before
the Soviet launch of Sputnik) and produced program recommendations by
November 1957); LEITENBERG, supra note 67, at 4-8 (describing genesis of U.S.
ASAT programs).
171 See Grego, supra note 70 (providing brief examples of countries that have
pursued ASAT and similar technologies). See also BURROWS, supra note 88, at 142–
48, 276–83; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2 at 525–30; STEINBERG, supra note 88, at 32–
35, 76–87; WRIGHT, GREGO & GRUNLUND, supra note 16, at 16–17, 117–39, 151–71.
See generally Brian Weeden, Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American and Russian
Anti-satellite Testing in Space, SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION (2014), available at
swfound.org/media/167224/Through_a_Glass_Darkly_March2014.pdf; MAX M.
MUTSCHLER, ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE: EXPLORING CONDITIONS FOR PREVENTIVE ARMS

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/3

03_KOPLOW (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

AN INFERENCE ABOUT INTERFERENCE

6/30/2014 2:24 PM

795

There are two basic physical concepts for ASATs—kinetic
energy (KE) interceptors and directed energy (DE) systems. KE
interceptors rely upon a mechanism for sending into space a
physical mass, which maneuvers close to the target and either rams
into it at fatal speed or detonates an explosion that destroys both
objects.172 Alternatively, directed energy ASATs would exploit
high-energy lasers, microwaves, cyber attacks, or beams of subatomic particles to burn a hole in a targeted satellite, blind or
temporarily “dazzle” its sensors, jam or spoof its communications,
or scramble its internal electronics.173
CONTROL (2013); STIMSON CTR., ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS, DETERRENCE AND SINOAMERICAN SPACE RELATIONS (Michael Krepon & Julia Thompson eds., 2013)
[hereinafter ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS, DETERRENCE AND SINO-AMERICAN SPACE
RELATIONS ].
172 WRIGHT, GREGO & GRUNLUND, supra note 16, at 135–39 (defining KE attacks
as, “[a]ttacks that attempt to damage or destroy a satellite through high-speed
collisions with another object” and providing further details of KE types and
mechanisms). See Grego, supra note 70, at 4–5. See also OTA, supra note 19, at 55–
66 (providing a general overview of U.S. ASAT capabilities and giving the Air
Force’s plans during the 1980s); WILSON, supra note 13, at 13–16 (noting that
“[k]inetic and chemical interceptors, conventional guns, and low power lasers are
the least sophisticated” ASATs); Ashton B. Carter, Satellites and Anti-Satellites, 10
INT’L SECURITY 4, 46 (1986); Jameson W. Crockett, Space Warfare in the Here and
Now: The Rules of Engagement for U.S. Weaponized Satellites in the Current Legal Space
Regime, 77 J. AIR L. & COM. 671, 677–79 (2012); Bruce M. DeBlois, Richard L.
Garwin, R. Scott Kemp & Jeremy C. Marwell, Space Weapons: Crossing the U.S.
Rubicon, 29 INT’L SECURITY 2, 50 (2004); Robert H. Zielinski et al., Star Trek—
Exploiting the Final Frontier: Counterspace Operations in 2025 (U.S. Air Force,
Research Paper for Air Force 2025, 1996), available at http://dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA392588. See also Brian Weeden, Anti-satellite Tests in
Space: The Case of China, SECURE WORLD FOUND., Aug. 29, 2013, at 1, available at
http://swfound.org/media/115643/China_ASAT_Testing_Fact_Sheet_Aug2013.
pdf [hereinafter Weeden, Tests in Space] (differentiating between kinetic ASAT
systems that rely upon a “direct ascent” mechanism (where the interceptor attacks
the target shortly after the interceptor is launched; it does not achieve its own
orbit) vs. “co-orbital” systems (which do place the interceptor in orbit, where it
may loiter for a sustained time before attacking a target). Notably, some early
U.S. and Soviet ASAT interceptor mechanisms relied upon nuclear explosives, but
in modern practice, with greater accuracy in homing in on the target, conventional
explosives are used (or no explosives at all—the system relies upon a direct
collision).
173 Grego, supra note 70, at 9, 15–16 (describing ground-based lasers and the
mechanisms whereby these lasers can “dazzle” and “partially blind” satellite
sensors). See OTA, supra note 19, at 66–75; HARRISON, supra note 3, at 10–14;
WILSON, supra note 13, at 17–20; WRIGHT, GREGO & GRUNLUND, supra note 16, at
118–35 (providing a detailed scientific description of the underlying mechanisms
for dazzling and partial blinding); Crockett, supra note 172, at 680–83 (discussing
radio frequency ASATs, which can jam signals, particle beam ASATs, which can
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In principle, either type of system could be based on the surface
of the earth, on an aircraft, or on a satellite; in practice, the
difficulty of sufficiently miniaturizing the power source, to date,
has required that any DE mechanism be ground-based.174 A KE
system could be “direct ascent,” meaning that the interceptor
suddenly soars from the earth to attack its target, or “co-orbital,”
meaning that the killer satellite circles ominously in space for some
extended duration, before being instructed to home in on and
attack a selected target.175
For purposes of this analysis, a major distinction between KE
and DE mechanisms concerns the creation of debris. Successful
use of a DE system could disable a target satellite, rendering it
“debris,” but at least it could be a single, large, and readilyobservable hazard in space. The nature of a KE system, on the
other hand, is to fracture the target (as well as the ASAT vehicle
itself), creating immensely more shards of debris, which are also
more difficult to detect and to navigate around. This distinction is
not absolute – a laser ASAT, for example, might (deliberately or
accidentally) hit a target’s fuel supply, causing it to explode, while
a hypothetical KE mechanism might be designed to capture or

generate “[e]nough energy to overload the satellite’s internal electronics,” and
microsat and nanosat ASATs, which can disrupt satellites); DeBlois et al., supra
note 172; Focus: Tackling Satellite Interference, MILSAT MAG., Dec. 2011, at 26,
available at http://www.milsatmagazine.com/cgi-bin/display_article.cgi?number
=289599074; Jan Kallberg, Designer Satellite Collisions from Covert Cyber War,
STRATEGIC STUDIES Q., Spring 2012, at 124, 124, available
at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/spring/kallberg.pdf (arguing how “cyber
warfare” may offer “[a]dversarial actors the opportunity to directly or indirectly
destroy US space assets with minimal risk due to limited attribution and
traceability”); Oppenheim, supra note 13, at 780–84. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF., DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS: FINAL
REPORT (2007), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA476
320.pdf.
174 See WRIGHT, GREGO & GRUNLUND, supra note 16, at 125 (noting that “ASAT
laser systems can be based on the ground, at sea, in the air, or in space,” and
providing examples of how ASATs could function in each location); Grego, supra
note 70, at 11, 16 (recognizing that, currently, the technology requires “large
power supplies, cooling, and, in some cases, exhaust systems”).
175 WRIGHT, GREGO & GRUNLUND, supra note 16, at 135-38 (defining and
describing direct ascent and co-orbital systems). See Grego, supra note 70, at 4–5.
See also WILSON, supra note 13, at 13-14.
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confine a target, while minimizing debris 176 – but it is generally
applicable.
4.1. United States
The United States conducted thirty-one kinetic ASAT tests in
space between 1959 and 1970, employing a variety of kill
mechanisms.177 Three more tests in the 1980s used another
approach, built upon a direct-ascent, non-explosive, hit-to-kill
Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV), launched from an F-15 jet.178
On September 13, 1985, the MHV was directed against an obsolete
U.S. Solwind solar observation satellite at 555 kilometers altitude,
colliding at 24,000 kilometers per hour.179 The impact obliterated
both spacecraft, generating over 250 pieces of traceable debris,
some of which required at least seventeen years to precipitate out
of orbit, and part of which spun dangerously within one mile of
the International Space Station.180
The MHV program was
terminated in 1987, but work continued fitfully on a nextgeneration kinetic ASAT through 2005.181

176 See Crockett, supra note 172, at 677; David Wright, Space Debris, 60 PHYSICS
TODAY 35, 36 (2007). See also Vladimir Dvorkin, Space Weapons Programs, in OUTER
SPACE: WEAPONS, DIPLOMACY, AND SECURITY, supra note 3, at 30, 35 (describing U.S.
concept for an “environmentally clean” KE ASAT).
177 See STARES, supra note 67, at 106–34, 261 (describing several early U.S.
ASAT programs, operated by Army, Navy, and Air Force, including both DE and
KE systems, including some using nuclear explosives); Pike & Stambler, supra
note 67, at 992–93. See also Desmond Ball, Assessing China’s ASAT Programs,
APSNET SPECIAL REP. (June 14, 2007), http://nautilus.org/apsnet/assessingchinas-asat-program/#n2; Weeden, supra note 171 at 21-30.
178 See Grego, supra note 70, at 4. See also STARES, supra note 67, at 206–09. See
generally WHITE HOUSE, THE U.S. ANTI-SATELLITE (ASAT) PROGRAM: A KEY ELEMENT
IN
THE
NATIONAL STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE, (1987), available at
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/reag87.html.
179 See KLINKRAD, supra note 20, at 20; Grego, supra note 70, at 5.
180 See Grego, supra note 70, at 5. See also KLINKRAD, supra note 20, at 20;
Imburgia, supra note 25, at 605.
181 See Pike & Stambler, supra note 67, at 993-94 (describing the history of the
program); Space Security Index 2012, supra note 2, at 140 (describing U.S. research
into ASATs throughout the 1990s and 2000s); Kerry Gildea, Possible Funding Boost
in FY’04 Budget Could Lead to KE-ASAT Flight Test, DEF. DAILY (Dec. 17, 2002);
Grego, supra note 70, at 5, 7 (reporting that the Air Force ended the ALMV
program amid political opposition; also, providing instances where work on
kinetic ASAT continued during the 2000’s); Emily Hsu, Program Officials Trying to
Rebuild Support for Army KE-ASAT System, INSIDE MISSILE DEF. (Mar. 5, 2003).
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In addition, it must be noted that there is (for Russia and
China, as well as for the United States) considerable technical and
bureaucratic overlap between ASAT programs and the
corresponding national anti-ballistic missile (ABM) efforts aimed at
developing systems for intercepting incoming ballistic warheads.
Therefore, equipment, know-how, hardware, and flight tests
nominally dedicated to either an ASAT function or an ABM
function can have considerable application to the other program,
too. Many missile defense systems are designed to operate at
relatively low altitudes, so the space debris resulting from an
intercept would not be persistent, but the similarity between the
two types of enterprises obscures any effort to state with clarity
whether a particular country is currently engaging in ASAT, ABM,
or both types of activities.182
A vivid illustration of this crossover was provided on February
20, 2008, when the U.S. Navy shot down the flailing USA-193
satellite by quickly adapting a standard ship-borne ballistic missile

182 JOHNSON-FREESE, HEAVENLY AMBITIONS, supra note 15; Michael Krepon &
Sonya Schoenberger, A Comparison of Nuclear and Anti-satellite Testing, 1945-2013,
in ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS, DETERRENCE AND SINO-AMERICAN SPACE RELATIONS,
supra note 171, at 131- 32 (discussing an emerging competition in ASAT capacities
among America, China and Russia); Mirmina, supra note 26, at 294, 299
(discussing possible overlap between ABM and ASAT testing, noting that missile
defense testing might generate space debris); David Wright & Laura Grego, AntiSatellite Capabilities of Planned US Missile Defence Systems, 68 DISARMAMENT
DIPLOMACY (2003) (analyzing the ASAT capabilities of three missile defense
systems: Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD), the ship-based Aegis-LEAP
system, and the Air-Borne Laser (ABL)); Am. Forces Press Service, Missile Defense
System Completes Successful Intercept Test, DEP’T OF DEF. (May 16, 2013),
http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=120059 (noting successful
missile defense test using the same type of missile and the same ship firing
platform that were used in the shoot-down of USA-193); Grego, supra note 70, at 2,
11-12 (noting that the ASAT mission is technically simpler than missile defense, so
capabilities that will suffice against incoming missiles would be relatively easy to
adapt for applications against satellites); Pellerin, supra note 127 (quoting U.S.
military official as stating “I think it’s safe to say that the Chinese didn’t conduct
the 2007 test and just quit. . . . They conducted another test in 2009 that, even
though it was called an antiballistic missile test, certainly had [anti-satellite]-like
ramifications. So I think it’s safe to say that they continue in their efforts.”);
Victoria Samson, Shooting down USA-193: A $100 million shot to be followed by even
greater political costs, CENTER FOR DEF. INFO. (Feb. 26, 2008); Overview of the
development of AEGIS by Lockheed Martin and United States Military, LOCKHEEDMARTIN
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/100years/stories/aegis.html
(quoting program director as asserting that “AEGIS is not a one-trick pony” and is
capable of missile defense and other missions) (last updated Feb. 7, 2013).
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interceptor to the task.183
The United States declined to
characterize this event as an ASAT test, but the capability is
unmistakable. Fortunately, this encounter occurred at low altitude
(approximately 250 kilometers) so the debris was short-lived.184
On the directed energy side, the most vivid demonstration of
U.S. ASAT prowess came in October 1997, with the test of the
MIRACL laser (Mid-Infrared Chemical Laser) in New Mexico. The
system targeted a MSTI-3 satellite at 420 kilometers altitude.
Detailed results of the event have not been released, but it appears
that although MIRACL basically failed, a companion lower-power
laser, intended merely to monitor the proceedings, demonstrated a
capacity to temporarily blind the target’s sensors.185
In recent years, the United States has expressed a vigorous
preference for DE, instead of KE, ASAT mechanisms, in order to
avoid the creation of unnecessary debris.186 The U.S. Air Force has
183 JOHNSON-FREESE, HEAVENLY AMBITIONS, supra note 15, at 108-16; U.S.
Missile
Hits
Spy
Satellite,
NEW
SCIENTIST
(Feb.
21,
2008),
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn13359-us-missile-hits-spy-satellite.html;
Press Release, Dep’t of Defense, DoD Succeeds in Intercepting Non-Functioning
Satellite (Feb. 20, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/
release.aspx?releaseid=11704; Am. Forces Press Service, Officials Declare Satellite
Mission Successful, DEP’T OF DEF. (Feb. 25, 2008), http://www.defense.gov/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49066.
184 Imburgia, supra note 25, at 604-05 (detailing that most of the debris from
this event de-orbited within an hour, and all the remaining debris fell soon
thereafter); Fred W. Baker III, Am. Forces Press Service, Gates Pleased by Mission’s
Success, DEP’T OF DEF. (Feb. 21, 2008), http://www.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=49025; Marc Kaufman & Walter Pincus, Effort to Shoot Down
Satellite Could Inform Military Strategy, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2008),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-02-20/ news/36805991_1_anti-satellitespy-satellite-joint-space-operations-center; Jim Wolf, U.S. Official Minimizes Debris
From Satellite Shoot, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2008, 6:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2008/03/19/us-satellite-intercept-usa-idUSN1932521820080319; Samson,
supra note 182.
185 Dvorkin, supra note 176, at 36-37; Grego, supra note 70, at 6-8; U.S. TestFires ‘MIRACL’ at Satellite Reigniting ASAT Weapons Debate, ARMS CONTROL TODAY,
Oct. 1997, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_10/miracloct; STARES, supra
note 67, at 213-15 (describing early US DE ASAT programs); Hitchens, Saving
Space, supra note 12, at 8 (describing continued U.S. military interest in highpowered lasers, which could have implications for ASAT development).
186 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: SPACE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY,
FISCAL YEAR 2004/2005 (2004), available at http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/
Y2005/AirForce/0603438F.pdf (stating that U.S. military policy is to “focus only
on negation technologies which have temporary, localized, and reversible
effects.”); Seven Questions: Space Weapons, Part II, FOREIGN POLICY (Aug. 1, 2005),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2005/07/31/seven_questions_space_we
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accordingly pursued a variety of advanced non-destructive “space
denial” mechanisms that would enable it to inflict disruptions
upon an enemy’s space systems that would be only localized,
temporary, partial, and reversible.187 Other states, too, are coming
to appreciate the importance of avoiding kinetic ASAT tests and
the unnecessary, dangerous space debris they create.188
The American fascination with the anti-satellite mission in
general has hardly abated. In his January 2013 confirmation
hearings, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel reiterated the standing
U.S. policy “to develop capabilities, plans and options to deter,
defend against, and, if necessary, defeat efforts to interfere with or
attack U.S. or allied space systems.”189 On May 7, 2013, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter revealed that the U.S. military
had undertaken a “long overdue” program to develop mechanisms
for countering the space capabilities of potential adversaries,
including both resistance to another state’s ASAT activities, and
pursuit of “our own capability to deny the use of space against our
forces in a conflict.”190
4.2. Russia

apons_part_ii (providing an interview with Daniel P. Leaf, vice commander of
U.S. Air Force Space Command, who states, “[o]ur priority is on temporary and
reversible means, not destruction”).
187 Kasku-Jackson & Waldrop, supra note 49, at 74-75; Jeffrey Lewis, Counter
Satellite Communications System Deployed, ARMS CONTROL WONK (Oct. 2, 2004),
http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/25/countersatellitecommunicationssystem-deployed (describing offensive counterspace program to enable U.S. Air
Force “to disrupt adversary space systems with temporary and reversible
effects”).
188 Group of Governmental Experts, supra note 15, at 17 (reaching a consensus
among an international group of governmental experts on outer space, including
representatives from China, Russia, and the United States on the judgment that
“[i]ntentional destruction of any on-orbit spacecraft or launch vehicle orbital
stages or other harmful activities that generate long-life debris should be
avoided”).
189 Bill Gertz, Hagel Responds, Hagel: Pentagon developing space weapons in
response to Chinese ASAT weapons, THE WASH. FREE BEACON (Jan. 31, 2013),
http://freebeacon.com/hagel-responds/.
190 Andrea Shalal-Esa, Pentagon Cites New Drive to Develop Anti-Satellite
Weapons, REUTERS (May l7, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/
05/07/us-pentagon-satellites-idUSBRE94614E20130507. But see Victoria Samson,
Space Control in the Air Force’s 2014 Budget Request, THE SPACE REVIEW (July 22,
2013), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2335/1 (concluding that Carter’s
remarks did not signal any major new anti-satellite weapons program).
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During the cold war, the Soviet Union was as early and as
vigorous as the United States in investigating multiple ASAT
instruments. The U.S.S.R. tested its primary mechanism (relying
upon 300 kilograms of high explosives) in space approximately
twenty times between 1968 and 1982. (Most of the tests were “flyby” demonstration events, not producing any collisions or debris.)
The system reached altitudes between 150 and 1600 kilometers,
and was regarded by the United States as an “operational”
capability.191 The program was decommissioned in 1993 and has
been quiescent for years, but Russian interest in the ASAT concept
has not dissipated. In 2009, responding to the continuing ASAT
developments in the United States and China, Russia’s Deputy
Minister of Defense, Valentin Popovkin, cautioned, “[w]e can’t sit
back and quietly watch others doing that; such work is being
conducted in Russia.”192
Moscow’s efforts on DE ASATs are harder to assess. A site in
Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan had long been suspected as the home
of advanced high-energy laser research, with possible ASAT
activities, or at least implications. However, an inspection of the
facility in 1989 revealed little cause for concern, and its current
status and activities are unknown.193

191 OTA, supra note 19, at 50-55; Dvorkin, supra note 176, at 32-33; Pike &
Stambler, supra note 67, at 994; Weeden, supra note 171, at 30-34; LEITENBERG, supra
note 67, at 27-34 (describing early Soviet ASAT programs); STARES, supra note 67,
at 135-56, 262; Asa Bates, Jr., National Technical Means of Verification, 123 ROYAL
UNITED SERVICES INST. J., no. 2, June 1978, at 64; Chinese Anti-satellite Test Creates
Most Severe Orbital Debris Cloud in History, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, Apr. 2007, at 2,
3, available at http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv11i2.pdf
(noting that Soviet ASAT testing from 1968 to 1982 had generated more than 700
catalogued items of space debris, 301 of which are still in orbit); Johnson, supra
note 25, at 3; Ball, supra note 177, at 3; Grego, supra note 70, at 3-4; Anatoly Zak,
The Hidden History of the Soviet Satellite-Killer, POPULAR MECHANICS (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/satellites/the-hiddenhistory-of-the-soviet-satellite-killer-16108970; Anatoly Zak, Spacecraft: Military: IS
Anti-satellite System, RUSSIAN SPACE WEB, http://www.russianspaceweb.com
/is.html (last updated Nov. 1, 2013).
192 Honkova, supra note 104, at 34-40; Russia Building Anti-satellite Weapons,
THE INDEPENDENT (UK), Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/europe/russia-building-antisatellite-weapons-1638270.html; Russia
Pursuing Antisatellite Capability, GLOBAL SEC. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 6, 2009,
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/russia-pursuing-antisatellite-capability/.
193 STARES, supra note 16, at 145-46 (describing early Soviet DE ASAT
programs); Ball, supra note 177; Grego, supra note 70, at 6, 8. See Space Operations
Discussion Board, Real Space Wars, STRATEGY PAGE (Sept. 25, 2004),
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4.3. China
China entered the ASAT game late, but with a bang.194 China
tested its KE mechanism—an interceptor launched from a mobile
two-stage ballistic missile—in space three times in 2005-07. The
first two demonstrations did not involve any impacts or explosions
or create any orbital debris.195 Then, on January 11, 2007, China
deployed the system to strike an aging Fengyun-1C weather
satellite at 860 kilometers altitude.196 The resulting collision
produced three thousand of pieces of trackable debris, totaling
approximately seventeen percent of all the human-caused rubble
then in orbit. This percussion is widely considered to be the worst
space debris-generating event in history, because the altitude of
impact will cause the debris cloud to remain in orbit for decades or
centuries, obscuring the possibilities for safe space travel and
operations in an unpredictable, ever-widening swath. Fully two-

http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/21-158.aspx#startofcomments
(discussing alleged Soviet use of lasers against U.S. reconnaissance satellites in
1970s through 1980s); see also Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces: Is Russia Reviving an
Old Laser ASAT Project, RUSS. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, May 27, 2011,
http://russianforces.org/blog/2011/05/is_russia_reviving_an_old_lase.shtml.
(regarding a possible renewal of Russian interest in laser ASAT systems).
194 China orbited its first satellite in 1970; its activities in space have
accelerated greatly in recent years. ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS, DETERRENCE AND
SINO-AMERICAN SPACE RELATIONS , supra note 171, passim; Cheng, supra note 59, at
55; Weeden, Tests in Space, supra note 172; Phillip Saunders, Jing-dong Yuan,
Stephanie Lieggi & Angela Deters, China’s Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic
of Anti-Satellite Weapons, CENTER FOR NAT’L SEC., JAMES MARTIN CENTER FOR
NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES (July 22, 2002), http://cns.miis.edu/stories/
020722.htm; Joan Johnson-Freese, China’s Space Ambitions, IFRI SECURITY STUDIES
CENTER PROLIFERATION PAPERS, Summer 2007, at 5, available at
http://www.ifri.org/files/Securite_defense/China_Space_Johnson_Freese.pdf;
John Hickman, China Is Winning the Space Race, FOREIGN POLICY (Aug. 2, 2013),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/02/china_is_winning_the_spa
ce_race.
195 Michael R. Gordon & David S. Cloud, U.S. Knew of China’s Missile Test, But
Kept Silent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/
23/washington/23satellite.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Weeden, Tests in Space,
supra note 172, at 2.
196 Shirley Kan, China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS22652 (2007); Special Report: Chinese Anti-Satellite Weapon Test: The Shot Heard
‘Round the World, 13 WMD INSIGHTS, Mar. 2007, at 2, available at
http://cns.miis.edu/wmd_insights/WMDInsights_2007_03.pdf; Gregory Kulacki
& Jeffrey G. Lewis, Understanding China’s Antisatellite Test, 15 NONPROLIFERATION
REV. 2, 335 (2008); Mineiro, supra note 135; Gordon & Cloud, supra note 195.
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thirds of the payloads now in orbit will have to pass through the
hazard zone.197
In January 2010 and January 2013, China again test-fired
rockets—without generating any orbital debris—labeling these as
missile defense tests, rather than ASAT events, but the
technological cross-over is undeniable.198 In August 2010, two
small Chinese satellites maneuvered into close proximity and
apparently “bumped” each other at low speed, in another possible
ASAT experiment.199 More dramatically, in May 2013, China fired
a DN-2 rocket into space—again, with no explosion or collision—in
197 MATTHEW DUNCAN & DAVID K. RAND, CLOSE APPROACH PREDICTION
ANALYSIS OF THE EARTH SCIENCE CONSTELLATION WITH THE FENGYUN-1C DEBRIS
(2008),
available
at
http://www.ai-solutions.com/Portals/0/AI%20Docs/
Technical%20Paper%20Library%20pdf/2008/7.pdf; T.S. KELSO, ANALYSIS OF THE
2007 CHINESE ASAT TEST AND THE IMPACT OF ITS DEBRIS ON THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT
(2007), http://celestrak.com/publications/AMOS/2007/AMOS-2007.pdf; NASA,
ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAM OFFICE, HISTORY OF ON-ORBIT SATELLITE FRAGMENTATIONS
1 (14th ed. June 2008), available at http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/
SatelliteFragHistory/TM-2008-214779.pdf; An Update of the FY-1C, Iridium 33, and
Cosmos 2251 Fragments, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, Jan. 2013, at 1, 4-5, available at
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv17i1.pdf
(reporting
that of the 3378 items of cataloged debris from the 2007 ASAT test, 302 had
decayed, leaving 3076 still in orbit, and projecting that some of the debris will
remain in space beyond 2105); Imburgia, supra note 25, at 600 (explaining that
because the debris from the Chinese 2007 test was driven by the collision into
different directions at high speeds, it has spread to completely surround the
earth); Mineiro, supra note 135; Most Severe Orbital Debris Cloud, supra note 191; Top
Ten Satellite Breakups, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, July 2010, at 2, 3, available at
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv14i3.pdf
(reporting
that the 2007 event was “By far the source of the greatest amount of orbital
debris,” accounting for eighteen percent of the entire catalog of human-made
debris in space); Brian Weeden, 2007 Chinese Anti-Satellite Test Fact Sheet, SECURE
WORLD FOUND., Nov. 23, 2010, at 1, available at http://swfound.org/
media/9550/2007_chinese_asat_test_factsheet.pdf; Miles, supra note 10; Weeden,
Tests in Space, supra note 172, at 2; Schulte, supra note 1, at 5.
198 Li Bin, What China’s Missile Intercept Test Means, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INT’L PEACE
(Feb. 4, 2013), http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/
02/04/what-china-s-missile-intercept-test-means/fa45; China: Missile Defense
System Test Successful, USA TODAY (Nov. 11, 2010, 8:08 PM), http:
//usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-01-11-china-missile-defense_N.
htm?csp=34; Bill Gertz, Going on Defense, WASH. FREE BEACON (Jan. 27, 2013, 5:02
PM),
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/going-on-defense/;
Brian
Weeden, Time for Obama to Go Public on China’s ASAT Program, DEF. NEWS (June 2,
2013,
4:05
PM),
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130602/
DEFREG/306020009/Time-Obama-Go-Public-China-s-ASAT-Program.
199 Cheng, supra note 59, at 64; Weeden, supra note 36; William Matthews,
Chinese Puzzle, DEFENSENEWS.COM (Sept. 6, 2010), http://www.defensenews.com/
article/20100906/DEFFEAT01/9060317/Chinese-Puzzle.
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an exercise widely interpreted as a first test of another new ASAT
system, one purportedly capable of jeopardizing even satellites at
high altitudes.200
Chinese authorities have gone on record as pursuing space
denial capabilities, saying, “[i]t is necessary for China to have the
ability to strike US satellites. This deterrent can provide strategic
protection to Chinese satellites and the whole country’s national
security.”201
200 CRAIG MURRAY, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, CHINA MISSILE
LAUNCH MAY HAVE TESTED PART OF A NEW ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITY (2013),
available at http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China
%20Missile%20Launch%20May%20Have%20Tested%20Part%20of%20a%20New
%20Anti-Satellite%20Capability_05.22.13.pdf; Bill Gertz, China Conducts Test of
New Anti-Satellite Missile, WASH. FREE BEACON (May 14, 2013, 1:46 PM), http://
freebeacon.com/national-security/china-conducts-test-of-new-anti-satellitemissile; Bill Gertz, China’s Latest Space Warfare is not ‘A Big Step for Mankind’ . . .
Satellite Catches and Doesn’t Release, SATNEWS DAILY, Oct. 4, 2013, http://www.
satnews.com/story.php?number=1243651026; Johnson-Freese, Learning, supra
note 77; Weeden, supra note 171, at 4-20; Tom Phillips, US Fears After Chinese
Missile Test, THE TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (May 17, 2013, 9:57 AM), http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10063455/US-fears-after-Chinesemissile-test.html; Andrea Shalal-Esa, U.S. Sees China Launch as Test of Anti-Satellite
Muscle: Source, REUTERS (May 15, 2013, 6:43 PM), http://www.reuters.
com/article/2013/05/15/us-china-launch-idUSBRE94E07D20130515;
Weeden,
Tests in Space, supra note 172, at 2. See also Bill Gertz, China Launches Three ASAT
Satellites, WASH. FREE BEACON (Aug. 26, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://freebeacon.com/
national-security/china-launches-three-asat-satellites (assessing that three small
satellites launched in July 2013 are also intended for testing anti-satellite
functions).
201 Ashley Tellis, Punching the U.S. Military’s “Soft Ribs”: China’s Antisatellite
Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective, 51 POLICY BRIEF (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace), Jun. 2007, at 1, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/
files/pb_51_tellis_final.pdf. Russian Satellite Hit by ‘Space Junk’ from Destroyed
Chinese Spacecraft, RT (Mar. 9, 2013), http://rt.com/news/russian-satellite-collidechinese-044/ (quoting a January 2013 editorial in the state-run Global Times
China). See also LARRY M. WORTZEL, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S
LIBERATION ARMY AND SPACE WARFARE (2007), available at http://www.
aei.org/files/2007/10/17/20071017_SpaceWarfare.pdf
(analyzing
Chinese
military strategists’ discussions and writings); Cheng, supra note 112, at 65-69
(surveying Chinese writings on military space operations); Wilson, supra note 13,
at 5 (quoting a Chinese news agency as noting, “For countries that could never
win a war by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. space
system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice”). But see Kulacki &
Lewis, supra note 196 (postulating that the U.S. perception of China’s intentions
overestimates “the importance of the United States as a driver in China’s decision
to develop the technology and conduct the test”); Paul Oh, Assessing Chinese
Intentions for the Military Use of the Space Domain, 64 JOINT FORCE Q., 1st quarter,
2012, at 91 (suggesting that the government of China may be divided concerning
militarization of space).
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The U.S. military has taken Beijing’s actions and statements of
intention seriously. The growing concern is reflected in the most
recent authoritative U.S. annual report on Chinese military
developments, which highlighted the fact that China “is acquiring
a range of technologies to improve China’s space and counterspace capabilities,” citing both kinetic and directed energy
programs that could “blind and deafen the enemy.”202
Regarding the DE ASAT systems, there have been
uncorroborated reports about what could be quite provocative
Chinese activity, allegedly illuminating and disrupting or
damaging U.S. satellites with high-powered lasers. Whether these
2006 events were tests of a laser dazzler or simply a mechanism to
detect and track orbiters overflying China remains unknown.203
Still, Chinese defense reports continue to assert that “the ability to
wage cyber war in space is vital for China’s military
modernization.”204
4.4. Other Countries
Distressingly, the capability for undertaking at least crude
ASAT activities may already have proliferated broadly. The
202 U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2013, at 33
(2013), available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.
pdf; Ball, supra note 177; Andrea Shalal-Esa, Space Plays a Growing Role in U.S.China Security Talks: Official, REUTERS (Apr. 11, 2013, 9:26 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2013/04/12/us-usa-china-space-idUSBRE93B01W20130412
(quoting Department of State official saying “The United States continues to have
concerns about the development of China’s anti-satellite program . . . .”); News
Briefing, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, DOD News Briefing with Deputy Secretary
William Lynn and Assistant Secretary of Defense Gregory Schulte (Feb. 4, 2011),
available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
4765 (expressing concern about a wide range of developing Chinese military
counter-space capabilities).
203 TELLIS, supra note 201, at 4–5; Ball, supra note 177; Yousaf Butt, Effects of
Chinese Laser Ranging on Imaging Satellites, 17 SCIENCE AND GLOBAL SECURITY 20
(2009); Grego, supra note 70, at 11; Francis Harris, Beijing Secretly Fires Lasers to
Disable US Satellites, THE TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Sept. 26, 2006, http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/worldnews/1529864/Beijing-secretly-fires-lasers-to-disable-USsatellites.html; Vago Muradian, China Attempted to Blind U.S. Satellites with Laser,
DEF. NEWS, Sept. 21, 2006, http://sci.tech-archive.net/pdf/Archive/sci.space.
policy/2006-09/msg00666.pdf.
204 Bill Gertz, China’s Military Preparing for ‘People’s War’ in Cyberspace, Space,
WASH. FREE BEACON (July 30, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://freebeacon.com/nationalsecurity/china-military-preparing-for-peoples-war-in-cyberspace-space.
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overlap between long-range missile technology and space-launch
technology means that many countries already possess, or could
soon develop, the competence for hostile space operations. Even a
low-tech concept, such as inserting a quantity of gravel or nails
into the oncoming path of a target satellite could constitute a crude
KE capability (at least for a country that was not overly concerned
about preserving its own ability to undertake peaceful space
operations in the future, uninhibited by persistent junk).205
India, in particular, has been publicly energized to pursue
autonomous ASAT capabilities. Spurred by China’s 2007 ASAT
test, India has hastened to enhance its military space activities,
focusing on a kinetic energy mechanism adapted from its missile
defense program.206
Jeffrey Lewis, “Hit-to-Kill” and the Threat to Space Assets, in CELEBRATING
SPACE AGE, supra note 17, at 147, 149 (highlighting kinetic energy ASAT
development work in Israel, Japan, and European countries); Robert McDougall &
Phillip J. Baines, Military Approaches to Space Vulnerabilities: Seven Questions, in
MONTEREY INST. CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, FUTURE SECURITY IN SPACE:
COMMERCIAL, MILITARY, AND ARMS CONTROL TRADE-OFFS 11, 13 (James Clay Moltz
ed., 2002) (asking “Who has the capability to create such threats?”); WRIGHT,
GREGO & GRONLUND, supra note 16, at 136–37, 157–65; Space Security Index 2013,
supra note 1, at 83; Space Security Index 2011, supra note 112, at 152; Wilson, supra
note 13, at 11–13; Burak Ege Bekdil, Turkey’s Sat-Launcher Plans Raise Concerns,
DEF. NEWS (July 28, 2013, 3:45 AM), http://www.defensenews.com/
article/20130728/DEFREG04/307280004/Turkey-s-Sat-Launcher-Plans-RaiseConcerns (noting technological overlap between satellite launch and missile
capabilities); Ball, supra note 177; Grego, supra note 70, at 9–10; Why It’s So Hard
for North Korea (or Anyone) to Build an ICBM, DVICE (May 9, 2013, 12:04 PM),
http://www.dvice.com/2013-5-9/why-its-so-hard-north-korea-or-anyone-buildicbm (citing North Korea technological progress as an example of the difficulty in
building an accurate ICBM).
206 Lewis, supra note 205, at 149; Arvind K. John, India and the ASAT Weapon,
ORF ISSUE BRIEF 41 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.observerindia.com/
cms/sites/orfonline/modules/issuebrief/attachments/ORF_Ib_41_134612941491
7.pdf; Kallberg, supra note 173, at 128–30; Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1,
at 86; Space Security Index 2011, supra note 112, at 156; Peter B. de Selding, India
Developing Anti-Satellite Spacecraft, SPACE.COM
(Jan. 11, 2010, 3:42 PM),
http://www.space.com/7764-india-developing-anti-satellite-spacecraft.html;
Grego, supra note 70, at 13; India Contemplates Anti-Satellite Vehicle Integration with
Agni-III Ballistic Missile, DEFENCENOW.COM, http://www.defencenow.com/
news/343/india-contemplates-anti-satellite-vehicle-integration-with-agni-iiiballistic-missile.html (last updated Oct. 2013); Vivek Raghuvanshi, China’s ASAT
Galvanizes Indian Efforts, ACCESS WORLD NEWS (Apr. 9, 2007, 3:45 AM),
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120225/DEFFEAT06/120202001/SPECI
AL-REPORT; Vivek Raghuvanshi, India’s Tech Roadmap Points to Small Sats, Space
Weapons, DEF. NEWS (Sept. 10, 2013, 9:45 AM), http://www.defensenews.com/
article/20130910/DEFREG03/309100007/India-s-Tech-Roadmap-Points-Small205
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DE mechanisms, including devices to interrupt normal satellite
services at least temporarily, may be even more widely
disseminated. Commercial-off-the-shelf lasers may almost suffice
to jeopardize many satellites, and one expert group concluded in
2006 that “[a]s many as 30 states may already have the capability to
use low-power lasers to degrade unhardened satellite sensors.”207
Electronic jamming or other radio frequency interference is an
even more present threat, with persistent complaints about
annoying and costly disruptions.208 Even non-spacefaring states
and non-state actors can get into this insidious game, with various
genres of hackers demonstrating the power to degrade, jam, or
even preempt satellite broadcasts.209
5.

THE THESIS

This section assembles the material presented above to
propound the thesis that a test or use in space of a debris-creating
ASAT would already be illegal under existing international law,
even in the absence of any new, hard-to-negotiate treaty on point,
because such an intercept would create a dangerous, persistent

Sats-Space-Weapons; Victoria Samson, Intel: India’s Missile Defense/Anti-Satellite
Nexus, MILSATMAGAZINE.COM (Sept. 2010), http://www.milsatmagazine.com/cgibin/display_article.cgi?number=1588860555.
207 SPACESECURITY.ORG, SPACE SECURITY 2006, at 23 (2006), available at
http://www.spacesecurity.org/SSI2006.pdf.
See also WRIGHT, GREGO &
GRUNLUND, supra note 16, at 119, 125-30, 140-42 (noting that simple mechanisms
for jamming satellite communications are inexpensive to make or buy); Grego,
supra note 70, at 10, 16 (reporting that dazzling of a satellite “can be achieved with
low-power lasers that are widely available commercially”); DOD News Briefing,
supra note 202, at 5 (noting that countries including China, Iran, and Ethiopia have
used their counterspace capabilities and jammed commercial satellites); Schulte,
supra note 1, at 5.
208 Space Security Index 2013, supra note 1, at 84-85; France’s Eutelsat Jams Iran
Press TV Channel, PRESSTV (May 31, 2013), http://www.presstv.com/detail/
2013/05/31/306383/press-tv-signals-jammed-on-nilesat/; Press Release, Eutelsat,
Eutelsat Condemns Jamming of Broadcasts from Iran and Renews Appeals for
Decisive Action to International Regulators (Oct. 4, 2012), available at http://www.
eutelsat.com/home/news/communiques-de-presse/archives/2012/press-listcontainer/eutelsat-condemns-jamming-of-bro.html.
209 WRIGHT, GREGO & GRUNLUND, supra note 16, at 122 (noting jamming of
Chinese television broadcasts by Falun Gong); William J. Lynn, III, A Military
Strategy for the New Space Environment, 34 WASH. Q. 7, 11 (2011); Nina-Louisa
Remuss, The Need to Counter Space Terrorism - A European Perspective, EURO. SPACE
POL’Y INST. PERSP., no. 17, Jan. 2009, at 3; Grego, supra note 70, at 9.
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debris stream that would, at some point, impermissibly interfere
with the operation of treaty-protected NTM satellites.
The discussion first presents the thesis and suggests its
implications. Then it considers three significant “counterpoints” or
potential limitations upon its validity and power.
This argument seeks to combine something old, something
new, and something surprising. The old part is the commitment to
use and protect NTM as an essential element in the global security
apparatus; international respect for this critical element of the arms
control infrastructure is longstanding and profound.210 The new
part is the increasing awareness of the hazards of orbital debris; the
spacefaring community is uniting as never before in its rejection of
the shortsighted fouling of the exo-atmospheric environment and
its appreciation of the imperative of avoiding further harm.211 The
surprising part is that existing international law—understood in a
novel way—can already contribute a partial solution, even in the
absence of any new laboriously-negotiated and politicallycontentious treaty that would explicitly ban ASAT activity.212
The emerging reality is that space debris imposes an increasing,
unacceptable cost to safe and efficient satellite operations, and any
future kinetic energy ASAT events in space would likely generate
expansive debris plumes that would impermissibly interfere with
NTM operations over a very long time frame. This interference
210 See supra text accompanying notes 135-165 (discussing treaty provisions
protecting NTM).
211 See supra section 1.2 (discussing increasing global concern about space
debris). See also Barry Kellman, Space: The Fouled Frontier: Adjudicating Space Debris
as an International Environmental Nuisance (forthcoming); Hitchens, supra note 61.
Arguably, the relatively recent growth in the recognition of the seriousness of the
problem of space debris could provide a basis for differentiating, in terms of legal
liability, between early and contemporary ASAT debris creation. That is, the U.S.
and Soviet ASAT tests of the 1960s through 1980s might not be viewed as such
egregious violations of the NTM-protecting provisions of the SALT I agreements,
because there was only a low probability that the resulting debris would, in fact,
disrupt the operation of the relatively few photoreconnaissance satellites then
operational. Today, however, the vastly greater population of objects in space has
created a much more serious debris problem, including a much greater danger of
disruption of NTM vehicles, and all spacefaring actors must be well aware of the
risks. See JAMES CLAY MOLTZ, THE POLITICS OF SPACE SECURITY: STRATEGIC
RESTRAINT AND THE PURSUIT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS 203 (2d ed. 2011) (noting the
U.S. Department of Defense’s official acknowledgement in the 1980s of the
problem of space debris and its pledge to mitigate creation of new debris).
212 See supra text accompanying notes 69-87 (discussing political difficulty in
attempting to negotiate new arms control measures for outer space).
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comes in three forms. First, wayward debris from an ASAT event
could directly impact an NTM satellite.213 Depending upon the
size of the fragment, the feature of the satellite it happened to hit,
the speed and angle of the collision, and other factors, the
consequences could range from minor to catastrophic; the NTM
functions could be temporarily disabled or permanently
terminated.214 Some ASAT fragments are large enough to be
effectively tracked and some verification satellites retain a
sufficient capability for maneuvering—but most debris is too small
to monitor reliably and satellites are essentially “sitting ducks,”
permanently vulnerable to abrupt destruction by invisible,
indiscriminate oncoming traffic.215
Second, when a country does have sufficient “space situational
awareness” about the presence of a debris plume, it can adjust the
space transiting orbits of its NTM satellites to steer them clear of
the hazard zone. But this, too, constitutes a form of prohibited
interference because it compels the verification assets to linger in
locations or trajectories other than those that would optimally be
selected for the performance of their particular treaty functions.
Any time an artificial, arbitrary “keep-out zone” is established by
an ASAT debris swarm, the treaty-protected NTM function is
partially compromised. Again, there is considerable variation: the
size of the debris stream could be large or small (but probably
growing over time216), and the enforced deviation from the
preferred NTM path could be minor and intermittent, or large and
(depending upon the altitude of the debris) persisting for decades
or even centuries.217

213 This analysis could also embrace “indirect” interference, such as when an
ASAT test generates fragments that collide in space with other debris, triggering a
chain reaction in which resulting remnants later impact another state’s NTM
satellite. See supra text accompanying note 33 (describing the Kessler Syndrome of
cascading collisions).
214 See supra text accompanying notes 26, 28 (including citations comparing
the power of high-speed outer space collisions to more familiar terrestrial events,
such as dynamite explosions or truck collisions).
215 Butt, supra note 19.
216 See Weeden, supra note 197 (noting that within three years after the 2007
Chinese ASAT test, the resulting debris cloud had spread so widely as to
essentially encircle the earth from 175 to 3600 kilometers altitude).
217 See supra text accompanying notes 23, 33 (including the notion of the
Kessler Syndrome through which collisions between items of space debris lead to
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Third, where an NTM satellite does have the ability and the
advance notice to maneuver effectively, it can attempt to dodge the
ASAT shards (at least those that are large enough to be detected).
But this forced adaptation is itself a form of interference, because it
consumes scarce fuel, reducing the satellite’s ability to perform
other necessary maneuvers and thereby potentially shortening its
lifespan. NTM satellites are so expensive that countries do not
deploy multiple “spare” or redundant systems; if even one is out of
place or prematurely incapacitated, the treaty monitoring function
may be degraded.
Advancing this thesis, admittedly, puts advocates in a
somewhat unusual posture. In complaining about a debriscreating ASAT activity, we cannot specify which particular NTM
satellite will be subjected to interference; similarly, we cannot
predict when or where the disruption will occur. But the relevant
arms control treaties do not require that level of courtroom
evidentiary precision—we do know, with statistical certainty, that
under the current debris-laden circumstances of outer space,
impermissible interference will occur. Today’s ill-advised action
will surely result in tomorrow’s bad results; the treaty violation is
present.218
As of this writing, this thesis remains, fortunately, hypothetical.
The world has not yet witnessed a clear, confirmed, publiclyknown instance of an NTM satellite being damaged or destroyed
by, or being compelled to maneuver in order to avoid impact with,
a leftover fragment from a kinetic ASAT test.
Something
ominously similar to that scenario may have played out in January
2013, when a functional Russian nanosatellite denominated BLITS
(Ball Lens In The Space), used for laser ranging experiments, was
apparently struck by debris from the Chinese 2007 ASAT test.
BLITS was knocked off its trajectory and its spin velocity and
altitude were compromised; it is still unclear whether the satellite
the creation of additional fragments, which could generate a “chain reaction” of
expanding generations of impacts and debris).
218 Conversely, advocates will often face a difficult attribution problem: With
today’s limited space surveillance capabilities, it can be hard to identify the reason
for a particular satellite malfunction; even if it is determined that the problem was
due to an impact, it can be problematic to tie it to human-caused, rather than
natural, sources; and even if spacecraft debris is identified as the cause, it is not
always possible to identify the specific space vehicle that originally generated the
particular piece of debris.
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has been rendered totally nonfunctional.219 We do know that
numerous other satellites have been compelled to maneuver in
order to dodge fragments from the Chinese 2007 ASAT event;220 it
seems very likely that NTM satellites, too, will be struck or forced
into similar fuel-consuming evasive operations, if they have not
already done so.
5.1. Counter-argument 1: Deliberateness
The first important point of resistance to this thesis arises from
the suggestion that the ban on “interference” contained in the
several relevant arms control treaties is best understood as a
prohibition only on “intentional” or “deliberate” interference with
NTM, not applicable to accidental or unplanned consequences,
even if they are “foreseeable.” That is, it could be argued that the
treaty makers indeed intended to bind themselves not to disrupt
each other’s NTM via any premeditated, purposeful campaign, but
they did not agree to measures that would simultaneously outlaw
unhappy bad luck.221
219 At this point, there is considerable uncertainty about whether the BLITS
satellite was struck by a tracked piece of debris from the 2007 Chinese ASAT test
(or by a smaller untracked piece) or whether something else caused the observed
disruption in its behavior. See Butler, supra note 46; Warren Ferster, Pentagon:
Russian Satellite Not Hit by ASAT Test Debris, SPACE NEWS (Mar. 21, 2013), http:
//www.spacenews.com/pentagon-russian-satellite-not-hit-by-asat-test-debris;
Russian Satellite Hit by Remnants of Destroyed Chinese Spacecraft, SPACE DAILY (Mar.
12,
2013),
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Russian_satellite_hit_by_
remnants_of_destroyed_Chinese_spacecraft_999.html; Russian Satellite Hit by
“Space Junk” from Destroyed Chinese Spacecraft, RT (Mar. 9, 2013),
http://rt.com/news/russian-satellite-collide-chinese-044/; Bruce Totolos, Reports
Confirm Collision between Chinese and Russian Satellite, FRENCH TRIB. (Mar. 9, 2013),
available at http://frenchtribune.com/teneur/1316598-reports-confirm-collisionbetween-chinese-and-russian-satellite; Mike Wall, Legal Action against China
Unlikely in Orbital Debris Collision, SPACE NEWS (Mar. 13, 2013), available at
http://www.spacenews.com/legal-action-against-china-unlikely-in-orbitaldebris-collision.
220 U.S. Satellites Dodge Chinese Missile Debris, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jan/11/us-satellites-dodgechinese-missile-debris/?page=all (explaining how a commercial satellite
Orbcomm FM 36 and a NASA earth observation satellite Terra were each forced
to maneuver in order to avoid debris from the 2007 Chinese ASAT test).
221 See Jeffrey C. Chu, Intel: Satellite Interference: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly,
MILSAT MAG., April 2012), at 78, available at http://www.milsatmagazine.com/
cgi-bin/display_article.cgi?number=1062654025
(differentiating
between
intentional and unintentional electronic interference with satellites).
The
sequential U.S. government statements of space policy sometimes specify that
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That could, indeed, have been a plausible approach to crafting
an arms control instrument, but it is simply not the choice that the
parties made in these particular treaties. First, the plain language
of the NTM provisions—from the original use in the ABM Treaty
through all its successors—does not include the qualifier
“deliberate” or “intentional” in the relevant passages.222 If the
drafters had intended to restrict coverage that way, they could
readily have accomplished that goal by writing, “Each Party
undertakes not to deliberately interfere with the national technical
means of verification of the other Party.”
Even more importantly, the SALT I negotiators did display a
fine eye for nuance in this area, as revealed in the contrast between
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the NTM article of the ABM Treaty.223 That
is, in paragraph 2, each party undertakes “not to interfere” with
NTM; in the immediately following paragraph, each undertakes a
complementary commitment “not to use deliberate concealment
measures which impede verification by [NTM]” (emphasis added).
This juxtaposition—the insertion of the word “deliberate” in one
place, coupled with its omission in the other—makes clear that
what is banned is “deliberate” concealment, versus “any”
interference.224

“purposeful interference” with space systems will be regarded as an infringement
of national rights (implying a lower concern for what might be regarded as
“accidental” interference). See alsoDOD DIRECTIVE NO. 3100.10, supra note 8, §4.b;
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3100.10, SPACE POLICY §4.2.1 (July 9, 1999); 2010
National Space Policy, supra note 47, at 3; 2006 National Space Policy, supra note 47
(referring to the fourth listed “Principle”).
222 See supra text accompanying notes 140-41 (indicating that under the ABM
Treaty, each party “undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means
of verification of the other Party,” without qualification).
223 See supra text accompanying notes 140 (stating that in the ABM Treaty, the
obligation under Article XII, paragraph 2 is “not to interfere”; under Article XII,
paragraph 3, the commitment is “not to use deliberate concealment measures”)
(emphasis added). See Rhinelander, supra note 136, at 139-40) (addressing the
scope of the word “deliberate”).
224 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 578 (2006) (“[A] negative inference
may be drawn from the exclusion of language from one statutory provision that is
included in other provisions of the same statute.”); Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.”).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/3

03_KOPLOW (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

AN INFERENCE ABOUT INTERFERENCE

6/30/2014 2:24 PM

813

Further confirmation of this interpretation arises from analysis
of subsequent arms control documents, such as the INF Treaty,
which omit the word “deliberate” from the paragraph about
“concealment,” too.225 This must be read as reflecting the parties’
determination, at that point, to extend the coverage even to nonpurposeful concealment activities as well as to accidental
interference.
Undoubtedly, deliberate or willful interference (and
concealment) were principally on the negotiators’ minds in all
these instances—that sort of calculated disruption of another
party’s NTM functions would pose the most severe challenge to
the treaty verification regime. Certainly, a deliberate campaign of
attacks on another state’s early warning, surveillance,
communications, and other satellites—the “eyes and ears” of the
intelligence network—would would constitute a grave threat to
international peace and security.226 But just as clearly, the
negotiators of the arms control treaties determined to cast the
agreements’ protections in wider, more ambitious terms,
consciously omitting the word “deliberate” from the non-

225 See supra text accompanying note 150-52 (providing that in the INF Treaty,
“Neither Party shall . . . use concealment measures which impede verification of
compliance”). The conscious nature of the omission of the word “deliberate” in
the INF Treaty’s NTM provision is confirmed by the Department of State’s
authoritative “article by article analysis” of the treaty, which accompanied the INF
Treaty when it was transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. See INF
Treaty: Article-by-Article Analysis, Article XII: National Technical Means of
Verification, UNDER SECR’Y OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION, TECH. & LOGISTICS, TREATY
COMPLIANCE, ,http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/inf/inf_art.htm#top (last
visited Apr. 12, 2014) (“In subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2, the Parties are
prohibited from using any concealment measures that impede verification by
national technical means of compliance with the Treaty. This provision is broader
than similar provisions in earlier U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements, which
merely prohibited deliberate concealment measures.”). See also GEORGE L.
RUECKERT, GLOBAL DOUBLE ZERO: THE INF TREATY FROM ITS ORIGINS TO
IMPLEMENTATION 92 (1993) (stressing that the INF Treaty prohibits “the use of any
concealment measure specifically designed to impede NTM. The formulations in
the INF Treaty are broader in this regard than those in earlier treaties which only
prohibited deliberate concealment measures” (emphasis in original)).
226 See Space Security Index 2011, supra note 112, at 72 (“Russia has
repeatedly expressed concern that attacks on its early warning and space
surveillance systems would represent a direct threat to its security.”).
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interference provisions, and thereby judiciously forbidding even
accidental, unintended interference.227
In a similar vein, a temporal objection might be heard, arguing
that the treaties would be concerned only with immediate, or nearcontemporaneous, interference, not with harms that might be
inflicted on NTM functions long after the ASAT test. Again, the
treaty drafters hypothetically could have incorporated such a
limitation in their texts; again, however, they chose not to do so.
Especially here, where the hazards of kinetic ASAT tests or uses
are so well-known, where the resulting debris (depending upon
altitude and other factors) can be expected to persist for such an
extended period of time, and where the jeopardy to NTM satellites
approaches a statistical certainty, there is no reason to impute a
“timing” factor into the text of the treaties, as if reading in a
“proximity” requirement that the drafters did not enact.
We therefore reach the conclusion that the ban on interference
with NTM is comprehensive, embracing both deliberate and
accidental, and immediate and long-term, disruptions with arms
control verification. To be sure, the interference must rise to some
level of “significance,” under the principle of de minimis non curat

227 See also ABM Treaty, supra note 137, at art. XIII.1(c) (authorizing the
Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)–the dispute resolution mechanism
established to promote the objectives and implementation of the SALT I
agreements–to “consider questions involving unintended interference with
national technical means of verification”). Insertion of the word “unintended”
into Article XIII, coupled with its absence in Article XII, confirms that the Article
XII prohibition on “interference” encompasses both deliberate and unintended
actions. On the other hand, any implication that the SCC would not also be
competent to address questions of “intended interference” with NTM would be
unwarranted. Two additional points of comparison to the Outer Space Treaty are
illuminating here. First, OST Article IX requires consultation prior to undertaking
any space activity that “would cause potentially harmful interference” with the
space activities of another party. See OST, supra note 50, at art. IX. However the
NTM requirements of arms control treaties are much stronger; they prohibit the
interference, not simply requiring prior consultation about it. Second, OST Article
VII (and the Liability Convention, Article III, see supra text accompanying notes
57) create a tort liability system, including liability for fault for damage inflicted
upon another party’s space assets. Again, the NTM provisions of arms control
treaties are stronger; they prohibit such damage, not simply provide
compensation for it. Whether the knowing, but unintentional, creation of a space
debris cloud could be construed as liability for fault has not been tested. LYALL &
LARSEN, supra note 2, at 103-14; Mirmina, supra note 26, at 303; Wall, supra note
219; Luke Punnakanta, Space Torts: Applying Nuisance and Negligence to Orbital
Debris, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 163 (2012).
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lex.228 But the types of interference under scrutiny here are far from
trivialities. The best reading of the NTM passages in the several
arms control treaties, therefore, overrules this first counterargument.
5.2. Counter-argument 2: Treaty Proliferation
A second type of objection to the thesis raises a very different
type of concern. That is, even if the main thrust of the analysis is
correct, it could be argued to be of only minor significance because,
at present, there are too few treaties in force that contain the
relevant non-interference provision—and China, in particular, is
not party to any of those legal commitments.
This counter-argument, admittedly, has legs. Unfortunately,
there are simply not enough treaties containing the explicit NTM
provisions to create a truly comprehensive, global restriction on
ASAT activities. In particular, at this writing, the only agreements
legally in force with the operative language are bilateral U.S.Russia treaties (especially New START, the INF Treaty, and
specialized test ban accords) or geographically limited (i.e., the
CFE Treaty, confined to North America and Europe). China, one
of only three countries to have tested a kinetic energy ASAT
interceptor in space, is not party to any such instrument, nor are
Japan, India, Iran, North Korea, and other highly relevant players.
Nonetheless, the glass remains partially full. The United States
and Russia—traditionally the powers undertaking the lion’s share
of space activities—are fully enmeshed in this web of international
law. Many other countries, including the European nations most
active in outer space, are parties to the CFE Treaty and its
embedded commitment to respect NTM.229 Notably, the INF
Treaty, the CFE Treaty, and the CTBT are all of unlimited (i.e.,
permanent) duration.230

228 The law does not notice trivialities. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 219 (4th
Pocket ed. 2011).
229 The continuance of CFE Treaty is in jeopardy, as a result of persistent
Russian non-compliance (under the guise of a unilateral “suspension”) and the
eventual United States response; there is considerable danger that the regime may
collapse. Tom Z. Collina, CFE Treaty Talks Stall, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 2011,
http://www.armscontrol.org/2011_09/CFE_Treaty_Talks_Stall.
230 INF Treaty, supra note 150, at art. XV(1); CFE Treaty, supra note 157, at art.
XIX(1); CTBT, supra note 92, at art. IX.
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Still, the primary rebuttal to this second counter-argument
must be forward-looking in several respects. First, additional arms
control treaties are likely to come along, sooner or later, and it is
very likely that they will incorporate some version of the nowstandard NTM provision as routine “boilerplate” language. The
CTBT, in particular, would provide the most significant extension
of the current legal regime, embracing a truly global constituency.
As noted above, CTBT contains a “non-standardized” provision
regarding NTM, but it is fully protective of their activities and
prohibits interference with them.231 The treaty cannot enter into
force until forty-four specified countries ratify it; currently thirtysix of those have done so (the United States and China are two of
the prominent holdouts) and 125 other states have also ratified the
accord.232 The prospects for early effectuation of the CTBT are not
bright,233 but when it occurs, not only will the ban on nuclear
weapons testing overnight assume very widespread force, but the
protection of NTM will be globally distributed, too.
Moreover, even the current interim CTBT status provides some
indirect refuge for NTM. This limited protection arises because the
signatory states established a “Preparatory Commission” to pave
the way toward entry into force of the treaty, including a mandate
for constructing the elaborate verification apparatus. The relevant
text charges the Preparatory Commission with responsibility for
ensuring prompt and effective operationalization of the network of
multiple sensors and the overarching International Data Center.234
This system is already substantially in place, with the vast bulk of

231 Supra text accompanying notes 159-161 (discussing that CTBT has a
variant of the standard non-interference language (art. IV.5, 6, 37) and states also
pledge cooperation with the verification program (art. IV.3, 11)).
232 CTBT, supra note 92, at art. XIV(1), Annex 2 (providing the entry into force
provisions); Status of Signature and Ratification, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY
ORG., http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/(last
visited Nov. 13, 2013).
233 See DAHLMAN et al, supra note 96, at 13–20 (surveying prospects for
ratification of the CTBT in the states whose membership is necessary for the treaty
to enter into force); see generally JONATHAN MEDALIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41201, COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS (2013).
234 See Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, CTBT/MSS/RES/1, ¶¶
13, 14, Annex (Oct. 17, 1996), available at http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_
upload/public_information/2009/prepcom_resolution.pdf.
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the planned configuration of 321 stations currently operational or
under construction.235
The system
utilizes
satellite
communications mechanisms to transmit the collected data to the
headquarters in Vienna and from there to the participating
states.236
In support of that structure, customary international law, as
reflected in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, specifies that in the interval between signature of a treaty
and its entry into force, a state has an obligation “to refrain from
acts which would defeat the object and purpose” of the treaty.237 It
is not too much of a legal stretch to suggest that CTBT signatories
have thereby assumed some level of commitment not to interfere
with national and multinational technical means of verification,
including the communications links, even prior to the treaty’s
entry into force.
Peering somewhat further into the future development of arms
control, a rich agenda of ambitious possibilities looms. No one can
anticipate the timetable on which this diverse series of bilateral,
regional, and global initiatives may come to fruition, but it is easy
to predict that verification provisions—in large part enabled by
satellite NTM—will form a key aspect of any agreements, and that
bans on interference will be prominent. These treaties may deal
with topics such as: a cutoff in the production of fissile materials
for use in nuclear weapons;238 a globalized expansion of the
currently bilateral INF Treaty;239 pursuit of the complete abolition

235 Station
Profiles,
COMPREHENSIVE
TEST
BAN
TREATY
ORG.,
http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/station-profiles/ (last visited Nov. 13,
2013).
236 The Global Communications Infrastructure, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY
ORG.,
http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/the-global-communicationsinfrastructure/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (noting that the CTBT structure
employs six geosynchronous satellites for communications to and from the
International Data Center in Vienna, Austria).
237 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331. The United States is not a party to this treaty, but accepts much of
its content as customary international law. Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm
(last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
238 Daryl Kimball, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at a Glance, ARMS
CONTROL ASSOC. (Aug. 2013), http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/fmct.
239 David A. Cooper, Globalizing Reagan’s INF Treaty: Easier Done Than Said?
20 NONPROLIFERATION REV. 1, 145 (2013); Catherine M. Kelleher & Scott L. Warren,
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of nuclear weapons globally;240 and articulation of regional
“nuclear weapons free zones.”241
The thesis advanced in this article, therefore, will only become
stronger and more comprehensive in the years to come, as more
arms control treaties are developed and extend the existing bans on
interference with NTM; as more states become party to those
obligations; as more countries, and an increasing array of
international consortia, invest in satellite verification assets; as
diverse types of NTM are placed in orbit to provide close,
persistent monitoring of different types of terrestrial arms
activities; and as more debris continues to accumulate in the most
favored outer space lanes.
5.3. Counter-argument 3: Consent of the States
The third form of resistance to this thesis adopts a political
perspective, arguing that it is “too clever by half”—it is implausible
to suddenly spring a new form of legal obligation of this sort upon
sovereign states. International law arises from the consent of
states,242 and unless the leading players voluntarily agree to accept
a commitment restricting ASAT activities, it cannot be effective.
This counter-argument contends that surprises—especially
surprising interpretations of long-standing legal obligations—do
not fit well into the structure of international law, and will not be
honored.243
Getting to Zero Starts Here: Tactical Nuclear Weapons, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Oct.
2009, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/Kelleher.
240 See The Global Zero Action Plan, GLOBAL ZERO, http://www. globalzero.
org /get-the-facts/GZAP (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
241 See, e.g., WMD-Free Middle East Proposal at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASSOC.,
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mewmdfz (last updated July 2013)
(describing a proposed WMD-free zone in the Middle East).
242 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 247, ¶ 52 (July 8) (affirming that international law is not generally
structured to “authorize” states to use specified weapons; instead, the rules are
cast as prohibitions); S.S. Lotus (Fr. vs. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sep. 7)
(asserting the fundamental proposition that “Restrictions upon the independence
of states cannot therefore be presumed”); RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, at § 102.1
(“A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the
international community of states.”).
243 See Rumsfeld Commission, supra note 13, at 17 (“The U.S. must be
cautious of agreements intended for one purpose that, when added to a larger
web of treaties or regulations, may have the unintended consequences of
restricting future activities in space.”).
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The response to this critique begins by acknowledging that a
new treaty—or even a new non-legally-binding “code of
conduct”—could be a preferable mechanism for insinuating into
international law an effective curb on ASAT activities. Overt lawmaking of that sort carries the undoubted advantage of clarity
regarding the precise content of the obligation and the roster of
states upon whom it is binding.
But if the world is in the unfortunate situation in which the
process of generating a new outer space treaty is unduly
constipated, then other mechanisms can be brought into play. And
here, after all, the proposed approach is to rely upon treaty law—to
exercise, in fact, a series of provisions that leading states have
repeatedly accepted in the most important international arms
control agreements—but to apply those traditional passages with
new rigor. The practice of international law—as with domestic law
in all states—is replete with “surprises” of various sorts, as courts
and other authorities sometimes construe existing legal obligations
in ways that were unanticipated by the progenitors. The concept
of “rule of law” sometimes demands respect for newly evolving,
but legally sound, novel interpretations of old rules.
In another way, the scope of this article’s argument may be
even more ambitious and surprising. That is, it is not only ASAT
testing that generates the enormous hazards of space debris
(although the Chinese 2007 collision stands apart as the single
worst proliferator of the pernicious dangers). All space events can
spawn debris, even those undertaken by actors sincerely
committed to following the “best practices” articulated by the
United Nations guidelines.244 Routine launches and operations are
responsible for some degree of litter, and statistically foreseeable
accidents and mishaps can be devastating for the space
environment. Could the logic of this article be extended from
opposing debris-creating ASAT tests to opposing all debriscreating space activities and labeling all of them as inconsistent
with parties’ obligations under arms control treaties that protect
NTM? If so, what would be the “limiting principle” for this
extension? Surely, we would not leverage this analysis to prohibit
any activity that generates any quantity of debris; that would
effectively preclude all space operations (including even the launch

244

See supra text accompanying note 47 (regarding UN IADC guidelines).
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of additional NTM!) This article simply notes that additional
conundrum but does not explore it further.
6.

CONCLUSION

Under pressure from the counter-arguments advanced above,
the thesis of this article is modest. It would become appreciably
more powerful when additional treaties—especially broad
multilateral treaties (such as the CTBT) and, in particular, treaties
that attract the participation of China—enter into force, and carry
with them some variant of the standard boilerplate language
prohibiting interference with NTM. Moreover, I readily concede
that a comprehensive new space treaty, incorporating an overt,
dedicated ASAT prohibition, could be a superior mechanism. Such
an agreement could inspire widespread support, and resolve
numerous tricky definitional and verification issues.245 Most
importantly, this type of agreement would protect all satellites
(regardless of function or national origin), and would address both
the directed energy ASAT systems and the debris-creating kinetic
energy systems principally considered here.246
In the alternative, perhaps it is not simply wishful thinking to
suggest that a general, global agreement might be crafted
specifically to protect NTM (and MTM, as well). Under such a
hypothetical NTM Treaty, parties could agree to refrain from
interference (and also promise not to undertake concealment
measures) that would impair verification with any arms control
treaty, regardless of their status as parties or non-parties to those
other accords. Conceivably, all states could recognize that they
share an interest in protecting the stability and mutual confidence
that NTM promote. They would agree to refrain from acts, such as
245 See supra text accompanying note 77-78 (discussing complex definitional
and verification issues in any effective ASAT treaty).
246 Cf. BLACK, supra note 168, at 5-8; GALLAGHER & STEINBRUNER, supra note 6,
at 76-78; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 307, 564-65 (advocating a formal, legally
binding treaty on space debris as “the best way to achieve International Law in
precision”); Rebecca Johnson, NGO Approaches and Initiatives for Addressing Space
Security, in FUTURE SECURITY IN SPACE, supra note 205, at 61-69; KREPON & CLARY,
supra note 7; Liemer & Chyba, supra note 77, at 154-57 (arguing for a limited ban
on ASAT testing); Oppenheim, supra note 13 (proposing a treaty to ban KE ASAT
tests). See also DoD Directive 3100.10, supra note 8, § 4.c (the official U.S.
government policy statement, expressing objective of deterring and responding to
attacks on allied space systems, as well as U.S. orbiters); 2010 National Space Policy,
supra note 47, at 3.
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unnecessary creation of significant space debris, which would
jeopardize the treaty’s goals.247
In yet another alternative, perhaps the leading spacefaring
states could collude in the creation of a new norm of customary
international law on point, to provide a degree of protection for
NTM via avoidance of the generation of new ASAT-created space
debris. Customary international law is a well-established source of
authority arising from a longstanding, widespread and concordant
practice undertaken by states out of a sense of legal obligation;248 it
has been especially prominent as a source of space law.249 In the
current environment, it could be argued that the “objective” half of
that definition—the analysis of how states actually behave—is
already met, because, in fact, nations do avoid interfering with
each other’s NTM (and all other satellites) with a high degree of
regularity, and because debris-creating ASAT tests have been
rare.250 On the other hand, the “subjective” or opinio juris element
is lacking, because states have not yet confirmed that they exercise
this pattern of self-restraint out of a sense that they are legally
obligated (aside from the contents of any particular treaty that they
have joined) to refrain from disrupting another state’s NTM or
from conducting ASAT tests.251 If leading states were to change
247 See Arbatov, supra note 73, at 96-101 (offering a Russian perspective in
favor of space arms control); Graham, supra note 93 (arguing for international
legal protection of NTM). A partial analogy here would be to the 1992 Treaty on
Open Skies, under which parties agree to allow frequent over-flights by other
states’ monitoring aircraft, outfitted with an array of sensors, as a confidencebuilding measure. Treaty on Open Skies, Mar. 24, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-37
(1992). This treaty does not entail any actual reductions or limitations upon
participating states’ weapons, but it can support the openness that can facilitate
other arms control regimes. Daryl Kimball, The Open Skies Treaty at a Glance, ARMS
CONTROL ASSOC. (Oct. 2012), http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/openskies.
248 RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, at § 102.2 (1986) (identifying customary
international law as a primary source of international law); Statute of the
International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S.
993 (listing international custom as one of the kinds of law the court will apply);
LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 42-43, 70-80 (discussing how elements of the OST
have passed into customary international law).
249 Cheng, supra note 59, at 23.
250 RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, at § 102 at cmt. b, rep. n.2 (1986) (discussing
how the 1962 United Nations General Assembly’s Outer Space Resolution could
have become customary international law, even in the absence of the OST).
251 Id. § 102 at cmt. c; Int’l Law Assoc., Res. 16/2000, Statement of Principles
Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, in INT’L LAW
ASSOC., REPORT OF THE SIXTY-NINTH CONFERENCE, LONDON 712, 719-21 (2000)
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their tune, however, and affirm their belief that such a general
obligation already exists, the magic of customary international law
could soon make it so.252
But the world does not have the luxury of unlimited time to
pursue these alternative law-making mechanisms.
An
unprecedented constellation of adverse factors demands a prompt
solution: we face the exacerbating proliferation of space debris,
combined with the incipient danger of an accelerating arms race in
outer space, replete with additional development and testing of
ASAT mechanisms.253 On the positive side, the world has finally
awoken to the dangers of space debris and its threat to safe,
efficient, and profitable exploitation of the myriad benefits of outer
space. Despite the seemingly intractable resistance to new treaties,
it may be possible to achieve progress through the sleight of hand
suggested in this article.
Aside from any new international agreement, therefore, an
additional political function of advancing this thesis could be to
help rally the space community against the dangers of ASATs and
to prompt concerted action in resistance to their re-emergence. The
article provides a legal, as well as political, rationale for
condemning debris-creating ASAT tests; it suggests a context for
“naming and shaming” those states that violate the taboo and
threaten to disrupt others’ NTM satellite activities.
On the level of individual countries, perhaps this analysis can
help inspire leadership toward unilateral action in opposition to
(arguing that the subjective element is not usually necessary for the establishment
of a rule of customary international law); Peter Hulsroj, Beyond Global: The
International Imperative of Space, 18 SPACE POL’Y 107 (2002). See Harrison,
Shackelford & Jackson, supra note 7, at 19 (noting that the United States and the
U.S.S.R./Russia have de facto extended the non-interference obligation contained
in arms control treaties to cover “the entire military space constellation of the
other,” instead of confining it solely to NTM; there are no public statements in
either country reflecting a commitment to this practice).
252 But see DEN DEKKER, supra note 146, at 62-66 (concluding that states have
been reluctant to create arms control rules via custom instead of treaty, and “In
the field of arms control it is difficult to establish rules of customary international
law”).
253 Johnson-Freese, Learning, supra note 77 (arguing that U.S. diplomatic
silence has been unsuccessful in persuading other countries to refrain from ASAT
development); Hitchens, Saving Space, supra note 12, at 3, 5 (calling the 2007
Chinese ASAT test a “game-changer,” and asserting that “the threats to safety and
security in outer space today are arguably greater than even at the height of the
Cold War”).
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ASAT developments. That is, reflecting upon the NTM provisions
of arms control treaties may remind national decision-makers that
they have sound, historically-tested reasons to protect satellites,
not to march further down a pathway that exposes these
vulnerable space assets to additional jeopardy. Self-restraint, of
course, does not guarantee that other space actors will reciprocate,
but the converse is surely true: if one state pioneers the next round
of an ASAT development race, others will surely follow.
On the collective level, perhaps this argument can help prompt
fresh action on a broader, more ambitious agenda of space
governance. Paul B. Larsen has suggested the possible application
to outer space of the principles that have so successfully facilitated
international civil aviation—“rules of the road” for safe, secure,
and profitable traffic management.254
Even if recognition of this thesis seems a stretch at the moment,
events will propel it forward. In the years to come, more states
will orbit more satellites to fulfill more functions, including NTM
functions, pursuant to more treaties. Creative adoption of new
technologies may soon amplify these trends as well. The U.S.
Department of State has recently promoted the notion—including
through sponsorship of a vigorous public innovation
competition—that “societal monitoring,” such as via new
programs of social media, can play a role in verifying compliance
with arms control treaties.255 Cellphone and tablet applications, for
example, could empower ordinary citizens around the world to
monitor and report about their country’s behavior in newfound
ways—not only by sending telltale photographs to international

Larsen, supra note 22.
See Innovation in Arms Control Challenge: How Can the Crowd Support Arms
Control Transparency Efforts? INNOCENTIVE (Aug. 28, 2012), https://www.
innocentive.com/ar/challenge/9933144 (describing the innovation competition
sponsored by U.S. Department of State to generate new ideas for transparency
and social verification mechanisms utilizing widely accessible information
technologies); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Department of State Launches
the “Innovation in Arms Control Challenge” (Aug. 28, 2012), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/08/196962.html
(announcing
a
contest in which the public is challenged to suggest how information technology
advancements can help shape arms control verification); Rose Gottemoeller,
Acting Under Sec’y for Arms Control & Int’l Sec, Remarks: Arms Control in the
Information Age: Harnessing “Sisu,” (Aug. 29, 2012), available at
http://translations.state.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/08/20120831135358.htm
l#axzz2XK9QXumb.
254
255
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authorities, but also by downloading onto ubiquitous personal
electronics new capabilities such as for detecting small earth
tremors that could substantiate doubts about clandestine nuclear
weapons testing. If crowd sourced data of those sorts proliferated,
could they someday be considered as a component of another
state’s NTM mechanism (or of an international organization’s
MTM), protected from interference and concealment?
In sum, the thesis advanced here is an attempt to leverage
existing treaty law to effectuate some surprising limits on a
dangerous outer space activity in a situation where the
achievement of more direct restraints has proven problematic. The
hope, of course, is that the concept will expand: that if a country is
precluded from conducting debris-creating ASAT tests (or uses)
that interfere with other parties’ NTM, there will de facto be a
prohibition on all kinetic ASAT events, and all satellites of all
states—not solely NTM of participating states—will be indirect
beneficiaries.256 As James Clay Moltz has observed, there is an
important symbiotic relationship: wise measures of arms control
can contribute to the stability of the outer space regime (by creating
the conditions for peaceful interaction among leading players) and,
conversely, stability in outer space can simultaneously promote
arms control (by ensuring effective verification of compliance
through reliable NTM monitoring).257

256 An important subsidiary question, not addressed in this article, concerns
the application or suspension of the NTM-protecting provisions of arms control
treaties during a time of armed conflict. None of the treaties discussed in this
article explicitly contemplates this point, and it would be difficult to assess the
unexpressed intentions of the drafters. It might seem implausible that belligerent
states would be obligated generally to refrain from interfering with each other’s
earth observation and communications satellites, since the reconnaissance data
and transmission links provided for arms control purposes could also be valuable
for waging war. See OTA, supra note 19, at 39 (asserting that arms control treaties
would be suspended during war); Arbatov, supra note 73, at 91-92 (“During times
of war, however, prohibitions against interfering with [another nation’s orbital
support systems] . . . could hardly be expected to hold.”). On the other hand, the
NTM of neutral states should still be respected—and debris, such as that created
by use of a kinetic energy ASAT, would jeopardize all states’ NTM into the
indefinite future. Regarding the author’s perspective on the legality of the use of
ASATs during wartime, see David A. Koplow, ASAT-isfaction: Customary
International Law and the Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L.
1187 (2009).
257 MOLTZ, supra note 211, at 45.
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In the interim, a similar analysis might also suggest the
possibility for a finding that other types of satellites are likewise
serendipitously protected by cognate shreds of existing
international law. For example, modern arms control treaties now
frequently provide mechanisms for “on-site inspection,” through
which designated personnel dispatched by an international
organization are privileged to conduct intrusive searches and other
investigations inside the territories of member states to ensure that
no illegal activities are being undertaken.258 Routinely, the relevant
treaties provide that the inspectors shall have the right to
unfettered communications with their home headquarters259 and
that the inspected state shall not impede that function.260 If those
communications (at the inspectors’ discretion) occur via satelliteenabled means, does that imply that the inspected state has an
obligation, in good faith, not to interfere with those satellites? And
would the inspected state therefore be in breach of its duty if it
conducted an ASAT test or use that generated a persistent debris
cloud that impaired the normal functioning of that satellite
network?
In similar fashion, perhaps other treaties, initially designed as
bilateral confidence-building and crisis-defusing instruments, can
support this broader function, too. For example, under the 1971
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement to Improve the Direct Communications
Link (the “hotline”), the parties agreed to “take all possible
measures to assure the continuous and reliable operation of the

258 See, e.g., CWC, supra note 92, at art. IX Annex on Implementation and
Verification, Part X (establishing a regime for challenge inspections); CTBT, supra
note 92, at art. IV.D & Protocol, Part II.
259 See, e.g., CWC, supra note 92, at Verification Annex, Part II.E(44)
(“Inspectors shall have the right throughout the in-country period to
communicate with the Headquarters of the Technical Secretariat. For this purpose
they may use their own, duly certified, approved equipment.”); CTBT, supra note
92, at Protocol, Part II.E (62) (“The members of the inspection team shall have the
right at all times during the on-site inspection to communicate with each other
and with the Technical Secretariat. For this purpose they may use their own duly
approved and certified equipment with the consent of the inspected State Party, to
the extent that the inspected State Party does not provide them with access to
other telecommunications.”).
260 See, e.g., CTBT, supra note 92, at art. IV.D(57)(e) (stating that the inspected
state has the obligation not to impede the ability of the inspection team to carry
out inspection activities).
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communications circuits.”261 Likewise, under the 1971 Accidents
Measures Agreement, each superpower undertook to notify the
other immediately “in the event of signs of interference” with its
missile warning systems or related communications facilities.262
Since these mechanisms did, and still do, rely upon satellite
services, maybe these early international instruments can now be
spun into a broader commitment not to undertake debris-creating
ASAT activities that would inhibit their vital communications
capabilities.263
Even more broadly—well outside the specialized realm of arms
control—the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations enshrines
a state’s obligation to “permit and protect free communication on
the part of the mission for all official purposes”264 and empowers
the diplomats to “employ all appropriate means”265 for
communications, which would, of course, include satellite
mechanisms. Can this provision, ostensibly established as part of a
framework for diplomatic privileges and immunities, likewise be
inflated into a covert constraint upon ASAT activities that produce
261 Agreement Supplementing and Modifying the Agreement on Measures to
Improve the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. Direct Communications Link, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. 2,
Sept. 30, 1971, 806 U.N.T.S. 402.
262 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. 3, Sept. 30, 1971, 807 U.N.T.S. 57.
263 Grego, supra note 70, at 3-4. See also Agreement between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Expand the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Direct Communications Link, U.S.-U.S.S.R., ¶ 6, Jul. 17, 1984, available at
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4786.htm (mandating that parties shall “[t]ake all
possible measures to assure the continuous, secure and reliable operation” of “hot
line” communications links); Agreement between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk
Reduction Centers Protocol II, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. 7, Sept. 15, 1987, available at
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/215573.htm; Agreement Between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, art. II(1)(b),
June 12, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 887 (committing parties to prevent “[u]sing a laser in such
a manner that its radiation could cause harm to personnel or damage to
equipment of the armed forces of the other Party”); id. at art. II(1)(d) (preventing
“[i]nterfering with the command and control networks in a manner which could
cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces of the other
Party”).
264 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 27(1), Apr. 18, 1961, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. See also Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
art. 35(1), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (providing freedom of
communications for consular officers in terms similar to those for diplomats).
265 Id.
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hordes of space debris that will eventually subvert the mandate to
“permit and protect” communications? Today, 189 countries
(including Russia and China, as well as the United States) are party
to this agreement.266 Although it does not incorporate the express
prohibition against “interference” with satellites that arms control
treaties have included, perhaps the notion of “good faith” in treaty
implementation267 drives to a similar result.268
It may, indeed, seem peculiar to use international law in this
novel way—identifying malleable scraps of existing treaty law and
bending them to purposes unforeseen by their originators. But this
sort of new inferential legal understanding—even if it suddenly
springs full-grown, instead of via the more traditional birthing
process for international law—may have a salutary and essential
impact in this urgent, under-developed area.

266 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III3&chapter=3&lang=en#EndDec (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
267 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 237, at art. 26
(“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
them in good faith.”).
268 Even more broadly, established principles of international environmental
law might already constitute restrictions upon debris-creating ASAT events,
independent of any new treaty. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 2, at 275-311;
David A. Koplow, ASAT-isfaction, supra note 256, at 1187; Mirmina, supra note 26.
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